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The dissertation consists of two essays on insurance markets and regulation. The first 
essay studies the timing of state-level tort reform enactments between 1971 and 2005. 
Using discrete time hazard models, we find the level of litigation activity---as measured 
by incurred liability insurance losses, the number of lawyers, and tort cases commenced--
-to be the most important and robust determinant of tort reform adoption. Political-
institutional factors and regional effects---such as Republican control of the state 
government, single party control of the legislature and governorship, and a (relatively) 
conservative political ideology among a state’s Democrats---are also associated with 
quicker reform adoption. 
In the second essay, we identify the effect of public guarantees on market discipline by 
exploiting the rich variation in U.S. state guarantees of property-liability insurer 
obligations. We find government guarantees significantly reduce the sensitivity of 
premium growth to changes in financial strength ratings, and that this reduced sensitivity 
applies to both price and volume changes. The effects are concentrated among insurers 
rated A- or lower by A.M. Best, the leading financial strength rating agency in the 
insurance industry. For downgraded insurers, we find that premium growth in business 
not covered by state guarantees falls in relation to growth in its covered business, with the 
estimate of the difference being as high as 15% for A- rated insurers and 10% for insurers 
rated below A-. 
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Essay I: What Drives Tort Reform Legislation? 
An Analysis of State Decisions to Restrict Liability Torts  
 
  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper studies the timing of state-level tort reform enactments between 1971 and 
2005. Using discrete time hazard models, we find the level of litigation activity---as measured by 
incurred liability insurance losses, the number of lawyers, and tort cases commenced---to be the 
most important and robust determinant of tort reform adoption. Political-institutional factors and 
regional effects---such as Republican control of the state government, single party control of the 
legislature and governorship, and a (relatively) conservative political ideology among a state’s 
Democrats---are also associated with quicker reform adoption.  
 
Key words: Tort reform, insurance, liability crisis 
JEL Codes: K1, K23, G22 
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I. Introduction 
 Over the past several decades, the United States has experienced several waves of tort 
reform.  The first wave came in the mid-1970’s, when a number of states enacted reforms such 
as caps on non-economic damages, changes to collateral source rules, and limitations on the 
application of joint and several liability. This was followed by a larger wave in the mid-1980’s 
and another wave in the early 2000’s.   Figures A1 through A7 in Appendix A display the timing 
of enactment of tort reforms in the various states. 
Much research has been devoted to estimating the impact of tort reforms, with many 
studies finding that tort reforms have large negative effects on various measures of litigation 
activity. However, relatively little attention1 has been paid to the question of why states enact tort 
reforms, and, as can be seen in the figures, the propensity to reform apparently varies 
significantly across the states. For example, as can be seen in Table 1, Florida has been 
extremely aggressive in instituting reforms, while, nearby, South Carolina has stood pat; 
similarly, one moves from an aggressive to a passive reform environment when one crosses the 
border from Idaho to Wyoming. Why did some states enact tort reforms while others stood pat? 
This paper maps out the diffusion of tort reforms across states over time and studies the social, 
economic and political factors associated with reform decisions. Specifically, we focus on 
adoptions of four of the most common and prominent liability tort reforms---caps on punitive 
damages, limitations on joint and several liability laws, caps on noneconomic damages, and 
changes to collateral source rules---during the 1971-2005 period.  
 Several theories may help explain the political process of legal change. Building on the 
segmentation offered by Kroszner and Strahan (1999), private-interest or economic theory 
(Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1989; Becker, 1983) describes the legislative process as one of 
competition among interest groups, where well-organized industrial and professional interests 
capture rents at the expense of more dispersed groups such as consumers.  In the case of tort 
reform, lawyers, physicians, the insurance industry, and businesses are all interest groups to be 
considered. The public interest theory (Joskow and Noll, 1981) features a benevolent legislature 
with a primary concern of social welfare. In this view, lawmakers identify failures in the current 
civil justice system and attempt to correct them.  A third group of theories emphasize the impact 
of political-institutional factors in the legislative process such as Republican versus Democratic 
                                                 
1  An important exception is Harrington (1994), who studies the adoption of automobile insurance no-fault laws in 
the early 1970’s. 
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control (Dixit, 1996; and Irwin and Kroszner, 1999), or the nature of state government ideology 
(Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; and Berry, 1998).  A fourth group emphasizes the impact of 
legislative outcomes in nearby polities, seeking to explain the diffusion of law across borders as 
being facilitated by, for example, the availability of ideas or templates for reform.2      
It is important to recognize that these theoretical approaches are by no means 
diametrically opposed, despite some attempts in the literature to cast them as such.  To take but 
one example, one could imagine interest group lobbying reinforcing a push for reform in the 
“public interest” that was inspired by legislation in neighboring states and consistent with the 
ideology of the state legislators. This paper recognizes that the factors identified by these 
theories may work in concert to influence tort reform enactments. To investigate what drives 
reform enactment, we use a discrete time proportional hazard model to explain the timing of tort 
reform adoption. We incorporate proxies for the size of various interest groups, the extent of and 
costs associated with litigation, political-institutional factors, the liability climate, state insurance 
regulation, economic conditions, and the presence of reforms in nearby states, and regional 
effects.  
Our most robust finding is that various measures of litigation activity are associated with 
quicker enactment of tort reform.  More lawyers, more tort cases in general jurisdiction courts, 
and higher liability insurance costs are all associated with faster tort reform adoption. Other 
variables are not consistently associated with tort reforms, with the exceptions of 1) Republican 
control of the state government and single party control of the legislature and governorship (both 
of which are positively associated with tort reform enactment in many specifications) and 2) 
regional effects (with states in the Northeast being significantly less likely to adopt reforms).   
Evidence on other influences is mixed. Reform adoption in neighboring states is 
associated with quicker adoption in some specifications. We also find some evidence of the 
influence of concentrated interest groups, i.e. insurance industry professionals, on quicker tort 
reform adoption in some specifications, though it should be noted that seemingly contrary effects 
are found for lawyers (more lawyers are associated with quicker adoption in most specifications) 
and physicians (more physicians are associated with slower adoption in some specifications). 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background on insurance crises 
and discusses related literature on tort reforms.  Section III describes the hypotheses, proxy 
                                                 
2 This diffusion literature is notably diffuse.  See Twining (2005) for a review. 
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variables and data sources. Section IV explains the empirical methods and results. Sections V 
and VI show robustness checks and extensions. Section VII concludes.  
 II. Tort crises and Tort reforms 
  A. Three Tort Crises in Liability 
 Since the 1970s, the United States has experienced three “liability crises.”  The crises 
were characterized by sharp rises in insurance premiums, accounting recognition of liability 
losses by insurance companies, and restrictions in coverage.  The first crisis happened in the 
mid-1970s, and several states enacted tort reforms during that period. The first liability crisis was 
especially acute in the area of medical malpractice liability, and it led several states to enact tort 
reforms targeted only at medical malpractice. The second liability crisis occurred in the mid-
1980s, and many states passed reforms around this time. Priest (1987) attributes this crisis to the 
interpretation of modern tort law. He argues that judicial findings of greater levels of liability in 
insurance contracts, combined with a decline in the interest rate, led to insurers increase prices 
and restrict coverage.  The third and most recent crisis started in the late 1990s and continued 
into the early 2000’s.   
 B. Four Tort Reforms 
 There are four prominent reforms:  caps on punitive damages, limitations on joint and 
several liability, caps on noneconomic damages, and reforms to collateral source rules.  These 
reforms have been most widely analyzed by other researchers and also directly impact the 
determination of awards.3  Table 1 shows the states that passed each of these four tort reforms by 
decade. Evidently, the largest tort reform wave took place in the 1980s. Table B1 and Figures A1 
to A7 in the Appendix illustrate the history of the four tort reform enactments by state since 1971 
in detail.  
Prior to 1971, most states did not have caps on punitive damages and limitations on joint 
and several liability, and no states had caps on noneconomic damages and collateral source 
reforms related to general liability.4 Starting in the mid-1970s, however, many states passed 
                                                 
3 Two additional reforms that are popular in the literature are contingency fee reform and periodic payments reform.  
We include neither in our analysis since only five states (AR, IL, ME, NH, and WY) enact contingency fee reform 
on general liability and only three states enact periodic payments reform on general liability (OH, RI, and SD) 
during the sample period. The results do not change materially if we include these reforms along with the other four 
reforms when analyzing the propensity of states to pass any type of tort reform. 
4 “Tort reform on general liability” means that the application of the tort reform was not restricted to medical 
malpractice. Please see Table 1 for states that enacted tort reform on general liability before 1971. 
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various reforms to the common law rules under which tort cases are tried in state courts. Most 
states enacted at least one of the four tort reforms during the 1970s and 1980s. The first wave of 
tort reform during the 1970s mainly targeted lawsuits related to health care, while the second 
wave of tort reform enactments during the 1980s was more general (Sloan et al., 1989).   
 Caps on Punitive Damages Reform   Punitive damages are awarded to punish tortfeasors 
for malicious and reckless behavior and to deter future misconduct (American Tort Reform 
Association, 2012). Punitive damages awards are infrequent but the awards can be enormous and 
are often sought in civil lawsuits. Views differ on the predictability and opacity of the awards 
(see, e.g., the discussion in Viscusi, 2004 and Eisenberg et al., 2010). Caps on punitive damages 
typically limit the amount of award either to a specific dollar amount (e.g. $250,000 in Alabama) 
or to a multiple of compensatory damages. Some even prohibit punitive damages entirely.  
 Joint and Several Liability Reform   Joint and several liability permits the plaintiff to 
recover damages from multiple defendants or from each defendant individually. If one defendant 
does not have enough resources to pay the tort award, the plaintiff can seek restitution from other 
defendants. Reform of joint and several liability modifies the joint responsibility that two or 
more defendants carry, typically by limiting a defendants’ financial responsibility for harm to a 
percent of total damages according to fault. The most common form of the reform is a limit to 
the application of joint and several liability in awarding noneconomic damages (Lee et al., 1993). 
 Caps on Noneconomic Damages Reform   Damages for noneconomic losses are for pain 
and suffering and are inherently difficult to measure (Sunstein, 2007). The discretion of juries 
may result in substantial variation in awards. Caps on noneconomic loss place typically provide 
numerical guidelines for the award or provide specific dollar ceilings on awards for 
noneconomic damages.  
 Collateral Source Rule Reform  The collateral source rule forbids the use of evidence at 
trial that the plaintiff is being compensated from alternative sources such as insurance contracts 
(American Tort Reform Association, 2012). Collateral source rule reform typically requires that 
court awards be adjusted for compensation from other sources. Thus, total damages awarded at 
trial are offset by the amount paid to the plaintiff through other sources such as health insurance, 
auto insurance and workers compensation insurance. 
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 C. Recent Studies of Tort Reform  
 The literature on tort reforms is vast and goes back at least 30 years. Previous studies 
have generally focused on three issues: whether tort limitations have affected the frequency and 
severity of claims (e.g. Browne and Puelz, 1999); whether tort reforms have affected insurance 
market quantities, such as premiums, losses, or loss ratios (Born et al., 2006); and whether tort 
reforms have had a direct influence on health market outcomes, including physician supply, the 
practice of defensive medicine, hospital expenditures and health insurance market indicators 
(Avraham et al., 2010).   
Analyses of the first issue have provided strong evidence that limitations on tort liability 
reduce the frequency of claims and the size of claims (Browne and Puelz, 1999; Browne and 
Schmit, 2006; and Paik et al., 2013). Analyses of the effect of tort reforms on insurance market 
typically indicate that tort reforms reduce insurance losses (Born and Viscusi, 1998, 1994 and 
Born et al., 2009), while studies on insurance premiums provide mixed results (Zuckerman et al., 
1991; Lee et al., 1994; and Born and Viscusi, 1994).  When examining the 1980s tort reforms, 
some researchers have found significant negative effects on general liability insurance costs but 
mixed evidence on medical malpractice insurance costs (e.g. Viscusi et al., 1993).  Analyses of 
the last issue provide evidence that medical malpractice tort reforms have had modest effects on 
defensive medicine and physician supply (Kessler et al., 1996, 2005 and Matsa, 2005), and that 
reforms lower the cost of health insurance to a certain extent (Avraham et al., 2010; Avraham 
and Schanzenbach, 2011; and Karl et al., 2013).5  
   With respect to the data structure in tort reform studies, there have been a number of 
papers examining the effect of liability reforms using either state level data (Viscusi, 1990; 
Blackmon and Zeckhauser, 1991; Viscusi, et al., 1993) or firm level data from the NAIC 
database (Born and Viscusi, 1994 and 1998; Viscusi and Born, 1995 and 2005). Since liability 
insurance claims may develop over long periods, Born et al., (2009) examine the long-run effects 
of tort reforms using the developed losses of insurers. Grace and Leverty (2012) show that 
restricting attention to ‘permanent’ tort reform (tort reform upheld constitutionally within the 
observation period) can enhance the results on insurance market performance.  
 Although the content of reforms varies greatly across states (for example, the stringency 
of a cap is determined by the level and type of the cap), almost all of these papers quantify tort 
                                                 
5 For example, Avraham et al., (2010) find that the enactments of various tort reforms decrease group self-insured 
health insurance premiums by 1 to 2 percent. 
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reform by using binary variables equal to one for all the years in which reforms are effective and 
zero otherwise (with the exception of Hyman et al., 2009, which studies the impact of various 
caps). In this paper, we adopt this traditional method of using a dichotomous variable to indicate 
tort reform enactments. 
    III. Hypotheses and Variable Definitions 
 Our empirical analysis considers the timing of four major tort reforms on general torts 
from 1971 to 2005: caps on punitive damages, limitations on joint and several liability, caps on 
noneconomic damages, and collateral source rule reforms. The effective year of tort reforms are 
obtained by state for the years 1971-2005 from Database of State Tort Law Reforms (Avraham 
2011 (4th edition)) and complemented by American Tort Reform Association (www.atra.org). 
Among those reforms, caps on punitive damages and limitations on joint and several liability 
usually apply to all torts rather than just medical malpractice, as shown in Figure A1 and Figure 
A2, whereas caps on noneconomic damages and collateral source rule reforms are often targeted 
exclusively at medical malpractice torts, as shown in Figures A3 to A6.  
In the remainder of this section we describe the variables and how they connect to 
hypotheses suggested by theory concerning the influence of lobbying, public interest, political-
institutional factors, state insurance regulation, and regional effects. All the variables and 
corresponding sources discussed below are described in detail in Table 2.  Table 3 reports mean 
and standard deviations for the explanatory variables used in the analysis and the average waiting 
time for tort reform adoption. In total, there are 1750 observations (50 states with 35 years) in the 
whole sample. 
Interest Groups 
 Lawyers, doctors and insurance companies are all concentrated stakeholders with 
interests in tort reform. Doctors and insurance companies are typically cast in favor of tort 
reform, and lawyers are typically cast in opposition. 1 Lawyers and injured parties, on the other 
hand, stand to gain from opposing tort reform. Private interest theory predicts that the legislative 
outcome will thus be influenced by the relative power of these groups.   
                                                 
1 These characterizations are obviously generalizations based on broad characterizations of self-interest, as well as 
the presumption that tort reform will restrict or reduce the effectiveness of litigation. The nature of economic self-
interest is evident in the case of doctors, as tort reform typically will involve some reduction in their liability 
exposures. The logic is less clear in the case of insurers; while they pay claims and legal defense costs emanating 
from tort lawsuits, their future premium revenue volume is connected to the ongoing threat of lawsuits. Lawyers’ 
business volume obviously depends on lawsuits. 
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We use the number of professionals in each of these groups as an indicator of the power 
of each group in each state.  Specifically, we use per capita employment in the insurance sector 
(Employment in insurer) as a proxy for the power of the insurance industry, and the number of 
lawyers in the state as a proxy for the power of the legal professionals. Lawyers per capita 
(Lawyer) are obtained from the Lawyer Statistical Report and from the American Bar 
Association’s annual report.7 Physicians per capita (Physician) is taken from the U.S. Statistical 
Abstract for each state and year. The data is not available for each year, so we interpolate values 
for the years in which the data are not reported using a method from previous studies (Schmit 
and Browne, 2008; and Leverty and Grace, 2012).8   
Litigation Activity 
In practice, litigation costs are often fingered as a prime motivation for reform adoption.  
In theory, litigation activity could either accelerate or delay the reform process. Litigation 
produces benefits for plaintiffs and lawyers and costs for defendants. The welfare impact of 
restricting litigation requires balancing those costs and benefits, along with the indirect benefits 
and costs associated with the tort environment’s impact on business activity and other behaviors. 
The prediction of public interest theory thus depends on the outcome of the welfare calculation 
and could go in either direction.  Private interest theory offers a similar level of nuance: More 
litigation activity means more benefits and more costs, raising the stakes for interest groups on 
both sides.  Thus, the direction of influence of high litigation activity is theoretically ambiguous, 
although its prominence in policy debates suggests that it plays an important role and is usually 
cast as a motivation for reform action.  
Two variables are used to proxy the litigation activity at the state level: Liability 
insurance losses and tort cases commenced at the state level. The measure of Liability insurance 
loss is the ratio of directed loss incurred in the state to gross state product. The source for the 
information is loss data aggregated by state and year over the period 1971-2005 provided by 
A.M. Best. The analyses include aggregate loss incurred in medical malpractice, auto liability, 
other liability (including product liability before 1992), product liability, and commercial 
                                                 
7 Though both would seem to benefit from litigation, it is possible that plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense lawyers might 
have different attitudes toward tort reforms. Our data, however, does not permit us to explore this distinction.  
8 We have 21 years of reported data (1971, 1980, 1985, and 1988-2005). Similar to previous studies, we provide 
fitted values for the missing years, based on an OLS regression using the 21 data points with the specification: 
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multiple liability.9 Well-known caveats to the situation that liability losses reported by insurers in 
a given year are subsequently revised years later exists, but we use loss incurred in the current 
year to evaluate insurers’ liability loss for three reasons. First, we want to capture the severe of 
liability crisis from   the insurance companies’ point of view in that year, although insurance 
companies may misreport the loss reserve. Second, the motivations and directions for insurance 
companies to misestimate the loss reserve are unclear. For example, a firm’s failure to take 
account of all the available information could results in misestimating loss reserve but the 
directions of loss reserve errors are uncertain. A firm could also deliberately underestimate the 
loss reserve to avoid regulator actions or it could overestimate the loss reserve because of future 
claims’ uncertainty. Third, the revised loss incurred data is not available by states. We use tort 
filings in general jurisdiction courts per capita (Tort cases in state court) as an alternative 
measure to proxy litigation activity at the state level. State court data are available for states from 
1975 to 2005 from the National Center for State Courts.10   
We use the number of tort cases commenced per capita in the U.S. federal courts 
nationwide (Tort cases in federal court) to proxy litigation activity at the national level.  
Jurisdictional rules only allow cases that involve questions of state law, but are 1) between 
citizens of different states or U.S. and foreign citizens and 2) involve more than $75,000 in 
losses, to be filed in federal court.  The vast majority of tort cases are filed in state courts, not 
federal courts. We do not include the federal cases in the same analyses with insurance liability 
loss or state tort cases because the time series is highly correlated with the state-level measures 
of litigation activity. 
It should also be noted that the number of lawyers (as captured in Lawyer), in addition to 
being measure of the power of the legal professionals, could also proxy for state-level litigation 
activity to the extent that such activity is not fully captured by the tort case or insurance loss 
variables. 
Political-Institutional Arrangements 
 Tort reforms are often associated with Republicans as opposed to Democrats, suggesting 
that states controlled by Republicans may favor tort reform (e.g. Rubin and Shepherd, 2007; 
Finley, 2004). Moreover, one party controlling the legislature and the governorship could also be 
                                                 
9 We also include four groups of liability insurance (i.e. other liability insurance loss, medical malpractice insurance 
loss, auto liability insurance loss and commercial multiple loss) separately into our regressions. We get similar 
results in unreported tables. 
10 Data is not available for SD, NE, VT, IA, IL, LA, KY, MT, OK, SC, VA, and PA. 
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an advantage for getting legislation of any kind passed (see, for example, Kroszner and Strahan, 
1999). The political climate and economic environment could also be correlated within regional 
areas in the United States. For example, the labels “Conservative” and “Liberal” may suggest 
different ideologies in different regions of the country.  
 We use two political variables from the U.S. Statistical Abstract.  We measure the 
influence of Republicans in the legislature by the average ratio of the fraction of the Republicans 
in the lower house and the upper house (Ratio of Republican). Second, we create a dummy 
variable which equals one if the same party controls the governor’s office and has majorities in 
both houses.  Finally, we use three measures of ideology in the state developed by Berry et al. 
(1998): Republican ideology, Democratic ideology, and Governor ideology. These variables 
capture the political ideology of the legislators and governor in the state, using the ideologies of 
the respective Congressional delegations as a proxy. The indices have high values if the state’s 
representatives in Congress are liberal and low values if the state’s representatives in Congress 
are conservative (Berry et al., 2011). 
Insurance Regulation Environment 
 Auto liability insurance premiums account for a significant proportion of liability 
insurance premiums. No-fault systems provide first party coverage for personal injury protection 
(medical cost, loss of income, etc.) while limiting the tort liability of negligent drivers. No-fault 
laws can reduce auto insurance costs if there are strong limitations on the right to sue 
(Harrington, 1994). In this sense, no-fault legislation could reduce cost pressures associated with 
tort environments that are in other respects permissive.  However, the presence of a no-fault 
system could also create spillover effects to displace tort activity into other liability markets, or 
could be reflective of a societal willingness to experiment with tort reform generally. Thus, the 
predicted association between the presence of no-fault systems and the propensity to enact other 
tort reforms is not clear.  
Rate regulation is also an important aspect of the insurance environment.  More stringent 
regulation may lead to more severe insurance market availability problems in the wake of a 
shock---accelerating the legislative process in tort reform. 
To measure the effect of state insurance laws, we create five variables. First, we use a 
dichotomous variable which equals one if punitive damages are insurable (Punitive damage 
insurable).  Second, we construct an indicator variable that is one if the state has any form of 
 11 
 
“prior approval” rate regulation (Rate regulation). “Prior approval” rate regulation is the 
toughest type of rate regulation, reflecting circumstances in which rates cannot be used until 
approved by the insurance commissioner. Last, we include three variables relating to no-fault 
automobile insurance laws. No-fault systems with value thresholds make the right to sue 
conditional on compensatory damages exceeding a designated dollar amount. No-fault systems 
with a small dollar threshold may thus be ineffective in limiting lawsuits. The benchmark 
variable No-fault other equals one for a tort law state or for a no-fault state with a low value 
threshold (less than $1000).  Another variable, No-fault high value, equals one if a state has a 
dollar threshold greater than $1,000 and zero otherwise.  States with verbal thresholds have the 
strictest no-fault system which allows the right to sue only in the cases where victims have 
severe damages such as death, disfigurement, or permanent loss of body function. The variable 
No-fault verbal equals one if the state has a verbal threshold and zero otherwise. 
Spatial Diffusion 
 When states pass laws, it may influence the likelihood that neighboring states will also 
pass such legislation. Such a relation is called a spatial diffusion effect or state spillover effect.  
Diffusion researchers suggest that policymakers often look to the policies adopted by nearby 
states to help them draft and make decisions about certain policies (Soule and Earl, 2001).  A 
state’s tort reform enactment may affect the timing of its neighbors’ tort reform enactments for 
several reasons. First, states may be concerned about businesses (e.g. entrepreneurs or 
physicians) moving out: if a state’s liability costs are higher than those of their neighbors, 
businesses may be driven away.  Under this logic, a state is most influenced by the actions of 
those states to which its businesses may move. This suggests that a tort reform in one state could 
produce competitive pressures for corresponding tort reforms in neighboring states.  
 Voters may also judge politicians’ performance relative to that of politicians in nearby 
states, especially those nearby states with similar ideology. An example of this is given by 
Besley and Case (1995), who provide evidence of “yardstick competition.” This could imply that 
states are most influenced by the actions of those states that their voters judge to be the most 
similar (Baicker, 2001).  All of this suggests that tort reforms in one state may have positive 
spillover effects on neighboring states, and that the most influential neighbors may be ones with 
similar ideological profiles. However, a few researchers have documented significant negative 
spillover effects for geographic proximity as well---states are less likely to pass some 
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controversial laws when they are in close spatial proximity to other states that enact such laws 
(e.g. Soule and Earl 2001, McMahon-Howard et al., 2008).  The direction of influence is thus an 
empirical question. 
We create a continuous variable, State spillover, to capture the influence of tort reforms 
in nearby states. The variable captures the proportion of neighboring states that had adopted tort 
reforms by the end of the previous year.  Neighboring states are defined as states sharing a 
border with the state in question.11  We use an alternative proxy, Ideological state spillover, to 
measure the proportion of neighboring states with similar ideology enacting tort reforms before 
the state in question enacts tort reforms.12  
Economic Variables 
Overall economic conditions, as well as the conditions in industries susceptible to 
litigation, may create pressures for or against reform. We use gross state product per capita (GSP 
per capita) as a general economic indicator connected with urbanization and business activity.   
The GSP data are from Bureau of Economic Analysis for each state for each year. We use a 
credit spread variable (Credit spread) to proxy the investment environment each year, measured 
as the difference between the Moody’s seasoned BAA corporate bond yield and the AAA 
corporate bond yield. We obtain the corporate bond yield data from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis’ Federal Reserve Economic Database. 
 Another potential proxy of interest is health care expenditure as a percentage of 
household income (Health care expenditure). If tort reforms are perceived as a means of 
reducing health care costs, public interest theory would predict a positive relationship between 
this proxy and tort reforms, especially in the area of medical malpractice.  Similar logic could be 
used to hypothesize a negative coefficient on Physician, as tort reform on medical malpractice 
could be a potential means of encouraging more physicians to practice in the state. 
Finally, we create four regional indicator variables representing the North, South, 
Midwest, and West.   
 
 IV. Methods and Empirical Results 
                                                 
11 For example, Florida shares borders with Georgia and Alabama. Georgia and Alabama enacted joint and several 
liability in 1988 and after 2005, respectively. Thus State Spillover for joint and several liability in Florida is 0 before 
1988 and one half from 1988 to 2005. 
12 We describe the construction of this variable in detail in Section V. 
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 In this section, we first use the non-parametric survival model to determine the shape of 
the baseline hazard function. Next, we investigate how the economic and political variables 
described above are associated with the timing of tort reform enactments using discrete time 
survival models with a Weibull baseline hazard.  We start by treating reforms as “competing risk 
events,” so that the duration time ends if any of the four tort reforms is enacted.  Then we study 
each of the four reforms independently.  
 A. Hazard Analysis with Nonparametric Estimates 
 To model the duration of the ‘waiting period’ before reform, we need to impose structure 
on the hazard function. The Kaplan-Meier product-limit estimator13 offers a nonparametric 
estimate of the hazard function over time (Greene 2006). Figure 1 graphs survival estimates for 
the data and shows that each hazard function is relatively flat in the 1970’s before dropping 
steeply in the mid-1980s and then becoming flat again. The graph also implies that joint and 
several liability limits have the shortest waiting time durations, followed by caps on punitive 
damages, collateral source rule reforms and caps on noneconomic damages. Figure 1 displays the 
survival rate for states based on the enactment of any of the four tort reforms; 87% of states enact 
one or more of those tort reforms during the sample period. It shows survival rates for each of 
the tort reforms during the sample period: about 40% of states enacted caps on punitive damages, 
79% enacted limitations on joint and several liability, 35% enacted collateral source rule 
reforms, and 24% of states enacted caps on noneconomic damages. Table B2 presents the results 
of the state ‘waiting period spells’ by Kaplan-Meier product limit estimates in detail. Consistent 
with Figure A1 to Figure A7, the null hypotheses of equalities of survival functions across the 
four tort reforms are rejected by log-rank tests. Survival rates when considering caps on 
noneconomic damages and collateral source rule reforms are significantly higher than when 
considering caps on punitive damages and joint and several liability, since fewer states enact the 
former two tort reforms.  Figure 1 also shows that the survival rates when considering the 
enactment of any type of reform drops dramatically during the years of 1985 to 1988. However, 
the non-parametric method is limited because it cannot provide the impact of independent 
variables on the likelihood of events.  
 
                                                 
13 The Kaplan-Meier product limit formula to estimate the survivorship function for the  year is 
  , where  is the number of states enacting tort reforms during  
year and  is the number of states entering the  year. 
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 B.  Discrete Time Proportional Hazard Model    
 Tort reform enactments and most of the independent variables are only observed once a 
year.14 This implies that the observed durations of tort reform should be grouped into yearly 
intervals.  Moreover, since many of the tort reforms occurred in the mid-1970s or the mid-1980s 
as Table 1 shows, there exists the substantial problem of tied duration times. The Cox model (or 
any fully parameterized continuous time model) is inappropriate in this case (Cox and Oakes, 
1984), because the Cox model is based on the assumption that duration times can be any real 
number (rather than certain discrete values corresponding to the number of years), and recorded 
duration times need to be ordered chronologically. The high number of ties and the discrete time 
property lead to estimation bias in regression coeﬃcients and in the corresponding covariance 
matrix.  
 That the duration variable of interest (time taken to enact the tort reform) is measured 
yearly means that the feasible approach to modeling the duration is the discrete-time proportional 
hazard model (also called the discrete-time historical event model). The four tort reforms can be 
considered as “competing events” in the sense that the state can change its common law civil 
justice system by enacting different tort reforms. We consider the period from the beginning of 
the sample (1971) until any tort reform occurs as the duration of interest in the analysis. The 
states that enacted tort reforms before 1971 are excluded from the analysis as left censored data, 
but the states that had not enacted tort reform by 2005 remain in the sample as right censored 
data. The data structure of discrete-time duration models is time-series cross-section, which is 
organized with as many observations for each state in the sample as there are time periods over 
which the state is at risk of experiencing the event of interest (Jenkins, 1995)---the enactment of 
a tort reform. The core variable is discrete elapsed time and event occurrence is a series of binary 
outcomes denoting whether or not the event occurred at the observation point.   
 A survival model that can accommodate this structure is a discrete time proportional 
hazard model with Weibull baseline hazard.  Consider an instantaneous force of mortality given 
by: 
     or            (1) 
where  is the hazard rate function and  is the baseline hazard function and   is a 
vector of covariates.  In this setting, the discrete time hazard rate (see, e.g., Allison (1982)) of 
                                                 
14 We recognize that some states are repeat-adopters of tort reforms, and we deal with the problem in robustness 
section.  
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enacting tort reform for state i in year  with a vector of time-varying covariates, , having 
spent  years in the same common law civil justice system, can be given by: 
             (2) 
where  represents the baseline hazard function of time which can be estimated either 
parametrically or nonparametrically. The above function can also be written in complementary 
log-log transformation: 
               (3) 
To specify the baseline hazard function , we consider the discrete-time specification similar 
to the Weibull model with a shape characterized by p:  =  where  in the discrete 
time case approximately corresponds to  in the continuous time Weibull model.  If  is 
greater than zero, the hazard increases monotonically, and if it is less than zero the hazard 
decreases monotonically.15   
The coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of covariates on the hazard rate of 
enacting tort reform. Positive coefficients indicate an increase in the hazard rate and thus a 
reduction in the duration of the ‘waiting’ period. The exp(  represent the hazard ratio of tort 
reform enactments for a one-unit change in the covariates because we use the proportional 
hazard model. The economic importance of coefficients on covariates can be evaluated by taking 
the exponential transform of the coefficients multiplying by the standard deviation of the 
explanatory variables. 
 We first investigate how economic and political variables influence the timing of general 
liability tort reform enactments by considering the four reforms together.  In other words, an 
“enactment” happens, and a state “dies,” whenever it enacts any of the four reforms. Our first 
analysis considers the association between tort reform adoption and a set of “core” explanatory 
variables, which will subsequently be expanded to include additional covariates.  
 Table 4 shows the correlation of the core political economy factors.  Highly correlated 
explanatory variables pose a common problem in empirical studies, especially when the sample 
size is limited.  Multicollinearity may cause regression results to be unstable and inflate standard 
                                                 
15 We use a complementary log-logistic hazard function rather than a logistic function since the process of enacting 
tort reform is intrinsically continuous but only the observations are in discrete time. Steele (2009) argues that the 
choice of binary model often has little impact on the results. To check the correctness of the proportional hazard 
specification, we have also estimated a discrete time logistic model and the results are very similar to 
complementary log-log. 
 16 
 
errors.  As shown in Table 4, variables representing private interest groups are correlated with 
Liability insurance loss to varying degrees, some significantly so.  We address this by using 
alternative measures of litigation activity (see Table 6) and also by adding explanatory variables 
to regressions sequentially (see, for example, Table 5) to investigate the stability of the empirical 
estimates. 
Table 5 shows the estimated effects of core time varying covariates on the hazard rate for 
the discrete time model with Weibull baseline hazard. We have 825 observations in Table 5 and 
use stepwise methods to select variables. Model 1 tests litigation activity costs by including only 
two variables: Liability insurance loss; Model 2 adds variables proxy for interest groups; Model 
3 adds political-institutional variables, and Model 4 further adds variables representing regions.16  
Overall, we document significant positive coefficients for Liability insurance loss, Ratio 
of Republicans, Same party and Lawyer, and negative positive coefficient of Physician.  
Pressures in the form of higher litigation costs and a relative shortage of physicians seem to be 
associated with quicker adoptions. An abundance of lawyers is also associated with quicker 
reform, consistent with the litigation activity hypothesis to the extent that greater numbers of 
lawyers are indicative of high litigation cost environments.  Private interest theory is consistent 
with the results to the extent that the general business size---which is presumably concerned with 
litigation and health care costs---is interpreted as the predominant private interest. On the other 
hand, the evidence concerning specific interest groups is weak and even contrary:  Greater 
numbers of lawyers, who presumably would oppose reform, are associated with faster adoptions; 
Greater numbers of physicians, who presumably support reform, are associated with slower 
adoptions.  Political-institutional variables reflecting Republicans and same party control of the 
government also are significant, with the expected signs. 
Table 6 Model 1 shows the estimated effects of all time varying covariates on the hazard 
rate for the discrete time model with Weibull baseline hazard. We have 825 observations in 
Model 1, which extends models in Table 5 by including all variables. Starting with the economic 
variables, higher Liability insurance loss is found to be associated with a higher hazard rate of 
tort reform enactment: a one-standard-deviation increase in the Liability insurance loss leads to a 
159.0% increase in the hazard of tort reform enactment. With regard to the political-institutional 
variables, the structure of the state government---the ratio of Republicans in the legislature, 
                                                 
16 We also run the regression with variables of private interests only and the results are robust. 
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single party control of the government, and the nature of Democratic ideology, all have 
significant impacts on the timing of tort reform. Notably, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
the Ratio of Republicans leads to an 86.0% increase in the hazard rate. The negative coefficient 
on Democratic ideology indicates that a more liberal character in the state’s Democrats delays 
tort reform, with a one-standard-deviation increase in the Democratic ideology decreasing the 
hazard rate by 45.4%.  In addition, Lawyer has a positive effect on the hazard rate of reform 
enactment but Physician has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on the hazard rate of 
tort reform. A one-standard-deviation increase in lawyers per capita results in a 3.7 times higher 
hazard of enacting any kind of tort reform. The regional dummies indicate that states in 
Northeast are associated with delayed timing of tort reform.  
Model 2 replaces Liability insurance loss with tort case filings in state courts and has 521 
observations since it uses only data after 1974, and data from SD,NE,VT, IA, IL, LA, KY, MT, 
OK, SC,VA, PA are now omitted due to the lack of information on tort case filings. The 
coefficient on tort cases in state general jurisdiction courts in Model 2 indicates a one-standard-
deviation rise in tort cases in state court increases the hazard by 82.5%. Model 3 uses tort cases 
filings in federal courts and the coefficient is significantly positive. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in tort cases in federal courts increases the hazard by 107.1%. The coefficients on State 
spillover and Health care expenditure are not statistically significant in any of the three models.  
 We then perform the analysis for each of the four reforms individually. The final four 
columns of Table 6 show the results for the timing of the enactments of each of the four tort 
reforms using the same method. We use Liability insurance loss to proxy the state liability 
environment in all individual tort reform models.  
Starting with caps on punitive damages (GL_CP) and limits on joint and several liability 
(GL_JS), there are 1346 observations in the regression for caps on punitive damages and 982 
observations in the regression for limitations on joint and several liability. The positive and 
statistically significant coefficients on the Liability insurance loss in both models indicate the 
association between higher insurance losses and enactments of both tort reforms, and these 
effects are economically important. The coefficient is 0.463 in the punitive damage cap 
regression, which means a one-standard-deviation increase in liability insurance loss per GSP 
results in a 2.7 times higher hazard of enacting caps on punitive damages. Similarly, the GL_JS 
column estimates indicate that hazard of joint and several liability reform enactment is higher by 
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136.0% with a one-standard-deviation rise in insurance loss. Lawyer has a positive effect on the 
hazard rates in both models: For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in lawyer is 
associated with a 2.2 times increase in the hazard of caps on punitive damages reform 
enactments.  
 The structure of the state government influences the timing of joint and several liability 
reform as well. Consistent with the political-institutional theory, split control of the branches of 
government tends to delay limitations on joint and several liability. The negative and statistically 
significant coefficient of Physician indicates that fewer physicians accelerate the timing of joint 
and several liability reform. States with fewer physicians are found to have a higher hazard of 
enacting tort reform compared with their counterparts: the effect of a one-standard-deviation 
decrease in Physician is to increase the hazard by 85.6%.  Regional effects also appear to be 
present. The results suggest that states in the Northeast regional variables in both regressions are 
large in magnitude and have negative signs, which imply the two types of tort reforms occur later 
in the Northeast.  
 Turning to caps on noneconomic damages (GL_CN) and changes to collateral source 
rules (GL_CS), there are 1543 observations in the regression for the GL_CN model and 1368 
observations in the regression for the GL_CS model.  Both tort reforms occur earlier in states 
with larger Liability insurance loss.  A one-standard-deviation increase in the liability insurance 
loss per GSP leads to an increase of 2.3 times in the hazard rate for caps on noneconomic 
damages.  A one-standard-deviation increase in Liability insurance loss results in 5.2 times more 
in the hazard of changes to collateral source rules. The coefficients on Democratic ideology are 
negative and statistically significant in the case of collateral source rule reforms. The coefficient 
of Employment in insurer is significantly positive for the GL_CS model, a possible indication 
that insurers’ lobbying power accelerates the enactment of changes to collateral source rules.  A 
one-standard-deviation increase in the Employment in insurer leads to a 119.8% increase in the 
hazard of changes to collateral source rules. This finding, however, does not appear in the other 
models of Table 6. 
 To summarize the results from the discrete time proportional hazard model in Table 6, 
litigation activity is strongly associated with reform adoptions. The most consistent positive and 
significant results are those connecting insurance losses and tort cases with reform adoptions. 
The two variables could also be connected to the insurance industry and general business interest 
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groups in the context of private interest theory. The number of lawyers exhibits a positive 
association with tort reform enactments, which is consistent with the hypothesis of high litigation 
cost environment. That said, effects of the size of legal professionals and medical professionals 
are not found in the evidence. On the contrary, the number of lawyers exhibits a positive and 
significant association with enactments and the number of physicians exhibits a negative 
association with enactments.  This finding could be interpreted as supportive of the public 
interest theory, or as indicators of higher liability/medical costs that could mobilize businesses to 
lobby for reform as predicted by the economic interest group theory. Political and institutional 
factors also help to explain the timing of tort reforms to some extent, as Republican influence, 
one-party governments and conservative Democratic ideology are associated with quicker action 
in all specifications. We do not find a linkage between the timing of tort reforms and spatial 
diffusion effects in Table 6.  
 
 V. Robustness Checks  
 In this section, we test robustness of the results in a variety of ways.  We consider a 
nonparametric baseline hazard, various analyses aimed at omitted variables problems, permanent 
versus transitory tort reforms, different estimation techniques, and alternative explanatory 
variables.  
Nonparametric Baseline Hazard 
To check the robustness of the Weibull baseline hazard, we use a discrete time 
proportional hazard model with a nonparametric baseline hazard. To eliminate assumptions 
about the functional form of the baseline hazard rate, we add duration dummy variables for time 
intervals to the same covariates that are used in the parametric model. This method requires 
events to occur in each time period since the hazard rate cannot be estimated for a period with no 
events. Since our data has a large number of ties with no events in some years, we split the spell 
times into decades with four dummies representing the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s to ensure 
that there are events occurring in each time interval. The model can then calculate the hazard 
ratio for each decade interval. The results are shown in Table 7 in the first column (Robustness 
Check with Decade Dummies). The signs of the significant coefficients are largely consistent 
with the results from the previous analysis. The coefficient on the 1980s dummy is significantly 
positive, indicating that more tort reforms are passed during the 1980s than other periods. 
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Omitted Variables    
 Many states have enacted a variety of medical malpractice tort reforms to reduce award 
and settlement amounts. One problem with other kinds of state tort reform concerns potential 
spillover effects. Specifically, medical malpractice tort reforms could either act on, or reflect 
changes in, the legislative atmosphere and liability climate in the states. To elaborate, enacting 
medical malpractice tort reform may partially relieve a tort liability crisis in a state, leading to a 
delayed enactment of tort reforms related to general liability. On the other hand, medical 
malpractice tort reform may provide a template for tort reform, or reflect changing attitudes in 
the state, and thereby be associated with a higher chance of passing general liability tort reform. 
Thus, these medical malpractice tort reforms may proxy for omitted variables that affect the 
timing of liability tort reform thereafter. 
 To proceed, we add four indicator variables to the same set of independent variables that 
are used in Model 1 in Table 6, which are set to one in state-years with the corresponding 
medical malpractice tort reforms from 1971 to 2005. The Robustness Check with MM in Table 7 
shows the results after incorporating these additional controls for medical malpractice tort 
reform. The coefficients on four medical malpractice tort reforms are mixed and not significant, 
while the signs of the other independent variables are the same and the magnitudes are virtually 
unchanged.   
 Permanent Tort Reform 
 Tort reform is subject to judicial challenge and is sometimes ruled unconstitutional. Tort 
reforms that are ultimately declared unconstitutional (temporary) and those that are unchallenged 
or upheld (permanent) may be fundamentally different. For example, Grace and Leverty (2012) 
document that 27% of medical liability tort reforms are unconstitutional and provide evidence 
that interested groups (e.g. insurers and customers) rationally expect tort reforms to be 
permanent or temporary. In our study, 18% of (19 out of 106) general liability tort reforms were 
declared unconstitutional. To address this, we redo the analysis by focusing on the enactment of 
permanent tort reforms only (a reform is considered “permanent” if it was not declared 
unconstitutional before 2011). 
 Our results in the Permanent Reform-GL column of Table 7 are largely unaffected by the 
switch to permanent tort reforms. We have 868 observations in the regression, which is slightly 
more than the earlier specification since states that enact non-permanent reforms remain in the 
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sample until they enact a permanent reform. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients are 
largely the same as in Model 1 of Table 6. 
 Different Estimation Techniques 
 Another issue that arises when investigating the timing of individual tort reform 
enactment (while ignoring the other tort reforms) is that some states may pass tort reforms 
gradually while others pass reforms as a “package.” Thus, considering only the first instance of 
any of the four tort reforms wastes potentially relevant information.  Analysis of individual tort 
reforms, on the other hand, fails to account for the lack of independence of the failure times. We 
address these issues by stacking the individual tort reform data and applying the “frailty” model 
(Jenkins, 1995 and 1997) and the “marginal risk set” model (Wei, Lin and Weissfeld, 1989; 
Spiekerman and Lin, 1996; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002). The frailty model explicitly 
models the association between the timing of tort reform enactments within a state as a random-
effect term.  Equation 2 is extended as: 
    
                     (4) 
with representing random effects which are state-specific unobservables and representing 
unobserved heterogeneity. To consider the possibility that different tort reforms have different 
baseline hazard functions, we also stratify the data by type of tort reform and use the marginal 
risk set model (also called the variance-corrected model), allowing each stratum (tort reform) to 
have its own baseline hazard function while adjusting the variance matrix of the estimators to 
account for the dependence of tort reform enactments (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002). In 
Table 7, we report the results of the frailty model in the Frailty Model—GL column and results 
of the marginal risk set model in the Marginal Risk Set Model—GL column, respectively.  
   The results are largely consistent with those already reported.  One difference to highlight 
is the State spillover coefficient, which becomes large and statistically significant. The State 
spillover results are consistent with the notion that states respond to the actions of their 
competitors with tort reforms, and that this response is sensitive to the perceived constitutional 
strength of the reform in the competing state.   
Alternative Measurements 
 We tried several alternative measurements to further test the robustness of variables. As 
mentioned in the state spillover discussion, the most influential neighbors may be ones with 
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similar ideological profiles.  To address this, we tried an alternative measurement of state 
spillovers to better capture the effects of “ideological neighbors.” We include only bordering 
states where the neighbor’s state government ideology differs from the state’s own by less than 
10 points (Berry et al. (1998, 2011) construct state government ideology on a 100 point scale 
based on the estimated ideology values of the governor and of the Republican and Democratic 
contingents in the state legislature) in the marginal risk set model with stacked tort reforms. As 
shown in Table B4 Alternative A, the coefficient of ideological state spillover has the same sign 
and is slightly larger than the coefficient on state spillover. 
We tried alternative definitions of several of the political variables.  Specifically, we tried 
specifications using three indicator variables reflecting party controls in the lower house, upper 
house and governorship separately. The coefficient estimates on these variables have same signs, 
and the results on other variables are unaffected by the changing of the political-institutional 
measures. We also tried an alternative measurement indicating the fraction of state government 
controlled by Republicans (Krozner and Strahan, 1998), e.g., one-third if Republicans control 
lower house and Democrats control upper house and governorship. As shown in Table B4 
Alternative B, the coefficient of Republican control is significantly positive, implying 
Republicans accelerate tort reform enactments. 
We tried including urbanization in the regressions, which is measured as urban 
population divided total population for each state by every decade. Previous research has 
identified a positive association between urbanization and the rate of tort filings (Danzon, 1984a; 
and Lee et al., 1994); urbanization has also been connected with earlier enactment of tort reform 
according to Danzon (1984b). However, this variable does not seem to be associated with 
accelerated adoption of tort reforms (beyond what is already captured in GSP), as shown in 
Table B4 Alternative C. 
 The tort reform enactment is on a calendar-year basis. Several states passed tort reform 
after July with some of those occurring in October and November. We tried a different definition 
of tort reform “effective” enactment: any tort reform enactment after July of year t is treated as 
effective tort reform in year t+1. Table B4 Alternative D reports results using new measurement 
of tort reform enactment and the result are very similar to previous results with respect to the 
explanatory variables of interest.  
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Since the legislative process can be slow, it is possible that contemporaneous variables 
may not capture the real effects of a liability crisis.  We explore this further by using the lagged 
values of explanatory variables instead of contemporaneous values in the analysis. Table B4 
Alternative E reports results using the lagged value of all variables except regions, and the results 
are very similar to previous results, except that Northeast becomes insignificant statistically 
though with the same sign.  
Although the discrete time survival model should be used for our data, we report the 
results from a continuous survival model (Weibull proportional hazard model) in Table B4 
Weibull Model. The advantage of using the continuous Weibull survival model is that we can 
map the change of hazard rate to the change in the expected time to pass tort reforms for a given 
change in our interested variables. The results of Weibull proportional hazard model are similar 
to those from the discrete time proportional hazard model in Table 6. A continuous survival 
model with Weibull distribution has a shape coefficient p. By taking , the new 
coefficient  represents the percentage change in the time to pass tort reform for a one-unit 
change in the explanatory variables. On average, it took a state 18.3 years from the beginning of 
the study to pass any kind of tort reform. A one-standard-deviation increase of Liability 
insurance loss results in about 1.7 years decrease in the time until enacting any four tort reforms, 
2.2 years for a one-standard-deviation increase in Ratio of Republican and 4.5 years for 
Lawyer.17 
 
VI. Extensions 
We first run a pooled time-series cross-section OLS regression with state-level dummies 
and a fractional logit model with initial values for key explanatory variables to isolate the roles 
of time-series variation and cross-section variation in explaining tort reform enactments. We 
make another attempt to detect interest group effects by studying differences in reform responses 
among the subsample of states experiencing shocks in the 1980s insurance crisis. Finally, we 
examine whether similar results are obtained when applying the model to medical malpractice 
tort reforms. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Note that the “time” impact of the explanatory variables is smaller than their impact on the hazard rates due to the 
impact of the shape coefficient, which implies positive duration dependence in this setting. 
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 Time-series Variation vs. Cross-section Variation  
 To explore the respective roles of time series and cross-sectional variation in our data, we 
estimate two probability models with the same set of regressors used in the other models. First, 
we run a pooled time-series cross-section OLS regression with state-level fixed effects for any of 
the four tort reforms. Using the same observations from hazard models, this fixed effects model 
eliminates the cross-state variation from the covariates and emphasizes the time variation. The 
Time-series Variation Test column of Table 8 reports the results, and the coefficient on Liability 
insurance loss is statistically significant, with the same sign as in the discrete time model---
indicating that this association persists even after controlling for state effects.   
Second, we use measures of variables as of 1971 (with the exception of no fault 
variables)18 and thus have one observation per state if it enters into the analysis sample. We 
invert the duration time until enacting tort reforms to get the estimate probability of tort reform 
for each state and set the dependent variable to zero if the state does not enact reform by 2005. 
This method implies that the probability is constant over time and removes the time-series 
variation in the data. We apply the fractional logit model to the restructured data since the 
dependent variable is between zero and one. The results are shown in Table 8 Cross-sectional 
Variation Test. The coefficients on Liability insurance loss, Ratio of Republican, Physician, and 
Lawyer are generally consistent with signs of previous models and statistically significant. The 
results of the fractional logit models suggest that the effects of these variables may be also driven 
by cross-section variation. 
Drivers of Tort Reform during the 1980s’ Liability Crisis 
The preceding analysis strongly suggests that liability costs are a key predictor of tort 
reform, but its importance may obscure other effects.  One possibility is that an insurance crisis 
creates ripe conditions for tort reform, but once it happens, then how the state responds---with or 
without reform--- is determined by private interest groups.  With this in mind, we look for 
interest group and institutional effects after conditioning on the occurrence of a liability cost 
shock.19 
                                                 
18 No fault variables are measured as of 1975 since only Massachusetts adopted no fault with threshold value of 
$500 in 1971. 
19 We do not perform the analysis for the first liability crisis since the first liability crisis was mainly a medical 
malpractice crisis (as shown in Table B1), and the medical liability insurance loss data by state is available only 
after 1974. This makes it hard to identify which states experienced pre-crisis shocks. We do not analyze the same 
issue in the third liability crisis in the early 2000s, because few states passed any tort reforms in the 2000s. 
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   We first measure whether a state experiences a liability insurance loss shock in 1985 
and 1986. We define a shock to be the situation where the state’s average liability insurance loss 
per GSP in 1985 and 1986 exceeds a threshold of 33% more than the state’s own average 
liability insurance loss per GSP over the period of 1977 to 1983.20  We restrict our sample to 
states that satisfied the criterion21 and then consider how states responded to the liability shocks 
by using a binary variable which equals one if states enact tort reform and 0 otherwise during 
1980s. We average independent variables for each state over 1985 and 1986 and test four 
variables: Lawyer, Physician, Employment in insurer and Republican control.  
Table 9 reports the logit model results. In total, 41 states experienced liability shocks 
during the mid-1980s. Lawyer and Republican control are found to be positively associated with 
states’ enactment of tort reform. Insurance company employment is found to be positively 
associated with collateral source rule reforms only. Physicians are found to be negatively 
associated with reform efforts, significantly so in the case of collateral source rules and punitive 
damage caps.   
 Factors Driving Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice  
 We now examine whether the forces driving tort reform on general liability also drive tort 
reform on medical liability. A significant proportion of tort reforms, notably those passed in the 
1970’s, were targeted exclusively at medical malpractice, especially for caps on non-economic 
damages and changes to collateral source rules.  It is appropriate to study these targeted tort 
reforms separately from general tort reforms on general liability. Insurance companies’ loss 
concerns and health care cost concerns (e.g. expenditure and number of physicians) are more 
likely to be active contributors in state legislation process.  We redo the analysis as in the Table 6 
and Table 7 but now consider all tort reforms which apply to medical liability. The results are 
reported in Table 10 and Table 11. 
 The signs of the significant coefficients on the Medical malpractice insurance loss and 
Ratio of Republican are largely consistent with the results from the models of tort reform on 
                                                 
20 The year of 1977 is chosen as the beginning of benchmark years in order to avoid the aftermath of first liability 
crisis occurred in the mid-1970s. 
21 We exclude five states (WA, NE, MI, SD, and VT) that had passed tort reform before 1971. Our results are robust 
to examining liability shocks defined by the situation where the state’s average liability insurance loss ratio (directed 
loss incurred/directed premium earned) in 1985 and 1986 exceeds a threshold of 20% more than the state’s own 
average loss ratio from 1977 to 1983 (37 states are in the sample). As another robustness check, we also use a 
sample in which states’ average loss ratios in 1985 and 1986 are larger than 0.8 and we get very similar results (37 
states are in the sample). 
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general liability. The coefficients on Health care expenditure are now significantly positive in 
almost every specification. We find Same party is positive and statistically significant in two of 
the specifications. Overall, the analysis of tort reform applying to medical malpractice has 
directionally similar results to the general analysis, thus providing a consistency check. 
 
VII. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the factors associated with state adoptions of tort reforms from 1971 
to 2005. The study contributes to at least two lines of literature. First, we make a significant 
contribution to the literature on the diffusion of laws. A few of researchers study the diffusion of 
other laws across the states (e.g. McMahon-Howard et al, 2009; Romano, 2006; and Smythe, 
2008). Our paper is the first study to examine the diffusion pattern of tort reforms and relative 
importance of social, economic and political factors driving tort reforms across states. Second, a 
huge literature focuses on the influence of tort reforms after their enactment but ignores the 
question of what motivated the reform in the first place.   
Our most robust and economically significant findings are that measures of litigation 
activity---such as insurance losses and tort cases filed---are associated with quicker adoption of 
tort reforms.22 These findings are broadly consistent with public interest theories of regulation, 
and generally with the idea that states respond to liability cost problems with tort reforms.  The 
findings can also be interpreted as being consistent with economic interest theories to the extent 
that the litigation activity measures reflect the interests of the business community and of the 
insurance industry.   
We find no evidence of the influence of sizes of medical or the legal professionals in the 
context of private interest theories. Lawyers per capita are consistently associated with quicker 
reform enactments, while physicians per capita are associated with slower enactments.  We also 
                                                 
22 We check whether the ex post consequences of tort reform are consistent with previous studies by measuring the 
effects of all four tort reforms on the insurance loss across different liability lines (Other Liability, Auto Liability, 
and Medical Malpractice). The dependent variables representing insurance loss are the direct loss incurred of 
different insurance liability lines scaled by gross state product and multiplied by 1000 for each state in that year. The 
four tort reform indicators are equal to one in the years when the tort reforms are effective and zero otherwise. We 
find coefficients on noneconomic damage caps and joint and several liability reforms to be of the expected negative 
signs in all four of the equations, and they are statistically significant in the case of Other Liability. The coefficient 
on noneconomic damage caps is also significant in the case of Auto Liability.  The coefficients on noneconomic 
damage caps are larger in absolute value than any of the other coefficients for those two lines. Our results are in line 
with prior literature studying the effect of tort reforms on the insurance market (e.g. Born and Viscusi, 1998, 1994 
and Born et al., 2009). However, coefficients on collateral source rule reforms and caps on punitive damages are not 
statistically significant in any of the regressions, and the signs are mixed. See Table B5 in the Appendix for details. 
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find very little evidence of an insurance industry lobby.  We also find that political-institutional 
factors, such as Republican control and control of the government by the same party, and 
insurance regulation environments affect tort reform, although these variables are not significant 
in all specifications.   
If the main motivation for tort reform lies in litigation costs, this naturally leads to the 
question of what drives litigation costs.  Indeed, if tort reform is a response to litigation costs, the 
deeper question about tort reform may not concern its impact, but rather why it was needed in the 
first place.  Why did costs reach critical levels in some states but not others?  Such questions are 
well beyond the scope of this paper, but they deserve more attention from future researchers.   
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       Table 1 Initial State Tort Reform Legislation on General Liability, by Decade  
 
 *Note: MI, NE, WA enacted caps on punitive damages before 1970s; SD, VT enacted joint and several liability before 
1970s. 
 
 
Reform 
States passing 
reform in 1970s 
States passing 
reform in 1980s 
States passing 
reform in 1990s 
States passing 
reform in 2000s 
States passing no 
tort reforms  
Caps on non-
economic 
damages 
--- 
AL, AK, CO, 
FL, HI,, ID, KS, 
MD, MN, OR, 
WA 
IL MS 
AZ, AR, CA, 
CT, DE, GA, IN, 
IA, KY, LA, 
ME, MA, MI, 
MO, MT, NE, 
NV, NH, NJ, 
NM, NY, NC, 
ND, OH, OK, 
PA, RI, SC, SD, 
TN, TX, UT, 
VT, VA, WV, 
WI, WY 
Caps on punitive 
damages 
--- 
AL, CO, FL, 
GA, KS, MT, 
NV, NH, TX, 
VA 
AK, IL, IN, 
LA, NJ, NC, 
ND, OH, OK, 
ID, MS 
AZ, AR, CA,  
CT, DE, HI, IA, 
KY, ME, MA, 
MN, MO, NM, 
NY, OR,  PA, 
RI, SC, SD, TN,  
UT, VT,  WV, 
WI, WY 
Collateral source 
change 
FL, ND 
AL, AK,  CO, 
CT, GA,HI, IL, 
IN, IA, KY, MI, 
MN, MT, OH, 
OR 
ID --- 
AZ, AR, CA,  
DE, KS,  LA, 
ME, MA, MS, 
MO,  NE, NV, 
NH,  NM, NY, 
NC, OK,  PA, 
RI, SC, SD, TN, 
TX, UT, VT, 
VA,  WV, WA, 
WI, WY 
Joint and several 
liability 
FL, KS, NV, 
OK, OR 
AL, AK,  AZ, 
CA, CO, CT, 
GA, HI, ID, IL, 
IN, IA, KY, LA, 
MI, MN, MS, 
MO, MT, NJ, 
NM, NY, ND, 
TX, UT, WA, 
WY 
NE, NH, OH, 
TX, WI, 
AR, PA 
DE, ME, MD, 
MA, NC,  RI, SC 
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Table 2 Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
 
Definition Sources 
Tort reforms   
Caps on punitive damages 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if a state sets a cap on the recovery of 
punitive damages 
American Tort Reform 
Association (www.atra.org) 
and Avraham (2011) 
 
Joint and Several liability 
 An indicator variable equal to 1 if a state limits a party’s responsibility 
for damages to a percent of total damages corresponding to that party’s 
degree of fault 
Noneconomic damage 
caps 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if a state has enacted a cap on the size of 
compensation for injured persons due to intangible but real injuries such 
as pain and suffering.   
Collateral source rule  An indicator variable equal to 1 if a state permits insurance recovery 
from a victim’s first party insurer to offset the damage judgment 
Economics variables  
A.M Best Custom Report  
 
CMS Office of the Actuary, 
1971-2005 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis’ FRED Economic Data  
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 1971-2005 
Liability insurance loss Aggregated direct loss incurred of liability insurance (including other 
liability, auto liability, commercial multiple-peril liability and medical 
malpractice) at state level divided by GSP and multiplied by 1,000    
Health care% Personal health care expenditure on physician and clinic services 
divided by personal annual income in a state multiplied by 100  
Credit spread The difference between the Aaa corporate bond yield and Baa corporate 
bond yield for each year 
GSP per capita Gross domestic product (GSP) divided by the total population scaled by 
1,000 in a state  
 
Politics and regulation variables 
Ratio of Republican  The average ratio of the lower house and the upper house that are 
Republican 
 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1971-2005 
 
 
 
Berry et.al (1998) 
 
 
 
 
National Center for State 
Courts, 1975-2005 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1971-2005 
 
 
American Insurance 
Association, Summary of 
State Laws and Regulations 
relating to Insurance, 1971-
2005 
  
 
  
Republican control* The fraction of state government (lower house, upper house and 
governorship) controlled by Republican  
Same party An indicator variable equal to 1 if the same party controls the governor’s 
office and has majorities in the lower house and the upper house  
Republican ideology A measure of the ideology of state Republican party ideology, in which 
0 is the most conservative and 100 is the most liberal  
Democratic ideology A measure of the ideology of state Democratic party ideology, in which 
0 is the most conservative and 100 is the most liberal 
Governor ideology A measure of the ideology of state governor’s ideology, in which 0 is 
the most conservative and 100 is the most liberal 
Tort cases in state court 
 
Tort cases commenced in state general jurisdiction courts divided by 
population and multiplied by 1,000 each year 
Tort cases in federal court Tort cases commenced in federal courts divided by national population 
and multiplied by 10,000 each year 
Rate regulation An indicator variable equal to 1 if the state applies a form of prior 
approval rate regulation, 0 otherwise 
Punitive damages 
insurable 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if state allows punitive damages to be 
insured 
No-fault verbal  
 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if state has adopted no-fault insurance 
with verbal threshold, and 0 otherwise   
No-fault high value An indicator variable equal to 1 if state has adopted no-fault insurance 
with threshold larger than $1,000, and 0 otherwise 
No-fault other An indicator variable equal to 1 if state has adopted no-fault insurance 
with threshold less than $1,000 and tort system, and 0 otherwise 
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Other variables 
 
 
Employment in insurer Ratio of the number of employees in insurance carriers to the state 
population multiplied by 1,000   
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 1971-2005 
Lawyer  
 
Physician 
 
Ratio of the number of lawyers to the total population in a state 
multiplied by 10,000 
Ratio of the number of physicians to the total population in a state 
multiplied by 10,000  
The lawyer Statistical Report, 
various years 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1971-2005 
State spillover  The proportion of states surrounding the state passing tort reforms 
before the state enacts the tort reform. 
 
Ideological state spillover*   The proportion of states with closed ideology surrounding the state 
passing tort reforms before the state enacts the tort reform. The 
surrounding states include only states that average absolute differences 
between state governments’ ideology of neighboring state and the state 
is less than 10. 
 
Urban* The proportion of the number of urban people to total state population, 
measured by every decade 
United States Census Bureau, 
1971-2005 
South An indicator variable equals to 1 if state is AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, 
MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, or WA 
 
Midwest An indicator variable equals to 1 if states is IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, 
MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, or WI 
 
Northeast An indicator variable equals to 1 if states is  in CT, MA, MD, ME, NH, 
NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT, and WV 
 
West 
An indicator variable equals to 1 if states are  in other states 
 
*These alternative measurements are used in robustness checks. 
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Table 3 Summary Statistics of Tort Reforms and Variables in Analysis for General Liability, 1971-2005 
Variable 
Whole 
Sample 
Four Tort 
Reforms 
Caps on Non- 
Economic 
Damages 
Caps on 
Punitive 
Damages 
Collateral 
Source 
Joint and 
Several 
Economic Characteristics 
      
   Liability insurance loss17 8.811 8.267 8.721 8.639 8.588 8.343 
 (2.725) (2.910) (2.775) (2.799) (2.757) (2.853) 
   Medical liability loss  0.475 0.383 0.487 0.476 0.429 0.437 
 (0.367) (0.321) (0.388) (0.385) (0.350) (0.358) 
   Health care expenditure   2.769 2.221 2.644 2.598 2.558 2.331 
 (0.941) (0.792) (0.913) (0.912) (0.907) (0.841) 
   Credit spread 1.082 1.225 1.113 1.127 1.137 1.205 
 (0.397) (0.423) (0.408) (0.410) (0.412) (0.422) 
   GSP per capita 20.491 14.132 19.089 18.505 18.141 15.130 
 (11.398) (9.413) (11.073) (11.025) (10.887) (9.767) 
       
Political Characteristics       
  Ratio of Republican 0.419 0.356 0.412 0.403 0.399 0.367 
 (0.179) (0.189) (0.178) (0.184) (0.181) (0.184) 
   Same party 0.463 0.492 0.465 0.468 0.468 0.481 
 (0.499) (0.500) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.500) 
   Republican ideology 35.078 36.765 35.347 36.134 35.392 36.589 
 (8.096) (8.373) (8.184) (8.414) (8.349) (8.089) 
   Democratic ideology 68.169 68.002 67.929 68.645 67.882 67.980 
 (7.317) (7.870) (7.429) (7.412) (7.704) (7.690) 
   Governor ideology 53.073 55.799 52.777 54.426 53.531 55.510 
 (17.969) (16.547) (17.595) (17.664) (17.789) (16.614) 
   Tort cases in federal court 1.538 1.377 — — — — 
 (0.368) (0.306)        
   Tort cases in state court 2.612 2.609 — — — — 
 (1.205) (1.233)        
   Rate regulation 0.583 0.655 0.591 0.546 0.624 0.643 
 (0.493) (0.476) (0.492) (0.498) (0.485) (0.479) 
   Punitive damage insurable   0.560 0.601 0.566 0.582 0.579 0.587 
 (0.497) (0.490) (0.496) (0.493) (0.494) (0.493) 
   No-fault verbal 0.072 0.032 0.070 0.049 0.045 0.051 
 (0.259) (0.175) (0.255) (0.216) (0.208) (0.220) 
   No-fault high value 0.185 0.126 0.154 0.160 0.122 0.143 
 (0.388) (0.332) (0.362) (0.367) (0.327) (0.350) 
   No-fault other 0.743 0.842 0.776 0.791 0.833 0.806 
 (0.335) (0.443) (0.560) (0.311) (0.280) (0.303) 
        
Other variables       
  Employment in insurer  5.855 5.175 5.782 5.597 5.419 5.301 
 (3.345) (2.687) (3.405) (3.367) (2.833) (2.672) 
                                                 
17 Liability insurance loss includes the Other Liability, Auto Liability, Medical Malpractice Liability and Product Liability lines. 
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Table 3 (continuous) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Survival Rate, by Tort Reform
  Lawyer 24.704 21.565 23.835 23.953 23.335 21.875 
 (9.321) (8.744) (9.257) (9.595) (8.805) (8.329) 
  Physician 19.435 18.026 19.028 19.222 18.929 18.415 
 (6.547) (7.183) (6.535) (7.147) (6.872) (7.153) 
 State spillover — 0.313 0.059 0.134 0.126 0.252 
   (0.307) (0.113) (0.215) (0.215) (0.286) 
 West 0.280 0.262 0.246 0.288 0.279 0.238 
 (0.449) (0.440) (0.431) (0.453) (0.449) (0.426) 
  Midwest 0.240 0.161 0.243 0.217 0.194 0.198 
 (0.427) (0.368) (0.429) (0.412) (0.396) (0.398) 
  South 0.280 0.314 0.295 0.256 0.298 0.319 
 (0.449) (0.464) (0.456) (0.436) (0.458) (0.466) 
  Northeast 0.200 0.263 0.216 0.239 0.228 0.245 
 (0.400) (0.441) (0.411) (0.427) (0.420) (0.431) 
Average waiting time — 18.333 30.860 29.261 27.580 20.458 
Observations 1750 825 1543  1346 1368 982 
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Table 4 Correlations of Core Political Economy Factors Influencing the Timing of State Enactments of Tort Reforms on General Liability, 1971-2005 
 
 
 
Liability 
ins loss 
Heath care 
exp. 
State 
Tort  
Nation. 
Tort 
Ratio of 
Rep. 
Same 
party 
Rep. 
ideology 
Democ. 
ideology 
Governor 
ideology 
Employment 
in insurer 
Physician   Lawyer 
Liability 
insurance loss 
1.000 
 
  
        
Tort cases in 
state courts 
0.324 1.000           
Tort cases in 
federal courts 
0.517 0.036   1.000          
Heath care 
expenditure 
0.559 0.080 0.638 1.000 
        
Ratio of 
Republican 
0.027 0.010 0.037 -0.028 1.000 
       
Same party -0.099 -0.001 -0.132 -0.110 -0.433 1.000  
     
Republican 
Ideology 
0.233 0.194 0.041 -0.018 -0.254 0.113 1.000 
     
Democratic 
ideology 
0.165 0.041 0.073 0.025 0.295 -0.237 0.414 1.000 
    
Governor 
ideology 
-0.039 0.013 -0.114 -0.131 -0.010 0.376 0.240 0.286 1.000 
   
Employment in 
insurer 
0.373 0.318 0.151 0.151 0.131 -0.053 0.491 0.395 0.014 1.000 
  
Physician   0.510 0.246 0.328 0.371 0.013 -0.157 0.431 0.366 -0.015 0.573 1.000 
 
Lawyer 0.320 0.124 0.283 0.250 0.031 -0.214 0.426 0.477 0.053 0.571 0.689 1.000 
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Table 5 Discrete Time Hazard Model of Core Political Economy Factors Influencing the Timing of State 
Enactments of Tort Reforms on General Liability (Stepwise Regression), 1971-2005  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
dependent variable for Models 1 to 4 is binary which equals one if a state enacts any type of tort reform on general 
liability in that year and zero otherwise. Observations of each state are included in the analyses until the state passes 
the tort reform. All the variables are described as in Table 2. Models report results of the discrete time hazard model 
with Weibull baseline hazard and have 825 observations. Stepwise forward regression method is used to select 
variables. Standard errors robust to clustering by year are showed in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Liability insurance loss 0.131** 
(0.055) 
0.229*** 
(0.057) 
0.228*** 
(0.048) 
0.317*** 
(0.069) 
Employment in insurer — 0.014 
(0.126) 
-0.031 
(0.144) 
-0.008 
(0.184) 
Physician   — -0.237*** 
(0.054) 
-0.223*** 
(0.064) 
-0.204** 
(0.088) 
Lawyer — 0.108*** 
(0.031) 
0.139*** 
(0.033) 
0.172*** 
(0.038) 
Ratio of Republican — — 3.066*** 
(0.753) 
3.063*** 
(0.881) 
Same party — — 0.836** 
(0.422) 
1.079** 
(0.533) 
Democratic  Ideology — — -0.055 
(0.039) 
-0.079** 
(0.035) 
Northeast — — — -1.510** 
(0.618) 
Midwest — — — 0.919* 
(0.531) 
South — — — -0.235 
(0.707) 
Log duration time 0.487** 
(0.247) 
0.919** 
(0.428) 
0.902** 
(0.408) 
0.623 
(0.443) 
Constant -5.410*** 
(0.594) 
-5.626*** 
(0.802) 
-4.200 
(2.750) 
-3.934 
(2.514) 
Log pseudolikelihood -147.29 -137.34 -129.24 -122.590 
Observation 825 825 825 825 
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Table 6 Discrete Time Hazard Model of All Political Economy Factors Influencing the Timing of State 
Enactments of Tort Reforms on General Liability, 1971-2005  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 GL_CN GL_CP GL_CS GL_JS 
Liability insurance loss    0.327*** 
(0.116) 
— 
— 
0.435*** 
(0.126) 
0.463*** 
(0.102) 
   0.662*** 
(0.076) 
  0.301*** 
(0.070) 
Tort cases in state court —  0.488** 
(0.208) 
— 
— — — — 
Tort cases in federal court — —     2.379*** 
(0.753) 
— — — — 
State Spillover 0.074 
(1.278) 
0.412 
(2.389) 
0.438 
(1.332) 
0.457 
(4.781) 
-1.234 
(1.611) 
2.170 
(1.436) 
1.350* 
(0.757) 
Heath care expenditure -0.328 
(0.736) 
0.130 
(0.880) 
0.077 
(0.069) 
-0.416 
(0.531) 
-0.471 
(1.023) 
-1.765*** 
(0.523) 
-0.043 
(0.811) 
Credit spread -0.154 
(0.513) 
-0.388 
(0.718) 
0.549 
(0.563) 
1.056 
(0.726) 
-0.338 
(0.782) 
-0.413 
(0.784) 
0.114 
(0.476) 
GSP per capita -0.020 
(0.047) 
-0.089 
(0.061) 
-0.055 
(0.039) 
-0.035 
(0.083) 
0.050 
(0.065) 
-0.076 
(0.079) 
-0.007 
(0.031) 
Ratio of Republican   3.284** 
(1.510) 
4.858** 
(1.968) 
3.117** 
(1.446) 
2.149* 
(1.307) 
2.327 
(2.012) 
2.939 
(2.142) 
3.276** 
(1.289) 
Same party 1.004* 
(0.559) 
1.240** 
(0.626) 
0.533 
(0.465) 
0.868 
(0.581) 
0.534 
(0.355) 
-0.166 
(0.495) 
  1.347*** 
(0.479) 
Republican Ideology 0.019 
(0.063) 
0.004 
(0.077) 
0.031 
(0.061) 
0.084* 
(0.048) 
-0.108* 
(0.060) 
0.163*** 
(0.056) 
0.042 
(0.049) 
Democratic ideology -0.077* 
(0.046) 
-0.026 
(0.064) 
-0.062** 
(0.030) 
-0.051 
(0.087) 
-0.133** 
(0.060) 
-0.088* 
(0.046) 
-0.053 
(0.056) 
Governor ideology 0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.026 
(0.019) 
0.008 
(0.016) 
0.031 
(0.021) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
Employment in insurer 0.025 
(0.237) 
0.067 
(0.286) 
0.111 
(0.183) 
-0.114 
(0.129) 
-0.189 
(0.186) 
0.278** 
(0.118) 
0.025 
(0.137) 
Physician   -0.193 
(0.134) 
-0.245 
(0.211) 
-0.142 
(0.133) 
-0.064 
(0.057) 
-0.127 
(0.090) 
-0.532*** 
(0.120) 
-0.271*** 
(0.057) 
Lawyer  0.178*** 
(0.063) 
0.151 
(0.108) 
0.126* 
(0.068) 
0.146** 
(0.060) 
  0.122*** 
(0.029) 
0.301*** 
(0.076) 
0.206*** 
(0.032) 
No-fault verbal  0.968 
(0.772) 
2.563** 
(1.133) 
1.102 
(1.460) 
-2.053** 
(0.979) 
0.397 
(1.118) 
-2.663 
(2.066) 
0.770 
(0.787) 
No-fault high value  -0.042 
(0.877) 
1.175 
(1.297) 
-0.055 
(0.897) 
0.704 
(0.661) 
1.026 
(1.119) 
  2.688*** 
(0.700) 
-0.191 
(0.602) 
Punitive damages insurable  0.364 
(0.657) 
0.176 
(0.884) 
0.147 
(0.797) 
-0.459 
(0.785) 
1.273 
(0.869) 
1.715** 
(0.797) 
0.037 
(0.571) 
Rate regulation  -0.107 
(0.561) 
0.315 
(1.254) 
-0.166 
(0.627) 
-0.161 
(0.652) 
0.934 
(0.742) 
-1.224*** 
(0.415) 
-0.133 
(0.524) 
South -0.258 
(0.846) 
2.834 
(2.198) 
0.622 
(0.557) 
-0.745 
(0.841) 
0.492 
(1.318) 
0.557 
(0.547) 
-0.540 
(0.524) 
Midwest 0.787 
(0.801) 
-0.071 
(0.684) 
-0.069 
(0.748) 
0.172 
(0.864) 
3.626** 
(1.481) 
1.274 
(0.866) 
0.085 
(1.290) 
Northeast -2.096** 
(1.062) 
0.538 
(0.868) 
0.233 
(0.915) 
-4.570*** 
(1.181) 
-1.303* 
(0.758) 
-3.219*** 
(1.185) 
-2.134 
(1.774) 
Log duration time 0.987* 
(0.582) 
-1.389 
(1.857) 
-1.843 
(1.597) 
1.531 
(1.036) 
1.774 
(1.494) 
2.710** 
(1.183) 
0.551 
(0.948) 
Constant -5.151 
(3.785) 
-9.890** 
(4.849) 
-7.568** 
(3.276) 
-15.733** 
(6.756) 
-4.318 
(5.950) 
-14.414** 
(5.865) 
-6.894 
(4.472) 
Log pseudolikelihood -121.662 -91.155 -124.337 -63.018 -80.762 -70.418 -119.593 
Observation 825 521 825 1543 1346 1368 982 
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The dependent variable for model 1 to 3 is binary which equals one if a state enacting any type of tort reform on 
general liability in that year and zero otherwise. Observations of each state are included in the analyses until the 
state passed the tort reform. Credit spread and tort cases in federal court are measured yearly from 1972 to 2005. All 
other variables are measured for each state in each year from 1972 to 2005. All the variables are described as in 
Table 2. Model 1 reports results of the discrete time hazard model with Weibull baseline hazard and has 780 
observations. Model 2 replaces liability insurance loss with tort cases filings in state courts and has 521 observations 
since it uses samples after 1976 and such data in SD,NE,VT, IA, IL, LA, KY, MT, OK, SC,VA, PA are missing. 
GL_CN, GL_CP, GL_CS, GL_JS report results of the discrete time hazard model with Weibull baseline hazard for 
caps on non-economic damages, caps on punitive damages, changes to collateral source and limits on joint and 
several on general liability. The dependent variable for the four models is binary which equals one if a state enacting 
the tort reform on general liability in that year and zero otherwise. Cluster standard errors by year are showed in the 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.    
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Table 7 Robustness Check of Discrete Time Hazard Models of Political Economy Factors Influencing the 
Timing of General Liability Tort Reforms, 1971-2005  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Robustness 
Check with 
Decade Dummies 
Robustness 
Check with 
MM 
Permanent 
Reform--GL 
Frailty 
Model--GL  
Marginal 
Risk Set 
Model--GL  
Liability insurance loss 0.265** 
(0.109) 
0.359*** 
(0.124) 
0.267*** 
(0.096) 
0.388*** 
(0.101) 
0.352*** 
(0.056) 
State Spillover  0.337 
(1.189) 
-0.205 
(1.313) 
1.455 
(1.345) 
2.854*** 
(0.451) 
2.670*** 
(0.462) 
Heath care expenditure 0.534 
(0.622) 
-0.343 
(0.813) 
-0.399 
(0.707) 
-0.190 
(0.591) 
-0.206 
(0.380) 
Credit spread -0.817 
(0.946) 
-0.112 
(0.529) 
0.177 
(0.501) 
0.606 
(0.398) 
0.679** 
(0.279) 
GSP per capita 0.016 
(0.044) 
-0.010 
(0.046) 
-0.030 
(0.050) 
-0.015 
(0.058) 
-0.007 
(0.033) 
Ratio of Republican 2.344 
(1.594) 
4.144** 
(1.903) 
3.359** 
(1.538) 
3.083* 
(1.684) 
2.466*** 
(0.891) 
Same party 0.918 
(0.579) 
0.975* 
(0.531) 
0.889** 
(0.400) 
0.462 
(0.349) 
0.464* 
(0.270) 
Republican ideology 0.013 
(0.060) 
0.037 
(0.070) 
0.048 
(0.069) 
0.035 
(0.042) 
0.024 
(0.031) 
Democratic ideology -0.085* 
(0.044) 
-0.067 
(0.047) 
-0.074* 
(0.045) 
-0.052 
(0.037) 
-0.057** 
(0.028) 
Governor ideology -0.004 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
Employment in insurer  0.075 
(0.213) 
0.013 
(0.237) 
0.063 
(0.199) 
0.029 
(0.113) 
0.029 
(0.091) 
Physician  -0.155 
(0.101) 
-0.209 
(0.148) 
-0.189 
(0.143) 
-0.167* 
(0.100) 
-0.183** 
(0.078) 
Lawyer 0.156*** 
(0.057) 
0.190** 
(0.076) 
0.181** 
(0.080) 
0.081** 
(0.038) 
0.083*** 
(0.031) 
No-fault verbal  1.637** 
(0.824) 
1.071 
(0.866) 
1.063 
(1.031) 
-0.256 
(3.762) 
-0.139 
(0.500) 
No-fault high value  -0.048 
(0.855) 
-0.233 
(1.143) 
-0.288 
(0.913) 
1.030 
(0.657) 
1.164*** 
(0.365) 
Punitive damages 
insurable 
0.412 
(0.553) 
0.372 
(0.687) 
0.262 
(0.567) 
0.444 
(0.463) 
0.327 
(0.347) 
Rate regulation  0.121 
(0.553) 
-0.053 
(0.716) 
-0.041 
(0.545) 
0.225 
(0.422) 
0.296 
(0.340) 
South -0.734 
(0.845) 
0.081 
(0.993) 
0.036 
(0.726) 
-0.126 
(0.613) 
-0.174 
(0.460) 
Midwest 0.740 
(0.700) 
0.750 
(0.678) 
0.123 
(0.451) 
0.412 
(0.784) 
0.450 
(0.507) 
Northeast -1.948** 
(0.969) 
-2.388* 
(1.337) 
-2.401** 
(1.165) 
-1.465 
(0.996) 
-1.225* 
(0.689) 
Log duration time 
— 
0.989 
(0.625) 
0.799 
(0.577) 
0.408 
(0.682) 
0.336 
(0.447) 
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     Table 7 Continued  
 
The dependent variable is binary which equals one if a state enacts tort reform on general liability in that year and zero 
otherwise. The observations of each state are included in the analyses until the state passed any of four tort reforms on 
general liability.  Robusness Check with Decades Dummies reports the results of discrete time hazard model with four 
duration dummies as the baseline hazard.  Robusnest Check with MM adds medical malpractice tort reforms as dummy 
variables to Model 1 in Table 6. The model Permanent Reform_GL reports results of permanent tort reforms using 
discrete-time hazard models.  Temp tort reform is a dummy variable representing temporary tort reforms in effect but 
ultimately held unconstitutional. The last two models report results of the timing of state enactments of any of the four 
permanent tort reforms on general liability gradually by using multivariate survival analysis, in which observations of 
each tort reform are stacked. The Frailty Model--GL uses a frailty model with random effects and the Marginal Risk Set 
Model--GL uses a marginal risk set model to control correlations and different baseline hazard functions of tort reforms.  
Standard errors (robust to clustering by year in the first 3 columns; robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
(jackknife standard error) in the last two columns) are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.   
      
Duration dummies in 
1970s 
2.102 
(1.733) 
— 
— — — 
Duration dummies in 
1980s 
2.918** 
(1.218) 
— 
— — — 
Duration dummies in 
1990s 
0.417 
(1.209) 
— 
— — — 
Medical caps on 
noneconomic damages 
— 
0.657 
(0.685) 
— — — 
Medical collateral source — 
-0.613 
(0.799) 
— — — 
Medical caps on punitive 
damages 
— 
0.431 
(0.845) 
— — — 
Medical joint and several — 
-0.602 
(1.380) 
— — — 
Temp tort reform 
— — 
0.162  
(0.505) 
0.873 
(0.567) 
0.636 
(0.388) 
Constant -5.410 
(4.504) 
-6.987 
(4.971) 
-6.370** 
(2.776) 
-8.811*** 
(3.189) 
-7.255*** 
(2.062) 
Log Pseudolikelihood    -116.939 -120.222 -123.909 — — 
Observation 825 825 868 5486 5486 
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Table 8 The Time-series Variation vs. the Cross-sectional Variation of Political Economy Variables 
Influencing the Timing of Tort Reform Legislations on General Liability, 1971-2005  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A pooled time-series cross-section OLS regression is used for the time-series variation test. The dependent 
variable for each regression is binary which equals one if a state enacted any tort reform in that year and zero 
otherwise. State fixed effects (not reported) are added in the regression. All variables are measured for each state 
in each year from 1971 to 2005. The fractional logit model is used for a cross-sectional variation test, in which 
the dependent variable is the inverse of duration time until enacting tort reforms for each state. All the 
independent variables are measured as of 1971 with the exception of no fault variables. All the variables are 
described as in Table 2. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.    
 
 
 
 Time-series 
Variation Test 
Cross-sectional 
Variation Test 
Liability insurance loss  0.024*** 
(0.007) 
0.210* 
(0.120) 
State Spillover  -0.032 
(0.068) 
2.352* 
(1.272) 
Heath care expenditure  2.615 
(3.641) 
0.156 
(0.551) 
Credit spread  0.006 
(0.015) 
— 
GSP per capita  0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.064 
(0.311) 
Ratio of Republican  0.210 
(0.135) 
  1.779** 
(0.815) 
Same party  0.031 
(0.024) 
-0.020 
(0.275) 
Republican ideology  -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
Democratic ideology -0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.081*** 
(0.017) 
Governor ideology -0.000 
(0.001) 
  0.019*** 
(0.007) 
Employment in insurer  -0.008 
(0.012) 
-0.065 
(0.063) 
Physician  -0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.061* 
(0.033) 
Lawyer  0.000 
(0.002) 
   0.188** 
(0.089) 
Rate regulation  -0.044 
(0.049) 
-0.081 
(0.297) 
No-fault verbal  0.036 
(0.067) 
0.201 
(0.828) 
No-fault high value  0.017 
(0.037) 
-0.536 
(0.700) 
Constant -0.097 
(0.272) 
-2.103 
(1.415) 
State Fixed Effects Yes — 
R-square 0.138 — 
Observations 825 45 
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 Table 9 Logit Model of Determinants of Tort Reform on General Liability during the 1980s’ Liability Crisis 
 
The dependent variable is binary which equals one if a state enacted any type of tort reform on general liability in 
that year and zero otherwise. The observations in the regression only include states experiencing a liability crisis 
during the 1980s. The state had a liability crisis if the average of its 1985 and 1986 insurance loss (scaled by GSP) 
was more than 1/3 higher than its average value over the 1977 to 1983 period. Republican control is measured as the 
average value of the fraction of the three parts of the state government (the lower house, the upper house, and 
governorship) controlled by Republicans from 1985 to 1986. All the independent variables are the mean value of the 
corresponding variables described as in Table 2 from 1985 to 1986. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Four 
General 
Liability 
Caps on Non-
economic 
Damages 
Collateral 
Source 
Rule 
Caps on 
Punitive 
Damages 
Joint and 
Several 
liability 
Lawyer   1.499** 
(0.809) 
  0.997 
(0.662) 
  1.991** 
(0.905) 
 1.161 
(0.786) 
  4.017*** 
(2.317) 
Physician  -0.143 
(0.130) 
-0.016 
(0.073) 
 -0.522*** 
(0.156) 
  -0.275** 
(0.131) 
-0.369 
(0.427) 
Employment in Insurer -0.034 
(0.120) 
-0.308 
(0.196) 
0.495*** 
(0.188) 
0.068 
(0.136) 
-0.197 
(0.186) 
Republican control 2.840** 
(1.190) 
0.906 
(1.426) 
-0.408 
(1.337) 
-0.709 
(1.453) 
2.814** 
(1.477) 
Constant -0.847 
(1.653) 
-2.241 
 (1.672) 
1.443 
(1.631) 
      1.095 
(1.453) 
-1.748 
(3.313) 
Log pseudolikelihood -22.061 -18.786 -18.744 -21.254 -17.478 
Pseudo R2 0.181 0.072 0.260 0.109 0.309 
Observations 41 41 39 41 37 
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Table 10 Discrete Time hazard model of Political Economy Factors Influencing the Timing of State Enacting 
Tort Reforms on Medical Malpractice, 1975-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MM_Four reports results of medical malpractice tort reform enactments, which has fewer (367) observations since 
medical liability insurance is separated from other liability insurance in 1975 and the focus on medical malpractice 
involves inclusion of tort reforms focused exclusively on medical malpractice. MM_CN, MM_CP, MM_CS, MM_JS 
report results of the discrete time hazard model with Weibull baseline hazard for caps on non-economic damages, caps on 
punitive damages, changes to collateral source and limits on joint and several liability. The dependent variable for this 
model is binary which equals one if a state enacts any type of tort reform on medical malpractice in that year and zero 
otherwise. Observations of each state are included in the analyses until the state passes the tort reform. Credit spreads are 
measured yearly from 1971 to 2005. All other variables are measured for each state in each year from 1971 to 2005. All 
 MM--Four  MM--CN MM--CP MM--CS MM--JS 
Medical Malpractice insurance loss 2.307*** 
(0.866) 
  1.549*** 
(0.600) 
0.344 
(0.556) 
0.371 
(0.567) 
1.452*** 
(0.422) 
State spillover  1.542 
(1.502) 
-0.964 
(1.694) 
-0.035 
(1.966) 
1.736** 
(0.844) 
0.318 
(1.000) 
Heath care expenditure  1.644*** 
(0.603) 
   1.729*** 
(0.551) 
0.684* 
(0.395) 
3.075*** 
(0.574) 
0.677 
(0.543) 
Credit spread  -0.951 
(0.659) 
-0.819 
(0.648) 
-0.319 
(0.671) 
-0.705 
(0.548) 
-0.412 
(0.486) 
GSP per capita 0.111 
(0.072) 
-0.063 
(0.040) 
-0.106 
(0.091) 
-0.002 
(0.066) 
-0.060 
(0.039) 
Ratio of Republican 5.093*** 
(1.880) 
2.122 
(2.139) 
0.968 
(1.716) 
4.893*** 
(1.061) 
3.209** 
(1.279) 
Same Party 0.856** 
(0.334) 
0.429 
(0.347) 
0.510 
(0.597) 
0.360 
(0.402) 
1.090*** 
(0.348) 
Republican Ideology 0.020 
(0.046) 
0.003 
(0.047) 
-0.123*** 
(0.044) 
0.001 
(0.032) 
0.037 
(0.049) 
Democratic ideology -0.006 
(0.054) 
0.015 
(0.045) 
-0.048 
(0.055) 
-0.046 
(0.049) 
-0.024 
(0.056) 
Governor ideology -0.022 
(0.022) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.000 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
Employment in insurer 0.044 
(0.143) 
0.020 
(0.135) 
0.008 
(0.139) 
0.120** 
(0.050) 
0.159 
(0.145) 
Physician    -0.062 
(0.148) 
-0.118 
(0.160) 
-0.112 
(0.077) 
-0.095 
(0.084) 
-0.254*** 
(0.077) 
Lawyer -0.044 
(0.050) 
0.087* 
(0.047) 
0.112 
(0.075) 
0.056 
(0.058) 
0.149*** 
(0.040) 
No-fault verbal 0.175 
(1.033) 
-1.846 
(1.231) 
2.335*** 
(0.651) 
-0.594 
(1.008) 
0.549 
(0.988) 
No-fault high value  0.730 
(1.071) 
0.239 
(0.567) 
0.272 
(0.817) 
1.150 
(0.882) 
0.381 
(0.915) 
Punitive damages insurable  0.318 
(0.673) 
-0.621 
(0.457) 
1.260** 
(0.584) 
-0.440 
(0.468) 
0.262 
(0.865) 
Rate regulation  0.253 
(0.435) 
0.382 
(0.504) 
1.391* 
(0.731) 
1.312* 
(0.692) 
0.462 
(0.670) 
South 0.042 
(0.780) 
-1.544** 
(0.656) 
-0.859 
(0.737) 
-1.188* 
(0.698) 
-0.931* 
(0.501) 
Midwest 0.473 
(0.730) 
1.019* 
(0.593) 
1.701** 
(0.803) 
0.228 
(0.570) 
-1.350* 
(0.801) 
Northeast 0.321 
(1.372) 
-1.609 
(1.168) 
-0.743 
(1.489) 
0.555 
(0.877) 
-2.477** 
(1.149) 
Log of duration time -4.083*** 
(1.196) 
-1.519 
(1.011) 
2.139** 
(1.046) 
-4.391*** 
(1.250) 
1.171 
(1.143) 
Constant 1.795 
(5.381) 
-3.880 
(5.620) 
-5.597 
(5.459) 
0.925 
(5.129) 
-7.231** 
(3.481) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -109.240 -115.197 -94.656 -117.403 -119.275 
Observations 367 927 1117 716 816 
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the variables are described as in Table 2. Standard errors robust to clustering by year are shown in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.    
 
Table 11 Robustness Check of Discrete Time Hazard Models of Political Economy Factors Influencing the 
Timing of State Enacting Permanent Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice, 1975-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medical Malpractice_PM reports results of using discrete-time hazard models, in which observations of each state are 
included in the analyses until the state passed any permanent tort reforms on medical malpractice. The last two models 
report results of the timing of state enactments of four permanent tort reforms on medical malpractice gradually by using 
 Medical 
Malpractice--PM 
Frailty Model--
MM 
Marginal Risk set 
Model --MM 
Medical Malpractice insurance loss  2.250*** 
(0.555) 
  0.892*** 
(0.295) 
0.939*** 
(0.240) 
State Spillover  3.317** 
(1.320) 
1.631*** 
(0.517) 
1.708*** 
(0.403) 
Heath care expenditure  0.523 
(0.433) 
0.778** 
(0.302) 
0.870*** 
(0.190) 
Credit spread  -0.448 
(0.646) 
-0.059 
(0.231) 
-0.144 
(0.193) 
GSP per capita  0.025 
(0.070) 
-0.059 
(0.051) 
-0.029 
(0.032) 
Ratio of republican 7.271*** 
(1.283) 
2.537*** 
(0.837) 
2.499*** 
(0.756) 
Same party  1.132*** 
(0.411) 
0.677** 
(0.261) 
0.730*** 
(0.210) 
Republican ideology 0.120*** 
(0.036) 
0.015 
(0.020) 
0.012 
(0.020) 
Democratic ideology 0.036 
(0.029) 
-0.008 
(0.022) 
-0.009 
(0.020) 
Governor ideology -0.035* 
(0.019) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
Employment in insurer  0.030 
(0.125) 
0.087* 
(0.049) 
0.094** 
(0.044) 
Physician   -0.016 
(0.140) 
-0.087 
(0.059) 
-0.088** 
(0.040) 
Lawyer  0.009 
(0.076) 
  0.082*** 
(0.025) 
0.076*** 
(0.022) 
No-fault verbal  0.834 
(1.584) 
0.517 
(0.489) 
0.514 
(0.462) 
No-fault high value  0.016 
(1.082) 
0.204 
(0.300) 
0.186 
(0.313) 
Punitive damages insurable  1.069 
(0.850) 
-0.030 
(0.325) 
-0.056 
(0.259) 
Rate regulation  0.249 
(0.631) 
0.424 
(0.263) 
0.406* 
(0.216) 
South 0.910 
(0.811) 
-0.651 
(0.401) 
-0.612* 
(0.362) 
Midwest -0.726 
(0.556) 
-0.136 
(0.329) 
-0.126 
(0.322) 
Northeast -2.111** 
(0.995) 
-1.702*** 
(0.498) 
-1.630*** 
(0.550) 
Log duration time -2.461** 
(1.017) 
-0.698 
(0.641) 
-0.088** 
(0.040) 
Temp tort reform  -0.626 
(0.743) 
-0.389 
(0.582) 
-0.473 
(0.393) 
Constant -8.471* 
(4.801) 
-5.170** 
(2.342) 
-5.950*** 
(1.694) 
Log Pseudolikelihood    -109.604 -498.393 — 
Observation 429 3760 3760 
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multivariate survival analysis, in which observations of each tort reform are stacked. Frailty Model--MM uses a frailty 
model with random effects and the Marginal Risk set Model --MM uses a marginal risk set model to control correlations for 
different baseline hazard functions of tort reforms. Medical malpractice models have observations after 1974 since medical 
liability insurance is separated from other liability insurance since 1974. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
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Appendix A: Figures 
 
Figure A1 Map of Caps on Punitive Damages on General Liability   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2 Map of Limitations on Joint and Several Liability on General Liability 
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Figure A3 Map of Caps on Noneconomic Damages on General Liability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4 Map of Caps on Noneconomic Damages on General Liability or Medical Malpractice Liability 
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Figure A5 Map of Collateral Source Rules Reform on General Liability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A6 Map of Collateral Source Reform on General Liability or Medical Malpractice Liability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** 
** ** 
** 
** 
1989 
1990 
1986 
** 
** 
1987 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
1988 
1985 
1985 ** 
** 
1976 
1988 
After 2005 
2000s 
1990s 
1980s 
1970s 
Before 1971 
 
**
 
**
 
**
 
** 1987 
** 
1989 
** 1987 
1987 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
1988 
** 
** 
** 1977 
** 
1988 
1975 
1976 ** 
** 
2004 
1976 
1990 
1986 
1995 
1976 
1987 
1977 
** 
2003 
1976 
** 
1988 
1987 
1985 
1985 ** 
1990 
1976 
1988 
After 2005 
2000s 
1990s 
1980s 
1970s 
Before 1971 
 
1977
 
1976
 
**
 
1987 1987 
1976 
1989 
1976 1987 
1987 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** ** 
1976 
1975 1977 
** 
1988 
1976 
1986 
1986 
1987 
1988 
 52 
 
After 2005 
2000s 
1990s 
1980s 
1970s 
Before 1971 
 
 
 
Figure A7 Map of Any of Four Tort Reforms on General Liability 
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Appendix B 
       Table B1 Year of the First Tort Reform Legislation on General Liability, by State  
State 
Caps on Noneconomic 
Damages 
Caps on Punitive 
Damages 
Collateral 
Source 
Joint and Several 
Liability 
Four Tort 
Reforms 
AL 1987 1987 1987 **** 1987 
AK 1986 1997 1986 1986 1986 
AZ **** **** **** 1988 1988 
AR **** **** **** 2003 2003 
CA **** **** **** 1986 1986 
CO 1986 1986 1986 1986 1986 
CT **** **** 1985 1986 1985 
DE **** **** **** **** **** 
FL 1987 1986 1976 1987 1976 
GA **** 1987 1987 1987 1987 
HI 1986 **** 1986 1986 1986 
ID 1987 2003 1990 1987 1987 
IL 1995 1995 1986 1986 1986 
IN **** 1995 1987 1985 1985 
IA **** **** 1988 1984 1984 
KS 1988 1987 **** 1975 1975 
KY **** **** 1988 1988 1988 
LA **** 1992 **** 1980 1980 
ME **** **** **** **** **** 
MD 1986 **** **** **** 1986 
MA **** **** **** **** **** 
MI **** <1971 1987 1987 <1971 
MN 1986 **** 1986 1989 1986 
MS 2005 2003 **** 1989 1989 
MO **** **** **** 1987 1987 
MT **** 1985 1988 1987 1985 
NE ****         <1971 **** 1992       <1971 
NV **** 1989 **** 1973 1973 
NH **** 1986 **** 1990 1986 
NJ **** 1996 1987 1987 1987 
NM **** **** **** 1982 1982 
NY **** **** **** 1986 1986 
NC **** 1996 **** **** 1996 
ND **** 1993 1977 1988 1977 
OH **** 1997 1988 1997 1988 
OK **** 1995 **** 1973 1973 
OR 1988 **** 1988 1975 1975 
PA **** **** **** 2002 2002 
RI **** **** **** **** **** 
SC **** **** **** **** **** 
SD **** **** **** <1971     <1971 
TN **** **** **** 1992 1992 
TX **** 1987 **** 1985 1985 
UT **** **** **** 1986 1986 
VT **** **** **** <1971 <1971 
VA **** 1988 **** **** 1988 
WA 1986 <1971 **** 1986 <1971 
WV **** **** **** **** **** 
WI **** **** **** 1995 1995 
WY **** **** **** 1986 1986 
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Note: **** indicates there is no such tort reform before 2005.
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Table B2 Estimated Survivor Functions: Kaplan-Meier Estimates for Tort Reforms on General Liability  
 
Year 
Four Tort Reform 
Survival 
Caps on punitive 
damage 
Joint and 
Several liability 
Collateral 
Source 
Caps on non-economic 
damage 
1971 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 
1972 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—)) 1.000 (—) 
1973 0.956 (0.031) 1.000 (—) 0.958 (0.029) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 
1974 0.956 (0.031) 1.000 (—) 0.958 (0.029) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 
1975 0.911 (0.042) 1.000 (—) 0.917 (0.040) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 
1976 0.899 (0.047) 0.980 (0.020) 0.917 (0.040) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 
1977 0.867 (0.051) 0.960 (0.028) 0.917 (0.040) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 
1978 0.867 (0.051) 0.900 (0.042) 0.917 (0.040) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 
1979 0.867 (0.051) 0.900 (0.042) 0.917 (0.040) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 
1980 0.844 (0.054) 0.900 (0.042) 0.896 (0.044) 1.000 (—)) 1.000 (—) 
1981 0.844 (0.054) 0.780 (0.059) 0.896 (0.044) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 
1982 0.822 (0.057) 0.780 (0.059) 0.875 (0.048) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 
1983 0.822 (0.057) 0.780 (0.059) 0.875 (0.048) 1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 
1984 0.800 (0.060) 0.780 (0.059) 0.854 (0.051)  1.000 (—) 1.000 (—) 
1985 0.711 (0.068) 0.780 (0.059) 0.812 (0.056) 0.977 (0.004) 1.000 (—) 
1986 0.467 (0.074) 0.780 (0.059) 0.583 (0.071) 0.977 (0.004) 0.960 (0.028) 
1987 0.356 (0.071) 0.660 (0.067) 0.458 (0.070) 0.927 (0.007) 0.960 (0.028) 
1988 0.267 (0.066) 0.660 (0.067) 0.375 (0.069) 0.887 (0.009) 0.840 (0.052) 
1989 0.244 (0.064) 0.660 (0.067) 0.354 (0.069) 0.858 (0.010) 0.840 (0.052) 
1990 0.244 (0.064) 0.660 (0.067) 0.333 (0.068) 0.858 (0.010) 0.840 (0.052) 
1991 0.244 (0.064) 0.660 (0.067) 0.333 (0.068) 0.858 (0.010) 0.840 (0.052) 
1992 0.222 (0.062) 0.660 (0.067) 0.292 (0.066) 0.858 (0.010) 0.840 (0.052) 
1993 0.222 (0.062) 0.620 (0.069) 0.292 (0.066) 0.841 (0.010) 0.840 (0.052) 
1994 0.222 (0.062) 0.620 (0.069) 0.292 (0.066) 0.841 (0.010) 0.780 (0.059) 
1995 0.200 (0.060) 0.600 (0.069) 0.271 (0.064) 0.823 (0.010) 0.780 (0.059) 
1996 0.178 (0.057) 0.600 (0.069) 0.271 (0.064) 0.765 (0.011) 0.780 (0.059) 
1997 0.178 (0.057) 0.600 (0.069) 0.250 (0.063) 0.745 (0.012) 0.760 (0.060) 
1998 0.178 (0.057) 0.600 (0.069) 0.250 (0.063) 0.724 (0.012) 0.760 (0.060) 
1999 0.178 (0.057) 0.600 (0.069) 0.250 (0.063) 0.724 (0.012) 0.760 (0.060) 
2000 0.178 (0.057) 0.600 (0.069) 0.25 (0.063) 0.724 (0.012) 0.760 (0.060) 
2001 0.178 (0.057) 0.600 (0.069) 0.250 (0.063) 0.724 (0.012) 0.760 (0.060) 
2002 0.156 (0.054) 0.600 (0.069) 0.229 (0.061) 0.724 (0.012) 0.760 (0.060) 
2003 0.133 (0.051) 0.600 (0.069) 0.208 (0.059) 0.675 (0.012) 0.760 (0.060) 
2004 0.133 (0.051) 0.600 (0.069) 0.208 (0.059) 0.650 (0.013) 0.760 (0.060) 
2005 0.133 (0.051) 0.600 (0.069) 0.208 (0.059) 0.650 (0.013) 0.760 (0.060) 
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Table B3 Year of the First Tort Reform Legislation on Medical Malpractice Liability, by State    
 
State 
Caps on Noneconomic 
Damages 
Caps on Punitive 
Damages 
Collateral 
Source 
Joint and Several 
Liability 
Four Tort 
Reforms 
AL 1987 1987 1987 **** 1987 
AK 1986 1998 1976 1986 1976 
AZ **** **** 1976 1988 1976 
AR **** 2003 **** 2003 2003 
CA 1976 **** 1976 1986 1976 
CO 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 
CT **** **** 1986 1987 1986 
DE **** **** **** **** **** 
FL 1987 1987 1976 1987 1976 
GA **** 1988 1988 1988 1988 
HI 1987 **** 1987 1987 1987 
ID 1975 2004 1990 1988 1975 
IL 1976 1995 1977 1987 1976 
IN 1976 1995 1987 1985 1976 
IA **** **** 1976 1985 1976 
KS 1988 1988 1976 1975 1975 
KY **** **** 1989 1977 1977 
LA **** 1992 **** 1981 1981 
ME **** **** 1990 **** 1990 
MD 1987 **** **** **** 1987 
MA 1987 **** 1987 **** 1987 
MI 1987 <1971 1987 1987 <1971 
MN 1987 **** 1986 1989 1986 
MS 2002 2004 **** 1990 1990 
MO 1986 **** **** 1988 1988 
MT 1996 1985 1988 1988 1985 
NE 1976         <1971 1976 1992     <1971 
NV 2003 1989 1975 1973 1973 
NH 1978 1987 **** 1990 1987 
NJ **** 1996 1988 1988 1988 
NM 1976 **** **** 1982 1976 
NY **** **** 1985 1987 1985 
NC **** 1996 **** **** 1996 
ND **** 1993 1977 1988 1977 
OH 1976 1997 1976 1997 1976 
OK 2004 1996 2004 1973 1973 
OR 1988 1988 1988 1976 1976 
PA **** 1997 1976 2002 1976 
RI **** **** 1976 **** 1976 
SC **** **** **** **** **** 
SD 1977 **** 1977 <1971     <1971 
TN **** **** 1976 1992 1976 
TX 1978 1988 **** 1986 1986 
UT 1988 **** 1987 1986 1986 
VT **** **** **** <1971 <1971 
VA **** 1989 **** **** 1989 
WA 1986 <1971 1975 1986 <1971 
WV 1986 **** 2003 1986 1986 
WI 1986 1985 1995 1995 1995 
WY **** **** **** 1986 1986 
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Table B4 Robustness Check with Alternative Measurements of Discrete Time Hazard Models of Political 
Economy Factors Influencing the Timing of General Liability Tort Reforms, 1971-2005
 
 Alternative 
A 
Alternative 
B 
Alternative 
C 
Alternative 
D 
Alternative 
E 
Weibull 
Model 
Ideological state spillover 3.298*** 
(0.536) 
— — — — — 
Republican control — 1.187** 
(0.482) 
— — — — 
Urban — — 0.015 
(0.011) 
— — — 
Liability insurance loss 0.365*** 
(0.057) 
0.355*** 
(0.057) 
0.340*** 
(0.057) 
0.305*** 
(0.055) 
0.355*** 
(0.058) 
0.223** 
(0.105) 
State Spillover — 2.741*** 
(0.503) 
2.691*** 
(0.506) 
2.778*** 
(0.458) 
2.671*** 
(0.530) 
-0.530 
(1.559) 
Heath care expenditure  -0.221 
(0.396) 
-0.184 
(0.399) 
-0.235  
(0.395) 
0.105 
(0.334) 
-0.179 
(0.353) 
-1.934*** 
(0.679) 
Credit spread  0.528* 
(0.274) 
0.693** 
(0.285) 
0.638** 
(0.280) 
0.437 
(0.318) 
0.764*** 
(0.242) 
-0.809 
(0.856) 
GSP per capita  -0.009 
(0.032) 
-0.010 
(0.033) 
-0.013 
(0.033) 
-0.017 
(0.031) 
0.013 
(0.043) 
-0.155*** 
(0.048) 
Ratio of republican   2.932*** 
(0.917) 
— 2.465*** 
(0.938) 
2.021** 
(0.839) 
2.327*** 
(0.846) 
4.549*** 
(1.753) 
Same party  0.426 
(0.267) 
0.426 
(0.266) 
0.473* 
(0.273) 
0.354 
(0.264) 
0.544** 
(0.249) 
0.856* 
(0.500) 
Republican ideology 0.038 
(0.031) 
0.014 
(0.030) 
0.029 
(0.032) 
0.015 
(0.030) 
0.022 
(0.029) 
0.086 
(0.082) 
Democratic ideology -0.070** 
(0.028) 
-0.059* 
(0.031) 
-0.059** 
(0.030) 
-0.055* 
(0.030) 
-0.060** 
(0.027) 
-0.061 
(0.045) 
Governor ideology  0.012 
(0.008) 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
Employment in insurer  0.048 
(0.088) 
0.058 
(0.093) 
0.027 
(0.093) 
0.059 
(0.095) 
0.017 
(0.095) 
0.128 
(0.162) 
Physician  -0.207** 
(0.082) 
-0.200*** 
(0.077) 
-0.196*** 
(0.074) 
-0.203*** 
(0.076) 
-0.200*** 
(0.076) 
-0.246* 
(0.147) 
Lawyer 0.081*** 
(0.027) 
0.085*** 
(0.027) 
0.078*** 
(0.028) 
  0.096*** 
(0.026) 
0.080*** 
(0.025) 
0.189*** 
(0.073) 
No-fault verbal -0.084 
(0.593) 
-0.116 
(0.545) 
-0.122 
(0.555) 
-0.132 
(0.577) 
-0.216 
(0.547) 
1.463 
(1.919) 
No-fault high value    1.108*** 
(0.377) 
1.142*** 
(0.366) 
1.131*** 
(0.387) 
1.383*** 
(0.370) 
1.253*** 
(0.363) 
0.325 
(0.938) 
Punitive damages insurable t 0.259 
(0.339) 
0.250 
(0.351) 
0.481 
(0.372) 
0.450 
(0.329) 
0.309 
(0.335) 
0.371 
(0.793) 
Rate regulation t 0.334 
(0.339) 
0.353 
(0.347) 
0.315 
(0.337) 
0.377 
(0.328) 
-0.078 
(0.320) 
0.039 
(0.584) 
South -0.703 
(0.457) 
-0.358 
(0.435) 
-0.136 
(0.439) 
-0.333 
(0.412) 
-0.196 
(0.440) 
-0.134 
(0.851) 
Midwest 0.016 
(0.474) 
0.460 
(0.495) 
0.581 
(0.536) 
0.391 
(0.502) 
0.533 
(0.532) 
0.104 
(0.970) 
Northeast -1.712** 
(0.725) 
-1.321* 
(0.716) 
-1.074 
(0.691) 
-1.020 
(0.681) 
-1.007 
(0.748) 
-3.859** 
(1.634) 
1/P 
— — — — — 
0.147                
(0.043) 
Log duration time 0.534 
(0.464) 
0.371 
(0.452) 
0.551 
(0.515) 
0.156 
(0.401) 
0.149 
(0.505) 
— 
Temp tort reform  0.558 0.605 0.719* 0.511 -0.586 — 
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The dependent variable equals one if a state enacts tort reform on general liability in that year and zero otherwise. The 
first five models report results of the timing of state enactments of any of the four permanent tort reforms on general 
liability gradually by using multivariate survival analysis, in which observations of each tort reform are stacked. Temp 
tort reform is a dummy variable representing temporary tort reforms in effect but ultimately held unconstitutional. The 
fourth column uses a different definition of tort reform “effective” enactment: any tort reform enactment after July of year 
t is treated as effective tort reform in year t+1. The fifth column reports results when using the lagged value of variables 
instead of contemporaneous variables. The sixth column reports the results of the continuous Weibull model. Standard 
errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the first five columns (jackknife standard error); robust to 
clustering by year in the last column) are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B5 Fixed Effect Regressions of Ex Post Consequences of Liability Tort Reforms, 1971-2005 
 
The dependent variables are direct loss incurred of different liability insurance lines scaled by GSP multiplied by 1000.  
All variables are measured for each state in each year. The tort reform indicators are equal to one in the years when the 
tort reforms are effective and zero otherwise. All the variables are described as in Table 2.   State fixed effects and year 
fixed effects are included in all regressions. The medical malpractice model has observations after 1974 since medical 
liability insurance is separated from other liability insurance only since 1974. The standard errors adjusted for clustering 
at the state level are in the parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.
(0.356) (0.368) (0.369) (0.357) (0.547) 
Constant -6.586*** 
(2.041) 
-6.720*** 
(2.064) 
-8.365*** 
(2.342) 
-6.366** 
(2.052) 
-6.546*** 
(2.036) 
-16.101** 
(6.436) 
Observations    5486 5486 5486 5529 5292 825 
 Loss of other 
liability insurance 
Loss of auto liability 
insurance 
Loss of medical 
malpractice insurance 
Caps on noneconomic damages   -0.434*** 
(0.105) 
   -0.427* 
(0.208) 
-0.021 
(0.040) 
Joint and several liability -0.269** 
(0.127) 
-0.131 
(0.237) 
-0.030 
(0.044) 
Caps on punitive damages  -0.106 
(0.100) 
0.160 
(0.289) 
-0.062 
(0.047) 
Collateral Source 0.114 
(0.118) 
-0.182 
(0.251) 
0.020 
(0.043) 
No-fault verbal 
— 
  -0.688** 
(0.320) 
— 
No-fault high value 
— 
0.014                  
 (0.324) 
— 
Constant    0.978*** 
(0.058) 
  5.447*** 
(0.134) 
   0.491*** 
(0.047) 
Medical malpractice tort reform Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 0.580 0.742 0.527 
Observations 1750 1750 1550 
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Essay II: Market Discipline and Government Guarantees: Evidence from the Insurance 
Industry*  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We identify the effect of public guarantees on market discipline by exploiting the rich variation 
in U.S. state guarantees of property-liability insurer obligations. We find government guarantees 
significantly reduce the sensitivity of premium growth to changes in financial strength ratings, 
and that this reduced sensitivity applies to both price and volume changes. The effects are 
concentrated among insurers rated A- or lower by A.M. Best, the leading financial strength 
rating agency in the insurance industry. For downgraded insurers, we find that premium growth 
in business not covered by state guarantees falls in relation to growth in its covered business, 
with the estimate of the difference being as high as 15% for A- rated insurers and 10% for 
insurers rated below A-. 
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The system of government guarantees is a double-edged sword: it can help to reduce 
systemic risk by preventing destabilizing runs on financial institutions, but it also reduces the 
incentives of consumers to monitor the solvency of their financial institutions. In general, 
consumers prefer financially strong institutions, but guarantees can reduce the costs associated 
with weak financial institutions. Understanding whether and how government guarantees reduce 
market discipline is important for regulatory policy.  
Identifying the effect, however, is difficult. Studies from the banking industry have taken 
a variety of approaches---but most suffer from the drawback that guarantees are applied on a 
national basis, which makes it difficult to disentangle the effect of the guarantee from other 
confounding influences. This paper studies the impact of government guarantees on market 
discipline by exploiting the unique institutional structure of the U.S. property-liability (P/L) 
insurance industry.  
U.S. P/L insurers are licensed and regulated on a state by state basis. Each state has its 
own guaranty fund, which protects the policyholders of the licensed insurance companies that 
fail. The types of insurance that receive guaranty fund protection differ across states and time. 
The generosity of the guaranty also differs across states and time, as states set different 
maximum claim amounts and net worth provisions. Unlicensed insurers do not receive guarantee 
fund coverage.1 This study exploits the cross-sectional and time-series heterogeneity in the 
breadth and depth of state insurance guaranty fund coverage to identify the influence of public 
guarantees on market discipline.  
We examine whether state insurance guaranty funds dull customer sensitivity to risk by 
investigating the relationship between firm premium growth and changes in A.M. Best Company 
financial strength ratings, which assess an insurer’s ability to meet ongoing obligations to its 
policyholders. Since policyholders covered by guaranty funds have less to lose from the failure 
of their insurer than do policyholders not covered, we hypothesize that premium growth in lines 
and states protected by guaranty funds will be less sensitive to rating changes. The alternative 
hypothesis is guaranty funds have no effect on market discipline when there is a change in 
insurer risk.  
                                                 
1 Unlicensed insurers provide coverage on risks that were not accepted by the licensed insurers in the state. An 
insurer can be licensed in one state, yet provide insurance on an unlicensed (surplus lines) basis in another state.  
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We investigate the question at two levels. The first level of analysis is at the firm-line 
level and uses the proportion of uncovered premiums as the measure of the extent of guaranty 
fund protection. We use control group tests and fixed effects regressions to measure the 
difference between covered and uncovered growth in the aftermath of a change in risk. Our 
analysis shows that guaranty funds decrease market discipline significantly, but the effect is 
asymmetric. The presence of guaranty funds consistently and significantly reduces market 
discipline for the downgrades of A- or low-rated insurers, whereas the effect for upgrades is 
weaker. 
The second level of analysis, which pushes well beyond the level used in previous 
studies, is at the firm-state-line-year level. Our data allows us to decompose each firm’s yearly 
premiums by state and by line of business, so we are able to classify each state-line combination 
according to whether it is covered by a state guaranty fund or not. First, we use firm-line-year 
fixed effects and state fixed effects to exploit variation in guaranty fund coverage across states. 
The primary source of variation is between licensed business, which receives guaranty fund 
coverage, and unlicensed business, which does not. A secondary source of variation is 
differences across states in what lines of insurance are covered by guaranty funds. Second, we 
use firm-state-year fixed effects and line fixed effects to exploit variation across the lines of 
insurance within the state that do and do not receive guaranty fund coverage. Third, we use firm-
line-state fixed effects and year fixed effects to exploit variation across time, as states add and 
drop lines from guaranty fund coverage over the years and some insurers write on both a licensed 
and unlicensed basis over the sample period. The analyses are performed separately for 
downgraded and upgraded firms. Using these specific levels of analysis, we compare the 
premium growth of different business segments within the same insurers, i.e. insurers operating 
the same lines of business across states, or insurers operating different lines within a state. We 
find that for a downgraded insurer premium growth in business covered by a state guaranty fund 
falls in relation to growth in its covered business, with the estimate of the difference being as 
high as 15% for insurers rated A- and 10% for insurers rated below A-.  However, when a state 
eliminates guarantee fund coverage for a line of business, the effect is much greater---30% for 
insurers rated A- and 46% for insurers rated below A-. Effects are concentrated among insurers 
rated A- or lower by A.M. Best.  In addition, our evidence suggests that the effects are mostly in 
commercial insurance. 
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 We further investigate the mechanism by which market discipline and guaranty funds 
work. Policyholders can discipline higher risk insurers by buying less insurance coverage, 
shifting their insurance contract to a lower risk insurer, or by demanding lower prices. 
Accordingly, we also investigate the relationship between insurance prices and guaranty funds 
surrounding changes in financial strength ratings. We do so by interacting the guaranty fund 
protection with rating changes to test whether the effect of guaranty funds on market discipline is 
through price changes. We find guaranty funds blunt market discipline: price growth is less 
sensitive to ratings changes in the presence of guaranty fund protection. The magnitude of the 
decrease is smaller for price growth than it is for premium growth. The results suggest that the 
reduced sensitivity of premium growth by guaranty funds applies to both price and volume 
changes. 
This paper contributes to at least three lines of literature. First, our analysis connects 
closely to studies examining deposit insurance and market discipline in banking (e.g., Billett, 
Garfinkel and O’Neal, 1998; Park and Peristiani, 1998; Martinez Peria and Schmuckler, 2001; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Forssbaeck, 2011; Karas et al., 2013). Insurance guaranty 
funds are similar to deposit insurance in banking in that both protect small 
depositors/policyholders against financial institution insolvency, and are designed to stabilize the 
financial institutions. However, insurance guaranty funds differ from deposit insurance in three 
important dimensions. First, the FDIC charges risk based premiums but guaranty funds are 
funded by assessments that are not risk-based. Second, guaranty fund protection is less well 
known to the public. Banks advertise FDIC protection, while regulations forbid insurance sellers 
to advertise the presence of guaranty fund protection. Third, and most importantly for our 
purposes, guaranty funds are organized on a state basis, while deposit insurance is national. Rich 
variation in guaranty fund coverage across states and time provides us with a unique opportunity 
to measure the effect of public guarantees without the identification problems present in most 
banking studies. 
Second, there is a growing literature on how market discipline works in insurance sectors 
(e.g. Eling and Kiesenbauer, 2012; Sommer, 1996; Epermanis and Harrington, 2006; Eling and 
Schmit, 2012). Perhaps most relevant to our context is the study by Epermanis and Harrington 
(2006), which examines the impact of discrete risk changes (i.e., ratings downgrades) on the 
premium growth rate of insurers. They find premium declines for downgrades are larger for 
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commercial insurance than personal insurance. Our research explicitly incorporates the 
heterogeneity in guaranty fund protection across lines and states and thus enables us to explicitly 
measure the effect of guaranty funds. We find guaranty funds significantly reduce the sensitivity 
of premium growth to changes in financial strength ratings. Third, our findings provide 
additional evidence on the adverse incentives created by guaranty funds, thus connecting to the 
literature on the effects of guaranty funds on insurance market behavior (Cummins, 1988; Lee, 
Mayers, and Smith 1997; Lee and Smith, 1999; Grace et al. 2014).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides background 
information on guaranty funds and discusses the related literature. Section II reports the data 
sources and the procedures of sample selection. Section III provides the identification strategy. 
Section IV discusses the main empirical results and robustness check. Section V explores the 
possible underlying mechanism of market discipline. Section VI concludes. 
I. Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Funds 
State P/L insurance guaranty funds, enacted between 1969 and 1981, cover policyholder 
losses associated with insurer insolvencies. The funds are administered by nonprofit associations 
that consist of all the licensed insurers in the state that write insurance in lines covered by the 
guaranty funds. All states, with the exception of New York,2 finance these funds by levying post-
insolvency assessments on solvent insurers. Assessments, based on the net direct premiums 
written in the state during the past year, are subject to a statutory ceiling (typically 2%). The 
assessment is independent of an insurer’s risk. Assessed insurers can recoup these fees through 
rate increases and/or tax offsets at a rate of up to 20% per year. Thus, future policyholders and 
current taxpayers fund guaranty funds 
Guaranty fund protection is not complete in several respects. First, guaranty funds do not 
cover all lines of insurance. The lines most commonly excluded are: accident and health, credit, 
fidelity, mortgage guaranty, financial guaranty, ocean marine, surety, title, and warranty. 
However, there is variation in the excluded lines across time3 and significant variation across the 
                                                 
2 New York uses a pre-funding model instead of an ex-post funding model. 
3 Several states changed their excluded lines during our sample years. For example, NV started to exclude financial 
guaranty, warranty and credit in 1993; OH started to exclude financial guaranty, fidelity and credit in 1994; and PA 
started to exclude financial guaranty and warranty in 1995. 
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states.4 Second, guaranty funds do not pay claims beyond maximum amounts. The maximum 
claim amount ranges from $100,000-$5,000,000. Table 1 shows that a majority of states have a 
maximum amount in the $300,000-$500,000 range. In most states, the caps do not apply to 
workers compensation insurance. Third, some states apply policyholder net worth provisions, in 
which claims are not paid for policyholders that have a net worth that exceeds specified levels. 
The typical net worth provision is $25,000,000, the net worth cap ranges from $5,000,000 to 
$50,000,000 (see Table 1). Fourth, the policyholders of insurers not licensed in the state (surplus 
lines insurers) are not covered by guaranty funds. Surplus lines insurers underwrite risks that do 
not meet the underwriting guidelines of licensed insurers or require specialized coverage, pricing 
or underwriting. Surplus lines insurers have flexibility both in contract language and pricing that 
allow them to underwrite a variety of risks---including ones that are unusual and/or substandard--
that do not conform to typical insurer appetites.   
 Guaranty funds can be viewed as providing a put option on the value of the insurer’s 
assets with a strike price equal to the value of the insurance policies (e.g. Cummins, 1988). The 
flat rate premiums in New York and the post-assessment schemes of the other states do not 
reflect insurer risk. Lee, et al. (1997) and Downs and Sommer (1999) find that stock insurers 
increased their asset risk with the enactment of guaranty-fund laws.  
II. Data and Sample Construction 
We use data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) annual 
statement database for the period 1989-2012. The database contains underwriting and financial 
information for all U.S P/L insurers. Our analysis is based on affiliated and unaffiliated single 
insurers. The Exhibit of Premiums Written (Schedule T) in the annual statement documents the 
states in which the insurer is licensed and the amount of business an insurer (licensed or 
unlicensed) writes in each state and line of business. We also collect other firm level information 
including total assets, leverage, reinsurance ceded, business diversification, and firm 
                                                 
4 Accident and health insurance is excluded in all but five (5) states: MI, MT, WA, WV, WI , and WY. Credit is 
excluded in all but two (2) states: MD and MI.  Fidelity is excluded in all but eighteen (18) states: AL, AZ, AR, KS, 
KY, ME, MD, MI, MN, MT, NM, NY, OK, OR, VT, WA WV, and WY. Financial guaranty is excluded by all but 
twelve (12) states: AL, AZ, KS, MD, MI, MT, NJ, OR, VT, WA, WV, and WY. Mortgage guaranty is excluded by 
all but one (1) state: MI. Ocean Marine is excluded in all but six (6) states: AK, KS, ME, MD, MI, and NY. Surety is 
excluded in all but eight (8) states: AR, KS, KY, ME, MD, MI, MN, and NY. Title is excluded in all but eight (8) 
states: AL, AK, CO, MD, MI, NH, NY, and ND. Warranty is excluded in all but nineteen (19) states: AL, CA, CO, 
CT, KS, MD, MI,  MT, NE, NH, NJ,  NM, NY, OK, OR, VT, WA,WV, and WY.  
 65 
 
demographics such as organizational form, distribution channel, and whether the insurer is 
affiliated with a group of insurers. The other firm data are obtained on a calendar-year basis. 
We use A.M. Best rating changes to proxy insurer financial strength changes. The 
insurance market is evaluated by several rating agencies such as A.M. Best, Fitch, Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P). Among them, A.M Best has, by far, the most comprehensive 
coverage over the sample period. AM Best’s financial strength ratings are assessments of 
insurers’ claims paying ability.5 From A.M. Best’s Insurance Reports, Property-Casualty Edition 
and Best’s Key Rating Guide, we obtain insurer financial strength ratings from 1989 to 2011. 
Similar to Epermanis and Harrington (2006), we use rating changes to proxy for changes in 
insurer default risk. The financial strength ratings are on a scale from A++ (the highest) to F (the 
lowest). Bohn and Hall (1997) find that insurers approaching insolvency have unusually high 
premium growth two years prior to failure. As a result, we exclude the small number of insurers 
with financial strength ratings below C- (less than 0.1% of total observations).6 Firm-year 
observations in which the firm was not assigned a rating by A.M. Best – for reasons such as 
insufficient size, company request, or failure to submit an NAIC annual statement – are excluded 
from our analysis, as are observations rated on the parallel Financial Performance Rating (FPR) 
scale that was used during the 1990’s. A.M Best updates ratings throughout the year with most 
changes occurring before July. To allow comparability with other studies (e.g., Epermanis and 
Harrington, 2006), we treat any rating change from August of last year through July of this year 
as a rating change in this year, and any rating change after August of this year as a rating change 
in the next year. Table 2 shows A.M. Best ratings and how we categorize the ratings into high 
(above A-), A-, and low (below A-) ratings.  
We match the insurer data with guaranty fund data in the P/L insurance industry. The 
guaranty fund data has been hand collected from the following sources: the National Conference 
of Insurance Guaranty Funds, state insurance divisions, and the session laws and compiled 
statutes of the various states.  
                                                 
5 A.M. Best also issues credit ratings on the financial instruments issued by insurance companies. We focus on 
financial strength ratings because the intent of these ratings is to help policyholders make decisions on which 
insurers to buy coverage from.   
6 All of the results are robust to the inclusion of these very low-rated firms (rated as D, E and F). 
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To be included in the sample, firms must have positive direct and net premiums written 
and write business in a certain line in the three years around a rating change (i.e. year t-1, t, t+1).7 
Insurers that specialize in reinsurance or international business are excluded. The original sample 
has 4,615,898 firm-line-year-state level observations and is aggregated to 245,934 firm-line-year 
level observations with many observations being zero in premiums written. The sample screens 
described above reduce the sample to 147,998 firm-line-year level observations. The inclusion of 
lagged rating variables in our regressions further reduces the sample to 142,247 firm-line-year 
level observations. In our analysis of the impact of market discipline on prices, we exclude all 
observations with negative prices. This step reduces the price sample to 120,533 observations at 
the firm-line-year level. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the 
effect of outliers. 
III. Identification strategy 
A. Firm-line level specification 
Our identification strategy is to exploit the features of guaranty funds that vary across the 
states and time. The variations in guaranty fund coverage are quasi-natural experiments—they 
directly protect insureds but are exogenous to the insurers’ financial strength. We first examine 
how government guarantees and rating changes affect premium growth at the firm-line level, 
with controls for firm observed and unobserved (invariant) heterogeneity, line of business 
unobserved (invariant) heterogeneity and unobserved time heterogeneity. Insurance lines with a 
higher proportion of premiums not covered by guaranty funds are hypothesized to be more risk 
sensitive and, thereby, more affected by rating changes. To measure this effect, we aggregate 
direct written premiums to the firm-line-year level to obtain total direct premiums, direct 
premiums not covered by guaranty funds (called uncovered premiums) and direct premiums 
covered by guaranty funds (called covered premiums).8 Specifically, we calculate  as the 
proportion of direct premiums written not covered by guaranty funds to total direct premiums 
written at the firm-line-year.  
                                                 
7 Since our unit of analysis is at firm-line-year level, as long as a firm writes the same line of business in any of the 
50 states in the three years surrounding rating change, it is included in our sample.  
8 For example, suppose Insurer ABC writes direct business in Other Liability insurance in three states in 2009: 
$1,000,000 in Michigan, $1,500,000 in Wisconsin, and $200,000 in Illinois. Insurer ABC, however, is not licensed 
in Illinois, so it writes business as a surplus lines insurer. The total direct premiums are $1,000,000 + $1,500,000 + 
$200,000 = $2,700,000. The uncovered premiums are $200,000 and the covered premiums are $2,500,000. 
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A potential concern with the research design is that premium changes may happen before 
changes in firm financial strength ratings. First, unfavorable changes in the insurance market 
(e.g. large catastrophes) could deplete insurer capital and lead to changes in premium growth and 
financial strength ratings. Second, insurers could begin to cut unprofitable business or expand 
profitable business before the rating agency discloses new information. For example, an insurer 
that anticipates a weak operating environment in the future may respond by reducing the amount 
of business they write, while firms that anticipate a strong operating environment may expand. 
Third, unobservable firm and line of business heterogeneity could be correlated with both 
premium growth and rating changes. Fourth, premium growth could result from private 
information and an anticipated change in an insurer’s rating.  
To address these concerns, we use three strategies. First, to address unfavorable changes 
in the environment for writing insurance we include indicator variables for one-year leaded, 
contemporaneous, and one-year lagged rating changes (i.e. rating change indicators in t+1, t, and 
t-1). We interact these indicators with guaranty fund coverage in the previous year to identify 
evidence on market discipline across different levels of protected financing. The strategy of 
using leading and lagged indicators is also employed by Epermanis and Harrington (2006). The 
one year lagged rating change is used to account for the ex post effects of the rating change. The 
coefficients of leaded variables provide insight into whether market discipline occurs in the year 
prior to a rating change. The differences among the coefficients of the leaded, contemporaneous, 
and lagged rating change variables provide information on whether market discipline occurs 
before, during, or after the year of the rating change. Second, to address the concern that the 
proportion of uncovered premiums may vary through time and be correlated with the error term, 
we use the lagged value of the proportion of uncovered premiums. We also include the 
interaction of a linear time trend with the proportion of uncovered premiums in the regressions. 
Third, to further control for the possibility that the insurers and markets anticipate rating changes 
we include a non-ratings based measure of firm risk. In particular, we include the variable, 
Anticipation, which is the average value of default-value-to-liability ratio (Risk) for the year’s t-1 
and t-2.9 
The main estimating equation is:  
                                                 
9 The precise definition of the variable Anticipation is in Appendix A. 
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where ijtP  is premium growth for firm i, line j and year t;  is the proportion of direct 
premiums written not covered by guaranty funds to total premiums. Specifically, we measure 
premium growth using direct premiums written since net premiums written (premium net of 
reinsurance) is not available at the state level. Growth in direct premiums written 
( ) is measured as the first difference of the log of direct premium written by 
insurer  at time  and the log of direct premium written by insurer  at time . The premium 
growth measures are censored at -1 and 1.10 , , and are vectors of binary 
variables equal to 1 for lead rating changes, contemporaneous changes, and lagged changes 
(upgrade or downgrade) for firm  in year t.  is the stack vector of these binary variables. The 
 represents a firm-line fixed effect, which absorbs unobservable differences at the firm and line 
of business level; is a year fixed effect, and  is an error term.  
The expected premium growth conditional on no rating change is: 
ijtit-1ijt10ijt XPchange) rating no|PE(   2'                                   
(2) 
where is lagged log premiums;  is a vector of covariates that includes controls for firm 
time variant characteristics such as asset, leverage, reinsurance ceded, geographical 
diversification, line of business diversification, organizational form, direct writer, premiums 
subjected to prior approval rate regulation and rating categories (A- or LOW) in the previous 
year (see extended models in Table 8 for more details), and also guaranty fund related controls 
such as claim caps and net worth provisions.11 This research design allows us to account for both 
the time-invariant characteristics of firm and lines of business and the time-varying 
characteristics of firms.  
 and  in equation (1) capture the current and post yearly premium growth 
percentage response to a change in the proportion of uncovered premiums for a firm-line-year 
experiencing a rating change, relative to the current and post premium growth of the control 
                                                 
10 Our results hold if we do not censor premium growth at -1 and 1, and the effects of guaranty funds are larger. 
11 The hypotheses and precise definitions of the control variables can be found in Appendix A.  
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group (those with ), respectively.   measures the difference in the premium 
growth between the firm-line with positive and the control group one year before the 
firm-line experiences a rating change. Evidence that government guarantees dull market 
discipline requires that the difference between  and  (or ) to be statistically and 
economically distinguishable from zero. We also extend equation (1) to incorporate the effects of 
the A.M. Best rating category (High, A-, Low). 
B. Firm-line-state level specification 
Many insurers operate the same line of business in multiple states and/or operate multiple 
lines in one state, providing insurance to both protected and unprotected customers. Some states 
change their guaranty fund coverage over years as well. Thus, we can use data on the firm-line-
state-year level to further control for potentially confounding effects and to detect the source of 
variation, by using business that is protected by a guarantee fund as a control group. To be 
included in these regressions, a firm-line-state-year observation is required to be downgraded in 
that year. We run the regressions three ways. The first regression includes a firm-line-year fixed 
effect and a state fixed effect. The firm-line-year fixed effect sweep out the variation between 
firm-lines, making the estimates based on only the variation within each firm-line and across 
states. The state fixed effect controls constant state unobserved heterogeneity over time. Within 
firm-line variation occurs when a given firm-line has premiums in two or more states whose 
guaranty fund protection differs at least once during the sample period. The primary source of 
identification is driven by surplus lines insurers, i.e., insurance firms that are not licensed in 
some states and therefore not covered by guaranty funds. A secondary source of identification is 
the lines of insurance that receive guaranty fund coverage in some states but not others (see 
footnote 4). The second regression includes a firm-state-year fixed effect and a line fixed effect. 
The firm-state-year fixed effect sweeps out the between firm-state variation, and the effect of 
guaranty funds is identified on the basis of protection differences within a firm operating 
multiple lines of business in a state. In other word, the regression tests for variation across line of 
business within each firm and state. The third regression includes a firm-line-state fixed effect 
and a year fixed effect. The two fixed effects identify the effect of guaranty funds over time. The 
sources of identification are states modifying the lines of business that receive guaranty fund 
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coverage and insurers changing their licensing status over the years of the sample period. 
Specifically, we estimate the following models: 
State variations: 
ijststsitijstuijstsijtijst StatePRCerUnPP   
''
11 cov          (3) 
Insurance line of business variations: 
ijstjtjitijstuijstjistijst LinePRCerUnPP   
''
11 cov          (4) 
Time variations: 
ijststsjtjitijstuijsttijsijst stateLinePRCerUnPP   
'''
11 cov     (5) 
 where  is premium growth for firm i, insurance line j, state s, and year t; is the 
natural logarithm of lagged premiums, itPRC  is the pre-change rating category (i.e. A- or 
Low), and   is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm  insurance line j is 
not covered by the guaranty fund in state s in year t, and 0 otherwise;  is a vector of 
state time-variant variables including insurance gross state production per capita, 
employment in the insurance sector, income per capita and the number of insurers that 
became insolvent;  is a vector of aggregated line of business time-variant variables 
including loss ratio and loss volatility;  is the firm-line-year fixed effect;  is the state 
fixed effect;  is the firm-state-year fixed effect; and  is the line fixed effect. The 
standard errors are clustered at the firm-line-year in (3) and at the firm-state-year in (4).12   
IV. Impact of State Guaranty Funds on Market Discipline 
A. Summary statistics and control group tests for premium growth  
Figure 1 shows the quantile plot of the proportion of uncovered premiums to total direct 
premiums at the firm-line level. More than 80% of the firm-line-year observations are fully 
covered by guaranty funds (the proportion of uncovered premiums equals 0). Beyond this 80th 
percentile threshold, the proportion of uncovered premiums increases sharply from 0% 
uncovered to above 50%. Amongst the firm-line-year observations that write uncovered 
insurance, less than 3% have less than 25% in uncovered premiums. We categorize firm-line-
                                                 
12 The definitions and data sources of control variables in equation (3) to equation (5) are described in the Appendix. 
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year observations into “covered” and “uncovered” groups using a threshold of 25% of business 
written in uncovered premiums for the control group tests.13  
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Panel A 
shows the summary statistics at the firm-line-year level for the full sample. Average direct 
premium growth is 4.3% and average direct premium written is 3,863,175. The average 
proportion of direct premiums that are uncovered by guaranty funds is 13.7%. 
Panel B shows the summary statistics at the firm-line-year level for the regression 
sample. The average value for the default-value-to-liability ratio (Risk) is 0.1%. Nineteen 
percent of the observations are direct writers of insurance, 17.1% are mutuals, and 81.6% are 
affiliated with a group. The average observation has a product line Herfindahl of 0.330 and 
geographical Herfindhal of 0.436. On average, 24.6% of direct premiums written are in business 
lines and states subject to stringent rate regulation; 87.7% are in states with a guaranty fund 
maximum claim amount of $300,000 or more; and 41.1% are in states with net worth provisions 
beyond $25,000,000.     
Table 4 shows the number and distribution of firms by rating category and by upgrades 
and downgrades. Table 4 Panel A provides this information for the sample uncovered by 
guaranty funds, while Panel B shows it for the covered sample. Comparing Panel A and Panel B, 
the uncovered sample has a slightly lower percentage of downgraded insurers. Meanwhile, there 
is a higher percentage of upgrades in the uncovered sample, especially for observations with 
ratings below A-. Figure 2 Panel A-C show that the patterns of rating changes by year are similar 
for the covered-and uncovered-samples.  
We start with control group tests of premium growth. To measure abnormal growth in 
premiums, we use time, line, and size adjusted mean (median) abnormal premium growth. For 
each year and line of business, we rank all insurers by total direct premiums and calculate mean 
(median) premium growth for insurers in each premium decile. The time, line, and size adjusted 
premium growth for each insurer equals its growth in line j and year t minus the mean (median) 
growth for insurers in its premium decile in line j and year t. The estimated mean (median) 
abnormal premium growth for downgraded firms in each rating category equals the difference 
between the mean (median) adjusted growth for downgraded insurers and for insurers with no 
rating change. A similar analysis is performed for upgraded insurers. 
                                                 
13 The results are robust to the use of different thresholds, such as 50%. 
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The results are shown in Table 5. The mean abnormal premium growth for downgrades is 
negative and statistically significant in year t and t+1 for both the covered and uncovered groups, 
but the magnitudes of the premium change are significantly different. Mean abnormal premium 
growth is -13.50% in year t and -10.03% in year t+1 for the uncovered-group, while it is -7.52% 
in year t and -7.77% in year t+1 for the covered-group. The mean abnormal premium growth for 
upgrades is positive and statistically significant in both year t (4.38%) and t+1 (3.72%) for the 
uncovered group only. Consistent with previous findings in the literature (e.g., Epermanis and 
Harrington (2006)), insurers experience more premium change when downgraded. 
Table 6 shows the control group test results by pre-change rating category (high, A-, or 
low) – Panel A for insurer downgrades and Panel B for upgrades. The mean abnormal premium 
growth for downgrades is negative and statistically significant in year t and t+1 for both the 
covered and uncovered group. However, for firms rated A- and below, the mean and median 
abnormal premium growth for the covered and uncovered group are significantly different. 
Specifically, in the A- rating category mean abnormal premium growth is -30.01% in year t and    
-31.65% in year t+1 for the uncovered-group. It is -14.80% in year t and -17.28% in year t+1 for 
the covered-group. The difference between the uncovered and covered-groups is -14.22% and -
14.37% in year t and t+1, respectively. For low rated firms, mean abnormal premium growth is -
26.01% in year t and -17.01% in year t+1 for the uncovered-group and -13.04% and -11.61% for 
the covered-group. The difference is -12.96% in year t and -5.40% in year t+1. The difference in 
mean and median abnormal premium growth between the two groups in year t-1 is not 
statistically significant for downgrades, suggesting that there is no pattern change in premiums 
prior to the downgrade. The results indicate that the uncovered-group experiences more negative 
mean abnormal premium growth with a rating downgrade compared to the covered-group. 
 The results in Panel B show that with a rating upgrade low rated firms in the uncovered-
group experience significantly greater mean abnormal premium growth than the covered-group. 
In particular, mean abnormal premium growth is 18.52% in year t and 13.52% in year t+1 for the 
uncovered group, while it is 2.75% and 7.44% for the covered group. The difference is 15.76% 
in year t and 6.07% in year t+1. Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
presence of guaranty fund protection reduces the sensitivity of premium growth to changes in 
insurer’s financial strength ratings. 
B. Regression results at the firm-line-year level 
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 Negative signs on the A- and LOW rating dummies are consistent with market discipline. 
A negative (positive) estimate of  for the lagged or contemporaneous downgrade (upgrade) 
indicators is also interpreted as evidence of market discipline. A significant positive (negative) 
estimate of would indicate that the higher the proportion of uncovered premiums the higher 
(lower) the premium growth. The interaction of the proportion of uncovered premiums variable 
with the vector of rating changes estimates whether guaranty funds reduce market discipline. 
Specifically, a negative and significant  and  would suggest that the presence of 
guaranty fund protection reduces market discipline, i.e., guaranty funds dull the risk sensitivity 
of demand. 
 Table 7 reports the least squares and fixed effects estimates of the model described by 
equations (1) and (2) for direct premium growth. Model (1) reports the OLS results, Model (2) 
shows the results with firm-line, and year fixed effects, Model (3) adds “Anticipation” and firm 
and guaranty fund controls. In order to account for the possibility that the size of the insurer 
influences the effect of market discipline, we use weighted fixed effects in Model (4).14 Model 
(5), which we discuss in detail below, is a 2SLS regression, which is designed to address the 
concern that changes in the proportion of uncovered premiums may arise endogenously with 
rating changes. 
The implications of the regressions are broadly consistent with those of the control group 
tests, but the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients on the rating change variables are smaller 
in the fixed effects regressions. A Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that differences in the 
coefficients of OLS and fixed effects are not systematic, suggesting the fixed effects approach is 
appropriate. The results are robust to the inclusion of the firm and guaranty fund controls and to 
the interaction of the linear year trend with the proportion of uncovered premiums. The results 
support the hypothesis that guaranty fund protection reduces policyholder sensitivity to risk---the 
coefficients for  are about -0.047 for downgraded insurers and 0.034 for upgraded insurers 
in Model (2).15 The coefficient on Anticipation is not significant, indicating that market 
anticipation of insurer risk change is weak. We get similar results using weighted fixed effects 
                                                 
14 We divide the insurers into ten ranked groups based on their average premium written across years. We assign the 
number 1-10 to each group and use them as weights. 
15 To identify whether monitoring by policyholders differs between direct writers and firms that use independent 
agents and brokers, we divide the sample into two subsamples: direct writers and non-direct writers. We find the 
effects of guaranty funds mainly come from firms that use independent agents and brokers. 
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(Model (4)), but the magnitudes by which guaranty funds dull risk sensitivity are marginally 
higher. 
Table 8 extends equations (1) and (2) by incorporating pre-change rating categories.16 
The coefficients in the fixed effects model for  provide little evidence that premium growth 
the year prior to a rating change varies with the proportion of uncovered premiums. The 
coefficients for   for A- insurer downgrades (-0.199) and for Low insurer 
downgrades (-0.145) are significantly negative, indicating that firm-lines with a relatively higher 
proportion of uncovered premiums experience more negative premium reactions to downgrades, 
ceteris paribus.  
Economically, the coefficient in year t for the downgrade of an A- rated insurer implies 
that a 10% increase in the proportion of uncovered premiums is associated with 2.0% decrease in 
premium growth to a downgrade action. Given that the difference between the average 
proportion of uncovered premiums for the covered- and uncovered-group is approximately 86% 
(see the table attached to Figure 1) and statistically significant, the A- rated uncovered-group 
would, on average, be associated with -17.2% premium growth with a downgrade in year t. The 
low rated uncovered-group would, on average, experience -12.3% premium growth with a 
downgrade in year t. These results suggest that guaranty funds dull the risk sensitivity of 
financing costs when insurers are downgraded. Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction 
variable for low rated insurer upgrades is 0.070, suggesting that, on average, the low rated 
uncovered-group realizes 6.0% additional premium growth with upgrades in year t.  
While the features of guaranty funds in each state (i.e. which lines are covered, the 
maximum claim amount, and the net worth provisions) are exogenous for individual insurers, it 
is possible that the proportion of uncovered premiums is endogenous, as insurers that experience 
downgrades may rely more on covered business, and vice versa.17 To deal with this potential 
problem, we use an instrumental variables (2SLS) procedure based on the weighted fixed effects 
model. The first stage regression instruments the proportion of uncovered premiums with its 
value lagged by three years, Mutual, Group, Busherf, and Geoherf. The R2 of the first regression 
                                                 
16 We also explore different rating thresholds. In particular, we use B++ instead of A-. Our results hold and the 
effects of guarantees for insurers rated below B++ are larger than those for insurers rated below A-.    
17 A significant proportion of insurance that is not covered by guaranty funds belongs to insurers with stable 
business or to insurers with a particular organizational structure, e.g. risk retention groups. It is important to note 
that a number of insurance entities that do not receive guarantee fund coverage (e.g., risk retention groups) are 
establsihed to provide stable and dependable coverage to their policyholders. 
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(not reported here) is around 0.89. The predicted value of the first-stage regression is then used 
in the second stage regression instead of the actual value. The results, shown in Table 8 Model 
(5), indicate that the magnitude by which guaranty funds dull risk sensitivity is marginally higher 
than the original weighted fixed effects model. 
We run Table 7 model (3) by line of business, and the results are shown in Table 9. We 
find directionally consistent and statistically significant guaranty fund effects on market 
discipline in Commercial Multiple Peril and Other Liability. Other lines also exhibit directionally 
consistent effects, although they are not statistically significant. 
C. Regression results at the firm-line-state-year level   
Table 10 Column 1 shows the regression results for equation (3) for all lines. The 
coefficients on the interaction terms of the ratings level and the indicator for lack of guaranty 
fund protection are negative and statistically significant for A- and low rated insurers. A 
downgrade yields a 15.2% drop in premium growth for A- rated firms and a 9.7% drop for low 
rated firms in lines of insurance not protected by guaranty funds.   
To see whether this state-variation effect is driven by non-traditional lines of insurance, 
we re-do the analysis using only traditional lines of insurance or only non-traditional lines. We 
classify non-traditional lines of insurance as credit, surety, fidelity, financial guaranty, mortgage 
guaranty, ocean marine, warranty, and title insurance. These are the lines of insurance that are 
most commonly not covered by guaranty funds. Column 2 shows the results using the traditional 
lines of insurance. Column 3 shows the results for non-traditional lines. For traditional lines, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms of ratings level and the indicator for lack of guaranty fund 
protection are negative and statistically significant for downgrades of A- and low rated firms. A 
downgrade yields a 21.2% drop in premium growth for A- rated firms. The drop is 11.9% for 
low rated firms. For non-traditional lines, the coefficients on the interaction terms of ratings level 
and the indicator for lack of guaranty fund protection are negative and statistically significant for 
downgrades. A downgrade yields a 3.0% drop in premium growth for high rated firms, a 7.9% 
drop for A- rated firms and an 8.4% drop for low rated firms. The results indicate that the effect 
of guaranty funds is not being driven by non-traditional lines of insurance. In fact, the 
magnitudes of the declines are greater for traditional lines than non-traditional lines. The results 
also indicate that customer sensitivity to risk is greater for lower rated insurers in traditional 
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lines, but higher for higher rated insurers in non-traditional lines, suggesting that financial 
quality is perhaps more important in non-traditional lines.  
Columns 4 and 5 test state variation for personal lines and commercial lines.18 The results 
imply that guaranty funds mainly influence downgrades in commercial lines. The results are in 
line with the findings in Epermanis and Harrington (2006) that market discipline works more in 
commercial lines than personal lines.  
As shown in Table 11 (the line of business variation model described in equation (4)), a 
downgrade yields a 5.8% drop in premium growth for high rated firms and 5.3% for A- rated 
firms in lines of insurance not protected by guaranty funds. A downgrade also yields a 5.5% drop 
in premium growth for low rated firms. The effect is also manifest in nontraditional and 
commercial lines. In Table 12 (the time variation model described in equation (5)), there is an 
8.4% drop in premium growth for high rated firms and a 30.1% drop for A- rated firms in lines 
of business not protected by guaranty funds relative to other years in which it received guaranty 
fund coverage. A downgrade also yields a 46.2% drop in premium growth for low rated firms. 
The effect is manifest in commercial lines but not in personal lines.  
In Table 10 and Table 11, the effects are from insurers writing both covered and 
uncovered business at the same time, i.e. insurers in the same line of business but writing 
business in different states, or insurers in the same state but writing business in different lines. In 
Table 12, the effects are from insurers writing the same business that receives different guaranty 
fund coverage over time (i.e. states change which lines receive guaranty fund protection or 
insurers change their licensing status in a state). We find premium declines are greater in 
uncovered business following downgrades. Thus we find that guaranty funds shield insurers 
from the full costs of market discipline.  
D. Robustness checks 
D.1 The internal valid check and dynamic impact of rating changes 
The main concerns to our first research design are (1) the correlation between the timing 
of rating changes and the time-path of premium growth, (2) rating changes being anticipated by 
the insurance market, and (3) the different patterns of premium growth before rating changes 
across the different levels of guaranty fund protection. To further provide supporting evidence 
                                                 
18 Personal lines include farm owners multiple peril, homeowners multiple peril, private passenger auto liability, and 
private auto physical damage; commercial lines include everything else. 
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that our results are valid, we perform internal validity checks. To formally test whether (1)-(3) 
are impacting our results we introduce pre-rating change leads. Moreover, to study the effect of 
rating changes over time, we add post-rating change lags. The effect of risk changes is likely to 
diminish over time as the insurer and policyholders adjust to a new reality. 
We explore the dynamic effect of rating changes by applying an event study framework 
with a long window (-7 years to 7 years surrounding the rating change). We use this flexible 
event study framework to non-parametrically estimate the pattern of premium growth for 
downgrades (e.g. Gallagher, 2014). The model is:  
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where  is premium growth for firm i, line j, and year t, and censored at -1 and 1;  is a firm-
line fixed effect and is a year fixed effect. The independent variables of interest are the event 
time indicator variables, . These variables track the year of a rating change and the years 
preceding and following a rating change. The indicator variable  equals 1 if a firm has a 
rating change in that calendar year. The indicator variable  equals 1 if the firm has rating 
change in  years. Many firms have more than one rating change during the sample period. For 
these firms, each rating change is coded with its own set of indicator variables.19 To make the 
results comparable with the previous research design, the event time indicator variable  is 
normalized to zero. In practice, this is done by excluding  from the regression. We also 
create  if , and   if  Equation (5) is then estimated with 
these two bin indicators. The estimated coefficient  captures the percentage response in 
premium growth per unit change of the proportion of uncovered premiums  ( ) year after 
(before) rating change.   
 Figure 3 Panel A-Panel C plots the event time indicator coefficients,  (denoted as 
covered group) and  (denoted as uncovered group), from the estimation of equation (5) 
on the 1991–2011 panel for downgrades. Event time is plotted on the x-axis. Year 0 corresponds 
to the year an insurer experiences a rating change, while years −1,…, −7 and 1,…, 7 are the years 
                                                 
19 For example, firm A has a downgrade in 2005 and 2009. Thus, in year 2007,  = 1, since it has been 2 years 
since the 2005 rating change and = 1, since it is 2 years before the 2009 rating change.  = 1 only if there is a 
rating change in 1991 and  = 1 only if there is a rating change in 2011.  
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before and after the rating change, respectively. The plotted event time coefficients can be 
interpreted as the percent change in premium growth relative to two years prior to the rating 
change. The bands represent the 95 percent confidence interval and show whether each point 
estimate is statistically different from 0.  
There is no discernable trend in premium growth in the years before a rating change. 
Premium growth is lowest in the year of a downgrade—a 12 percent decrease for the uncovered 
group and a 7 percent decrease for the covered group. After a downgrade, premium growth 
remains negative and statistically significant for four years. After four years, premium growth is 
not statistically different from zero. The difference in the impulse responses between the 
uncovered and covered groups, however, disappears after one year. The same pattern of decline 
in insurance premium growth repeats if an insurer has multiple downgrades during the period. 
The effect of downgrades on premium growth is transitory; however, the shock to total premium, 
is “permanent”: on average, total premium is decreased by 0.5 million for uncovered business the 
year of a downgrade. Overall, the patterns shown in Figure 3 are in line with the results in Table 
8--- the premium decline for A- and low-rated insurers is significantly greater for the uncovered 
group than the covered group in the year of a downgrade. We also estimate the pattern of 
premium growth for upgrades. We do not find any significant evidence that there are different 
effects of guaranty fund protections on market discipline for insurer upgrades (shown in 
Appendix Figure C.1).   
D.2 Test for an alternative explanation 
 Another potential concern is that covered business and uncovered business may differ in 
their business characteristics and in particular their profitability and riskiness. Firms may reduce 
their exposure to less profitable or higher risk business after a downgrade. Thus, the observed 
drop in uncovered business may be due to changes in the composition of the insurer’s 
underwriting portfolio and not because of guaranty fund protection. We investigate the 
alternative explanation in two ways. First, we examine whether uncovered business is more or 
less profitable than covered business. We test whether the mean value of the ratio of losses to 
premiums (the loss ratio) differs by guaranty fund status. A higher loss ratio implies less 
profitable business. We first divide all insurers’ business into covered business and uncovered 
business at the firm-line-state-year level. We then aggregate direct losses incurred and direct 
premium earned for covered and uncovered business, at the line and year level. We then divide 
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aggregate losses by aggregate premiums. Table 13 reports differences in the means by guaranty 
fund covered status. In general, the results show that the loss ratio of uncovered business is 
largely the same as the loss ratio of covered business. We do not find significant differences in 
the mean values of the loss ratio between covered business and uncovered business, except for 
workers compensation, special liability and warranty. We find the mean value of the loss ratio is 
higher for uncovered business in workers compensation,20 but it is lower for uncovered business 
in special liability and warranty. Based on these results, we cannot conclude that uncovered 
business is more or less profitable than covered business.  
Second, we examine whether premium growth differs by the risk characteristics of 
business surrounding rating changes. If our results are driven by downgraded insurers’ trimming 
risky business, then we should observe that behavior across all lines of business (i.e., firms 
would also cut back on riskier covered business). To examine riskiness, we calculate the variance 
of the loss ratio by line of business (shown in Table 13). A more volatile loss ratio suggests a 
higher risk line of business (Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993). We sort the lines of business into 
high and low risk groups – if the variance of the loss ratio is in the top seven lines among the 14 
lines it is classified as high risk and if it is in the bottom then it is classified as low risk.21 The 
seven high risk lines are homeowners/farmowners, medical malpractice, special liability, special 
property, fidelity/surety, product liability and financial guaranty/mortgage guaranty.  
We run two models using our previous identification strategies. First, we calculate the 
proportion of high risk business as the fraction of direct premiums written of high risk business 
to total direct premiums written and repeat our first identification strategy in equation (1) and (2). 
As shown in Table 14 Panel A, we do not identify any negative coefficients on the interactions of 
downgrades and the proportion of high risk business. Second, we use data on the firm-line-state-
year level. To be included in these regressions, a firm-line-state-year observation is required to 
be downgraded in that year. We run the regressions similar to equation (4) but we include a firm-
                                                 
20 We exclude workers compensation and repeat our previous analyses. All of our results are robust.  
21 We also examine whether the variances of the loss ratio differ significantly by guaranty fund status. To avoid the 
issue that the volatility of the loss ratio is caused primarily by significantly less premium volume in uncovered lines 
than their covered counterparts, we conduct the analysis for insurers having both uncovered business and covered 
business. Table C.2 reports the means and variances of the loss ratio by guaranty fund covered status across lines 
over the sample period. In general, the results show that the business characteristics of uncovered business and 
covered business are largely the same. We do not find significant differences in the variances of the loss ratio 
between covered business and uncovered business, except for homeowners/farmowners, product liability and special 
liability. We find the variances of the loss ratio are higher for the uncovered business in homeonwers/farmowners, 
but the measure is lower for uncovered business in special liability and product liability. 
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year fixed effect, a state fixed effect and a line of business fixed effect. The firm-year fixed 
effect sweeps out the variation between firms, making the estimates based on only the variation 
within each firm across line of business and states. We use a dummy variable High Risk 
Business, which equals one to indicate if the business is high risk, and 0 otherwise. The results 
are shown in Table 14 Panel B. We again do not find any negative coefficients on the 
interactions of the pre-change rating categories and High Risk Business. These results suggest 
that the greater premium declines in uncovered business relative to covered lines are not driven 
by insurers changing the risk composition of their underwriting portfolios. 
V.  Prices, Market Discipline, and Government Guarantees 
A. Prices and Market Discipline 
 In this section we explore evidence on the nexus between prices and market discipline. 
Evidence in this paper has shown that increases in insurer risk are accompanied by reductions in 
premium growth. This could be because firms are forced to lower prices, or their business 
volume drops, or both. Accordingly, policyholders can exert market discipline by buying less 
coverage, not buying insurance, or demanding a lower price from a downgraded insurer. Insurers 
may respond to market discipline as well, but not all insurers have the same flexibility. Insurers 
subject to stringent rate regulation may not be able to adjust prices (Grace and Leverty, 2010).  
We study the relationship between insurance prices and changes in financial strength 
ratings. In particular, we use equation (1) and equation (2), but replace the dependent variable, 
premium growth, with price growth. We calculate insurance price growth ( ). Since 
explicit contract prices are not available, we follow the literature and use an implicit measure of 
price (e.g. Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Cummins et al., 2005).22 We measure price at the firm-
line level as information on business net of reinsurance is not available at firm-line-state level.23 
Since premiums are revenues (price times quantity), the impact of downgrades on prices will 
yield insight on the price mechanism and because we have already studied the impact on 
premiums, we can impute the impact on quantity.  
 The results of the fixed effects estimates of price growth using net business are reported 
in Table 15. The regressions in Models (1) and (2) do not consider guaranty fund characteristics, 
                                                 
22 The precise definition and calculation of insurance price are described in Appendix B. 
23 We also calculate price using direct business (premium written and direct loss incurred) instead of net business 
and our results are robust. 
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while Models (3) and (4) do. The regressions reported in Table 16 incorporate the pre-change 
rating categories. We document several noteworthy price effects. First, the coefficients on all 
current and leading rating change indicators for downgrades are negative and significant, 
providing evidence that insurers have slower price growth the year before and the year of a 
downgrade. The coefficients on Anticipation are negative and statistically significant, possibly 
indicating that insurers anticipate downgrades and adjusts prices accordingly. In Table 15, 
current and lagging coefficients on upgrades are positive and significant but the coefficients on 
the leading variables are not significant, indicating that price growth increases after upgrades. In 
Table 16, all the current and leading coefficients on rating change indicators for downgrades are 
significant, suggesting that price deterioration may precede downgrades. This result can be 
explained in several ways. Since our price measure is a proxy for profit margin, it could be that 
insurers have poor underwriting results in the year before a downgrade, which explains a drop in 
measured price as well as the subsequent downgrade. Another explanation could be that the 
market anticipates rating deterioration, and prices adjust accordingly. The effect of upgrades on 
price growth is statistically significant---upgrades are associated with price increases for A- and 
low-rated insurers, with pre-rating change increases also evident for low-rated insurers.   
Second, we compare coefficients across regressions of premium growth and price growth 
(results shown in Appendix Table C.1). The magnitudes of the coefficients on downgrades in the 
current price growth regression are smaller than those for premium growth change for A- and 
lower rated insurers.24 We find that price growth decreases significantly in the year of a 
downgrade, but that the magnitude of the decrease is much smaller for price growth than it is for 
premium growth in the year of insurer downgrades. The results suggest that policyholders 
respond to increases in insurer risk both by demanding lower prices and by shifting their 
contracts. Insurance prices, however, are only slightly affected the year after insurer downgrades, 
suggesting policyholders continuously react to downgrades by switching to safe insurers. 
In addition, we control for price growth in the premium growth regression, since 
premium growth endogenously depends on price growth. We employ the two-stage least squares 
method (2SLS) to investigate how premium growth changes after controlling price growth 
                                                 
24 We run the seemingly unrelated regression to test whether coefficients of premium growth and price growth are 
significantly different. We use the sample with positive calculated insurance price, which includes 120,533 
observations. The results shows the coefficients on current variables of price growth are significantly smaller than 
those for premium growth model for A- and lower insurers (see Appendix C Table C.1 for details). 
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change (Results are shown in Table 18, Model (1)). Predicted price growth is included in the 
premium growth regression in the second step.  Although the regression sample size is reduced 
by fifteen percent because negative prices are excluded in our analysis, we can still identify 
market discipline in the form of premium growth. The magnitudes of the coefficients on the 
rating change variables estimated for premium growth rates are smaller than the previous fixed 
effects regressions (Table 8, Model 2). The signs of these estimated variables in 2SLS are 
consistent with the previous regressions (i.e. Table 8). Overall, the results suggest that price 
growth depends on the direction of the rating action and the magnitude of the difference is fairly 
small for downgrades after rating changes.  
B. Price, Market Discipline and Guaranty Funds 
 Consistent with previous reasoning, guaranty funds may dull market sensitivity to risk 
changes in the price domain as well as the overall volume domain.  Accordingly, we study the 
influence of guaranty funds on price growth in the time periods surrounding changes in insurer 
risks. The results are reported in Table 15 Model (3) and Model (4). Overall the evidence 
suggests that the guaranty fund scheme weakens market discipline in the price channel. 
Specifically, absence of guaranty fund protection is associated with more negative price growth 
after a downgrade. We extend our analysis to consider pre-change rating categories in Table 17. 
Our variables of interest in Table 17, the interaction term of downgrades and the proportion of 
uncovered premiums, generally confirms that the extent of market discipline through the price 
channel depends on the extent of the safety net. Specifically, the results show that the absence of 
guaranty fund protection significantly enhances the sensitivity of price growth to insurer 
downgrades. For insurers rated A- or lower prior to being downgraded, the contemporaneous 
coefficients are negative and significant. The coefficient estimates in Table 17 Model (2) indicate 
that A- insurers with a 10% higher proportion of uncovered direct premiums experience a 1.0% 
decrease in price growth with a downgrade in year t. We do not find significant results for 
upgrades. These results echo the asymmetric findings in prior literature that the market reaction 
to rating downgrades is stronger than the reaction for upgrades (e.g. Halek and Eckles, 2010). 
We also conduct the price growth analysis at the firm-line-state-year level using equation 
(3). We calculate the price using the information of direct premium written and the results are 
reported in Table C.3. The coefficients on the interaction terms of the ratings level and the 
indicator for lack of guaranty fund protection are negative and statistically significant only for 
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low rated insurers. A downgrade yields a 20.3% drop in price growth for low rated firms in 
business not protected by guaranty funds, comparing to business protected by guaranty fund in 
the same insurers. The effect is stronger in personal lines. 
Again, we employ the two-stage least squares method (2SLS) to investigate how 
premium growth changes after controlling for price growth changes conditional on guaranty fund 
protection (results are shown in Table 18 Model (2)). The results of Table 17 Model (2) and 
Table 18 model (2) suggest that the effect of guaranty funds on market discipline are through 
both the price channel and the quantity channel.  
VI. Concluding Remarks 
This paper explores how government safety-net schemes affect market discipline in the 
financial sector. We study the state regulated P/L insurance industry because the diversity of 
guaranty fund protection offered by the states offers a compelling environment in which to 
identify the effects of public guarantees. The evidence suggests that public guarantees dull 
customer sensitivity to financial institution risk, and overall the effects are quite large. The 
effects are especially large for A- and low-rated insurer downgrades. The pattern of decline in 
premium growth suggests that the process of market discipline is most pronounced within two 
years of a downgrade. Moreover, the effects are most pronounced within commercial insurance 
lines.  
The study is important from a public policy perspective. Policymakers are increasingly 
aware of the role of market discipline in the regulation of financial firms and modern regulatory 
policy tries to encourage market discipline (e.g. Solvency Modernization Initiative, Basel II and 
Solvency II). In fact, both Basel and Solvency II include market discipline as a fundamental 
pillar and attempt to enhance it through public disclosure of risk-related information by banks 
and insurance companies. The benefit of stronger market discipline is believed to reduce the 
need for government intervention. Our study finds that consumer protection schemes, even ones 
that consumers are less aware of, impair market discipline, as such regulators must take these 
programs into consideration in the design of solvency regulatory policy. Combined with the 
evidence on the huge cost of insurer failures (Bohn and Hall, 1997; Grace, Klein and Phillips, 
2009; Leverty and Grace, 2012), our findings suggest that policy makers should address the 
adverse incentives that guaranty funds create in order to better discipline insurers and protect 
policyholders. Potential changes could be the creation of a first layer of private loss of guaranty 
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fund coverage (e.g., coinsurance or a high deductible) or the adoption of risk-based guaranty 
fund assessments. The results for the insurance industry have interesting implications for the 
financial sector more broadly. This supports the view that deposit insurance and other public 
guarantees in banking have significant effects on market discipline.   
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Figure 1: The Quantile Plot of the Proportion of Uncovered Premiums at Firm-Line-Years, 1990-2011  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: We set the threshold of 25% to categorize our observations into covered- and uncovered groups. The summary statistics of the 
two groups are as following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean Median STD Min Max N 
Uncovered-group 0.861 0.962 0.194 0.250 1.000 23179 
Covered-group 0.003 0.000 0.019 0.000 1.000 124820 
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Figure 2 Panel A: Percentages of Upgrades across Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2 Panel B: Percentages of Downgrades across Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Panel C: Percentages of No Rating Change across Years   
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Figure 3:  Premium Growth for Insurer Downgrades at Firm-Line-Years, 1991–2011 
The figure plots event time premium growth coefficients from estimation of equation (5) on the 1991–2011 panel. Panel A is 
premium growth for all insurer downgrades, panel B is for A- and lower rated insurer downgrades and Panel C is for higher 
rated insurer downgrades. The end points on the graph are binned so that −7 (+7) is a bin for years −7 to −20 (+20 to +7). The 
vertical axis measures ΔLog Premium. The coefficient for the last second year before a downgrade is normalized to zero. The 
bars show the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered by firm-line level.   
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Table 1 
Summary of Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Funds, By State22 
 
State 
Effective 
Date 
Max Per  
Claim           
Net Worth 
Provision 
State 
Effective 
Date 
Max Per 
Claim23           
Net Worth 
Provision 
AL 1981 $150,000 $25,000,000 MT 1971 $300,000 $50,000,000 
AK 1970 
$300,000 before 
1990; $500,000 
NO NE 1971 $300,000 NO 
AZ 1977 
$100,000 before 
2007; $300,000 
NO NV 1971 $300,000 $25,000,000 
AR 1977 $300,000 $50,000,000 NH 2004 $300,000 $25,000,000 
CA 1969 $500,000 NO NJ 1974 $300,000 $25,000,000 
CO 1971 $300,000 $25,000,000 NM 1973 $100,000 NO 
CT 1971 
$300,000 before 
2007; $400,000 
NO NY 1969 $1,000,000 NO 
DE 1970 $300,000 $10,000,000 NC 1971 $300,000 $50,000,000 
FL 1970 $300,000 NO ND 1971 $300,000 $10,000,000 
GA 1970 
$100,000 before 
2005; $300,000 
$10,000,000 OH 1970 $300,000 $50,000,000 
HI 1971 $300,000 $25,000,000 OK 1980 $150,000 $50,000,000 
ID 1970 $300,000 NO OR 1971 $300,000 $25,000,000 
IL 1971 $300,000* $25,000,000 PA 1994 $300,000 $50,000,000 
IN 1972 
$50,000 before 
1988; $100,000 
$5,000,000 RI 1970 $500,000 $50,000,000 
IA 1970 
$300,000 before 
2010; $500,000 
NO SC 1971 $300,000 $10,000,000 
KS 1970 $300,000 NO SD 2000 $300,000 $50,000,000 
KY 1972 
$100,000 before 
1998; $300,000 
$25,000,000 TN 1971 $100,000 $10,000,000 
LA 1970 
$150,000 before 
2008; $500,000 
$25,000,000 TX 2007 $300,000 $50,000,000 
ME 1970 $300,000 $25,000,000 UT 1971 $300,000 $25,000,000 
MD 1971 $300,000 $50,000,000 VT 1970 $500,000 NO 
MA 1971 $300,000 $25,000,000 VA 1970 $300,000 $50,000,000 
MI 1969 $5,000,000 $25,000,000 WA 1971 $300,000 NO 
MN 1971 $300,000 $25,000,000 WV 1970 $300,000 NO 
MS 1971 $300,000 NO WI 1969 $300,000 $25,000,000 
MO 1971 $300,000 $25,000,000 WY 1971 $150,000 No 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Detailed information on excluded lines is provided in the footnote. 
23 Maximum claims exclude workers compensation, since coverage for workers compensation is unlimited in 49 
states. 
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Table 2  
Rating categories of A.M Best rating 
 
 
High categories 
 
A++  
                                                  A+  
                                                  A  
  
                                                  A-  
 
Low categories 
 
 
B++  
                                                  B+ 
                                                  B 
                                                  B- 
                                                  C++ 
                                                  C+ 
                                                  C 
                                                  C- 
                                                  D 
                                                  E 
                                                  F 
No categories 
 
NR (NR 1, NR 2, NR 3, NR 4, NR5) 
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Table 3  
Summary Statistics at Firm-Line Level 
 
The full sample includes firm-line-years during 1990-2011. The regression sample includes firm-line-years for 
1991-2011. High (A-, Low) indicates rating of A or above (A-, B+ + or below). Down equals 1 if rating 
downgrade during year, 0 otherwise. Up equals 1 if rating upgrade during year, 0 otherwise. Proportion of 
Uncover Premiums is the proportion of uncovered direct premiums to the total direct premiums. Portfolio_Risk 
(sigma) and default-value-to-liability ratio (risk) are calculated as in Myers and Read (2001). Anticipaton is the 
average value of default-value-to-liability ratio for the year’s t-1 and t-2. Size is the logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Reinsurance is the ratio of premiums ceded to total 
premiums written. Directw equals 1 if direct writer, 0 otherwise. Mutual equals 1 if mutual company, 0 
otherwise. Group equals 1 if an insurer is affiliated to a group, 0 otherwise. Busherf is calculated by the sum of 
the squares of the percentages of direct premium written across all lines of business. Geoherf is calculated by the 
sum of the squares of the percentages of direct premium written across all states. Reg% is the percentage of the 
insurer’s direct premium written in states with prior approval or state made rate regulation. Max% is the 
percentage of the insurer’s direct premium written in states with guaranty fund exceeding $300,000. Prov% is 
the percentage of the insurer’s direct premium written in states with a net worth provision above $25,000,000. 
 
 
Variables Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
Panel A: Full sample  (N=147,998)   
Log Direct Premium 15.167 2.606 6.783 13.667 15.481 16.998 23.561 
Δ Log Direct Premium   0.043 0.400 -1.000 -0.095 0.035 0.177 1.000 
Proportion of Uncover Premiums 0.137 0.323 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
        
Panel B: Regression sample  (N=142,247)   
Δ Log Direct Premium    0.042 0.401 -1.000 -0.096 0.035 0.177 1.000 
High 0.610 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
A- 0.232 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Low 0.159 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Down 0.072 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
UP 0.071 0.258 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
High × Down 0.048 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
A- × Down 0.012 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Low × Down 0.013 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
High × Up 0.020 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
A- × Up 0.019 0.136 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Low × Up 0.032 0.177 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Proportion of Uncover Premiums 0.138 0.324 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Portfolio_Risk (sigma) 0.143 0.070 0.011 0.099 0.118 0.161 0.485 
Default-value-to-liability ratio (Risk) 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.117 
Anticipation 0.004 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.117 
Size 18.991 1.816 13.636 17.712 18.885 20.142 25.485 
Leverage 0.595 0.157 0.110 0.518 0.629 0.707 0.840 
Reinsurance 0.351 0.216 0.000 0.151 0.429 0.500 1.000 
Directw  0.127 0.334 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Mutual 0.171 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Group 0.816 0.388 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Busherf  0.330 0.213 0.068 0.178 0.266 0.407 1.000 
Geoherf  0.436 0.365 0.030 0.097 0.306 0.825 1.000 
Reg% 0.246 0.371 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.509 1.000 
Max% 0.877 0.223 0.000 0.860 0.971 1.000 1.000 
Prov% 0.411 0.353 0.000 0.067 0.351 0.692 1.000 
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Table 4  
Number and Percentage of Sample Firm-line-years, by Rating Categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: 
Uncovered Rating 
No. of 
observation 
% 
Total No change  
% No 
change Upgrade  
% 
Upgrade Downgrade  
% 
Downgrade 
High A++ 2335 10.07% 2142 91.73% 0 0.00% 193 8.27% 
 
A+ 6266 27.03% 5544 88.48% 217 3.46% 505 8.06% 
 
A 7448 32.13% 6626 88.96% 373 5.01% 449 6.03% 
 
Total 16049 69.24% 14312 89.18% 590 3.68% 1147 7.15% 
 
A- 5049 21.78% 4322 85.60% 498 9.86% 229 4.54% 
Low B++ 878 3.79% 604 68.79% 204 23.24% 70 7.97% 
 
B+ 801 3.46% 492 61.42% 262 32.71% 45 5.62% 
 
B 257 1.11% 170 66.15% 69 26.85% 18 7.00% 
 
B- 80 0.35% 47 58.75% 27 33.75% 6 7.50% 
 
C++ 17 0.07% 5 29.41% 9 52.94% 3 17.65% 
 
C+ 31 0.13% 13 41.94% 17 54.84% 1 3.23% 
 
C 16 0.07% 10 62.50% 6 37.50% 0 0.00% 
 C- 1 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 
 
Total 2081 8.98% 1341 64.44% 594 28.54% 144 6.92% 
Total 
 
23179 100.00% 19975 86.18% 1682 7.26% 1520 6.56% 
 
 
 
        
Panel B: 
Covered Rating 
No. of 
observation  
% 
Total No change  
% No 
change Upgrade  
% 
Upgrade Downgrade  
% 
Downgrade 
High A++ 7704 6.17% 6979 90.59% 0 0.00% 725 9.41% 
 
A+ 29294 23.47% 26019 88.82% 773 2.64% 2502 8.54% 
 
A 37832 30.31% 33649 88.94% 1536 4.06% 2647 7.00% 
 
Total 74830 59.95% 66647 89.06% 2309 3.09% 5874 7.85% 
 
A- 28606 22.92% 24878 86.97% 2259 7.90% 1469 5.14% 
Low B++ 8097 6.49% 6240 77.07% 1215 15.01% 642 7.93% 
 
B+ 7656 6.12% 5446 71.12% 1594 20.82% 616 8.05% 
 
B 3416 2.74% 2422 70.90% 720 21.08% 274 8.02% 
 
B- 1274 1.02% 791 62.09% 358 28.10% 125 9.81% 
 
C++ 362 0.29% 205 56.63% 127 35.08% 30 8.29% 
 
C+ 320 0.26% 154 48.13% 131 40.94% 35 10.94% 
 
C 217 0.17% 113 52.07% 97 44.70% 7 3.23% 
 C- 41 0.03% 27 65.85% 12 29.27% 2 4.88% 
 
Total 21384 17.13% 15398 72.01% 4254 19.89% 1731 8.09% 
Total 
 
124819 100.00% 106923 85.66% 8822 7.07% 9074 7.27% 
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Table 5   
Mean and Median Abnormal Premium Growth at Firm-Line-Years, 1990-2011 
 
Table 5 shows the adjusted mean (median) abnormal premium growth rate for downgrades and upgrades. The uncovered-group is defined as firm-line-years with 
a proportion of uncovered premiums greater than or equal to 25%. The covered-group is defined as firm-line-years with a proportion of uncovered premiums less 
than 25%. Time, line, and size adjusted mean [median] abnormal premium growth in year t equals the firm-line-year’s premium growth in year t minus the mean 
[median] time, line, and size adjusted premium growth in year t for firm-line-years with no rating change in year t. Medians are reported in square parentheses. 
Significance of tests of differences in means are based on a two-tailed t-test and the difference in medians are based on a two-sided nonparametric Wilcoxon rank 
sum test. The one-tailed t-test standard error are reported in parentheses. Bold values are significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
  Downgrades   Upgrades 
 
t-1 t t+1   t-1 t t+1 
Uncovered group -1.67% 
(0.02) 
[-1.50%] 
-13.50%  
(0.02)  
[-8.36%] 
-10.03% 
(0.02)  
[-2.60%] 
 Uncovered group -5.46% 
(0.02) 
[-1.95%] 
4.38%  
(0.02)  
[3.53%] 
3.72%   
(0.02)  
[4.14%] 
                              19975 no change; 1520 downgrades   19975  no change; 1682 upgrades 
Covered group -2.42% 
(0.01) 
[-1.13%] 
-7.52%   
(0.01)  
[-4.70%] 
-7.77%  
(0.01)  
[-3.62%] 
 Covered group -2.89%   
(0.01) 
[-1.23%] 
-0.33%    
(0.01)  
[0.37%] 
1.81%   
(0.01)  
[0.98%] 
                             106923 no change; 9074 downgrades   106923 no change; 8822 upgrades 
Mean difference         0.76% -5.73% -2.26%  Mean difference            -2.57%   4.71%   1.91%  
Median difference      0.37% -3.66%  1.02%  Median difference         -0.72%    3.16%    3.16% 
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Table 6  
Mean and Median Abnormal Premium Growth at Firm-Line-Years Level Based on Pre-Change Rating Categories 
 
Panel A shows the adjusted mean (median) abnormal premium growth rate for downgrades from 1990 to 2011. Panel B shows results for upgrades. The 
uncovered-group is defined as firm-line-years with a proportion of uncovered premiums greater than or equal to 25%. The covered-group is defined as firm-line-
years with a proportion of uncovered premiums less than 25%. Time, line, and size adjusted mean [median] abnormal premium growth in year t equals the firm-
line-years’ time, line, and size adjusted premium growth in year t minus the mean [median] time, line, and size adjusted premium growth in year t for firm-line-
years in the same rating category with no rating change in year t. Medians are reported in square parentheses. Significance of tests of differences in means are 
based on a two-tailed t-test and the difference in medians are based on a two-sided nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. The one-tailed t-test standard error are 
reported in parentheses. Bold values are significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
Panel A. Downgrades                  High A- Low 
 
t-1 t t+1 t-1 t t+1 t-1 t t+1 
Uncovered 
group 
0.46% 
(0.03) 
[-0.33%] 
-7.39% 
(0.02)  
[-5.55%] 
-3.67% 
(0.02)  
[-1.96%] 
-5.28% 
(0.04) 
[-1.72%] 
-30.01%  
(0.04)  
[-20.05%] 
-31.65%   
(0.05)  
[-23.86%] 
-2.50% 
(0.06) 
[-3.39%] 
-26.01%  
(0.05)  
[-17.49%] 
-17.01%  
(0.06)  
[-20.56%] 
14312 no change; 1147 downgrades 4322 no change; 229 downgrades 1341 no change; 144 downgrades 
Covered group 
-1.17% 
(0.01) 
[-0.59%] 
-4.02%  
(0.01)  
[-3.48%] 
-4.26%   
(0.01)  
[-3.59%] 
0.21%  
(0.01) 
[-0.44%] 
-14.80%   
(0.01)  
[-10.09%] 
-17.28%  
(0.01)  
[-8.68%] 
-3.24%  
(0.01) 
[-2.13%] 
  -13.04%  
  (0.01)  
  [-8.69%] 
-11.61%  
(0.01)  
[-7.86%] 
66647 no change; 5874 downgrades 24878 no change; 1469 downgrades 15398 no change; 1731 downgrades 
Mean difference         1.63% -3.37% 0.59%    -5.49%   -15.22%   -14.37%       1.72%       -12.96% -5.40% 
Median difference      0.26% -2.07% 1.63%    -2.16%    -9.96%   -15.18%      -1.26%        -8.80% -12.7% 
Panel B. Upgrades High A- Low 
 
t-1 t t+1 t-1 t t+1 t-1 t t+1 
Uncovered 
group 
-4.77% 
(0.03) 
[-4.09%] 
-0.33% 
(0.03) 
[1.14%] 
1.18% 
(0.02) 
[1.09%] 
-1.60% 
(0.03) 
[-2.64%] 
0.05% 
(0.03) 
[-0.81%] 
1.37% 
(0.03) 
[-0.61%] 
-0.05% 
(0.03) 
[0.01%] 
18.52% 
(0.02)  
[13.77%] 
13.52% 
(0.02)  
[10.24%] 
14312 no change; 590 upgrades 4322 no change; 498 upgrades 1341 no change; 594 upgrades 
Covered group 
-2.80% 
(0.01) 
[-1.20%] 
-0.97% 
(0.01) 
[0.30%] 
-0.77% 
(0.01) 
[0.05%] 
0.87% 
(0.01) 
[-2.52%] 
-0.91% 
(0.01) 
[-0.49%] 
1.34%  
(0.01) 
[1.50%] 
-1.02%  
(0.01) 
[-0.74%] 
2.75% 
(0.01) 
[2.31%] 
7.44% 
(0.01) 
[5.36%] 
66647 no change; 2309 upgrades 24878 no change; 2259 upgrades 15398 no change; 4254 upgrades 
Mean difference         -1.97% 0.64% 1.95% -2.47% 0.96% 0.03%   0.53% 15.76% 6.07% 
Median difference      -2.87% 0.84% 1.04% -0.12% -0.32% -2.11% 0.75%        11.46% 4.88% 
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Table 7 
 Impact of Guaranty Funds on Market Discipline at Firm-Line-Year Level 
 
The dependent variable is ΔLog Premiumt. The sample consists of 142,247 firm-line-years. Prop is the proportion of 
uncovered premiums to total premiums in the previous year. Anticipation is the average value of the default-value-to-
liability ratio (Risk) calculated as in Myers and Read (2001) for the year t-1 and t-2. The Firm & Guaranty funds 
Controls include Size, Leverage, Reinsurance, Group, Mutual, Geoherf, Busherf, Reg%, Max%, Prov%, Directw and the 
interaction of Prop with a linear year trend (variables are defined in Table 3). The last column shows the results of Two-
Stage Least Square estimates of ΔLog Premiumt. The proportion of uncovered premiums is instrumented by its value 
lagged of three years, Size, Geoherf, Busherf, Mutual and Group in the first stage of regression and the predicted value is 
used in the second stage. The interaction of the proportion of uncovered premiums with a linear trend is included in 2SLS. 
The sample for 2SLS regression includes 138,878 observations, as the data of 1991 is deleted. Standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm-line level and are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables OLS (1) F.E. (2) F.E. (3) Weighted FE (4) 2SLS (5) 
Log premium t-1 -0.021*** -0.105*** -0.122*** -0.105*** -0.115*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Prop. of Uncovered Premiums t-1 -0.040*** -0.042* 0.050* 0.033 -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.023) (0.027) (0.031) (0.022) 
Uppost 0.007 -0.009* 0.005 -0.005 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Upcurrent -0.004 -0.025*** -0.011** -0.015*** -0.012*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Uppre -0.020*** -0.031*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.024*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Downpost -0.068*** -0.051*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.043*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Downcurrent -0.065*** -0.058*** -0.055*** -0.061*** -0.058*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Downpre 0.006 0.011** 0.009** -0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Prop t-1 × Uppost 0.041** 0.030* 0.018 0.024 0.030* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Prop t-1 × Upcurrent 0.057*** 0.034** 0.017 0.019 0.011 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Prop t-1 × Uppre -0.025 -0.026 -0.040** -0.032* -0.026 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Prop t-1 × Downpost 0.015 0.009 0.014 0.003 0.019 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) 
Prop t-1 × Downcurrent -0.047*** -0.047** -0.047** -0.056*** -0.067*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) 
Prop t-1 × Downpre 0.012 0.023 0.019 0.008 0.022 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Anticipation — — 0.062 -0.293 -0.319 
   (0.119) (0.231) (0.219) 
Constant 0.367*** 1.655*** 1.901***   1.232***   1.272*** 
 (0.010) (0.027) (0.082) (0.107) (0.102) 
Firm-Line, Year Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES 
Firm & Guaranty funds Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
R2 0.022 0.261 0.278 0.262 0.266 
Observations 142,247 142,247 142,247 142,247 138,878 
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Table 8  
Impact of Guaranty Funds on Market Discipline at Firm-Line-Year Level for Different  
Rating Categories 
 
The dependent variable is ΔLog Premiumt. The sample consists of 142,247 firm-line-years. Anticipation is the average 
value of default-value-to-liability ratio (Risk) calculated as in Myers and Read (2001) for the years t-1 and t-2. The 
Firm & Guaranty Funds Controls include Size, Leverage, Reinsurance, Group, Mutual, Geoherf, Busherf, Direct 
writer, Reg%, Max%, Prov% and the interaction of Prop with a linear year trend. All regressions include pre-change 
rating categories, the interaction of Prop with pre-change rating categories, the variables of rating upgrades and 
downgrade and rating categories as shown in Table 3, and the interaction of the rating changes with Prop. The last 
column shows the results of Two-Stage Least Square estimates of ΔLog Premiumt. The proportion of uncovered 
premiums is instrumented by its value lagged of three years, Size, Geoherf, Busherf, Mutual and Group in the first 
stage of regression, and the predicted value is used in the second stage. The sample for 2SLS regression includes 
138,878 observations as the data of 1991 is deleted. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at 
firm-line level and are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variables OLS (1) F.E. (2) F.E. (3) Weighted FE (4) 2SLS (5) 
Prop t-1 × High × Downpost 0.021 0.020 0.024 0.023 0.021 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Prop t-1 × High × Downcurrent -0.010 -0.012 -0.014 -0.007 -0.037 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
Prop t-1 × High ×Downpre 0.044** 0.047** 0.041* 0.028 0.037* 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Prop t-1 × A-× Downpost -0.059 -0.079 -0.065 -0.164** -0.043 
 (0.058) (0.061) (0.058) (0.072) (0.063) 
Prop t-1 ×A- × Downcurrent -0.204*** -0.192*** -0.199*** -0.327*** -0.175*** 
 (0.047) (0.053) (0.052) (0.060) (0.057) 
Prop t-1 ×A- × Downpre -0.081* -0.045 -0.048 -0.040 -0.026 
 (0.043) (0.046) (0.045) (0.048) (0.045) 
Prop t-1 × Low × Downpost -0.070 -0.103 -0.096 -0.117 0.017 
 (0.076) (0.083) (0.082) (0.101) (0.083) 
Prop t-1 × Low × Downcurrent -0.115** -0.151** -0.145** -0.269*** -0.191*** 
 (0.058) (0.072) (0.069) (0.088) (0.072) 
Prop t-1 × Low × Downpre -0.033 -0.064 -0.067 -0.151** -0.014 
 (0.063) (0.059) (0.058) (0.075) (0.063) 
Prop t-1 × High × Uppost 0.024 0.021 0.015 0.036 -0.006 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030) 
Prop t-1 × High × Upcurrent 0.041 0.026 0.015 0.019 -0.019 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.031) 
Prop t-1 × High × Uppre 0.003 -0.002 -0.012 0.004 -0.024 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) 
Prop t-1 × A- × Uppost 0.061** 0.055* 0.047 0.047 0.063** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) 
Prop t-1 × A- × Upcurrent 0.006 0.009 -0.005 0.017 0.002 
 (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) 
Prop t-1 × A- × Uppre -0.042 -0.038 -0.053* -0.048 -0.047 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) 
Prop t-1 × Low × Uppost 0.053** 0.049* 0.042 0.022 0.042 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028) 
Prop t-1 × Low × Upcurrent 0.117*** 0.078** 0.072** 0.045 0.042 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.046) (0.037) 
Prop t-1 × Low × Uppre -0.057 -0.038 -0.038 -0.052 -0.023 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.042) (0.038) 
Firm-Line &Year Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES 
Firm & Guaranty funds Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
R2 0.031 0.264 0.286 0.266 0.269 
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Observations 142,247 142,247 142,247 142,247 138,878 
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Table 9  
The Effect of Guaranty Fund on Market Discipline at Firm-Line-Year Level by Lines 
 
The dependent variable is ΔLog Premium t. We run Table 7 Model 3 by line of business. Auto liability includes personal and commercial auto liability; 
commercial liability includes medical malpractice liability, other liability and product liability; special property includes fire, allied lines, inland marine, 
earthquake and burglary and theft; Misc. commercial lines includes ocean marine, aircraft, boiler and machinery, credit, accident and health, financial guaranty and 
mortgage guaranty, fidelity and surety, and warranty. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Lines Downpost Downcurrent Downpre Uppost Upcurrent Uppre Prop t-1 × 
Downpost 
Prop t-1 × 
Downcurrent 
Prop t-1 × 
Downpre 
Prop  t-1× 
Uppost 
Prop t-1 × 
Upcurrent 
Prop × 
Uppre 
Homeowners -0.036*** -0.013 -0.001 0.013 -0.009 -0.003 0.106 -0.183 0.100 0.142 0.225** 0.157 
/Farmowners (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.107) (0.124) (0.107) (0.108) (0.097) (0.140) 
             
Auto physical  -0.050*** -0.069*** -0.001 0.007 -0.009 -0.025** 0.199 -0.021 0.098 -0.041 0.023 -0.072 
damage (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.139) (0.120) (0.114) (0.075) (0.084) (0.088) 
             
Auto   -0.040*** -0.098*** -0.022 -0.002 -0.020 -0.033** 0.069 -0.181 0.054 0.159 -0.080 0.001 
liability (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.096) (0.116) (0.110) (0.097) (0.109) (0.100) 
             
Workers’  -0.044*** -0.119*** 0.029* -0.018 -0.031** -0.024 0.104 -0.076 0.210 0.206 0.141 -0.038 
compensation (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.260) (0.237) (0.298) (0.252) (0.332) (0.169) 
             
Commercial  -0.032*** -0.055*** -0.003 0.002 -0.027 -0.040*** -0.008 -0.163* -0.048 0.114* -0.003 0.016 
multiple Peril   (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.101) (0.091) (0.081) (0.062) (0.076) (0.071) 
             
Commercial  liab. -0.039*** -0.057*** 0.002 0.010 -0.016 -0.028** -0.076 -0.120** 0.022 0.053 0.043 0.008 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.063) (0.057)    (0.044) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043) 
             
Special property   -0.027 -0.073* -0.025 0.018 -0.029 -0.061 -0.004 -0.021 0.033 0.005 0.018 -0.032 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.042) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.061) (0.057) (0.058) (0.053) (0.058) (0.060) 
             
Misc. commercial  -0.034** -0.049*** -0.009 -0.002 -0.007 -0.001 -0.009 -0.085 0.014 0.017 0.005 -0.144*** 
lines (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.067) (0.079) (0.070) (0.059) (0.053) (0.053) 
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Table 10  
Impact of Guaranty funds on Market Discipline at Firm-Line-State-Year Level, State Variation 
 
The dependent variable is ΔLog Premiumt. The sample is at firm-line-state-year level and the period is 1990-2011. 
Regressions include only downgraded firms. Uncover equals 1 if the premiums in a state are uncovered by guaranty 
funds, 0 otherwise. Traditional lines exclude ocean marine, fidelity, surety, credit, title, financial guaranty, health 
and accident, mortgage guaranty and warranty. The control variables include the logarithm of lagged premium, a 
firm-line-year fixed effect and a state fixed effect. State time-variant variables are included in all regressions, which 
are insurance employment, insurance gross state product (GSP), state income, and the number of insolvent insurers. 
All state variables are scaled by state annual population. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered at firm-line-year level and are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with 
***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables All 
 Lines 
Traditional 
Lines 
Nontraditional 
Lines 
Personal  
Lines 
Commercial 
Lines 
Log Premium t-1    -0.088*** 
(0.001) 
-0.088*** 
(0.001) 
-0.090*** 
(0.003) 
  -0.034*** 
(0.002) 
-0.101*** 
(0.001) 
Uncover × High -0.013 
(0.010) 
0.053 
(0.035) 
-0.030*** 
(0.010) 
-0.079 
(0.109) 
       -0.017* 
(0.010) 
Uncover × A- -0.152*** 
(0.025) 
-0.212*** 
(0.038) 
-0.079*** 
(0.030) 
-0.045 
(0.082) 
-0.159*** 
(0.026) 
Uncover × Low -0.097** 
(0.035) 
-0.118** 
(0.055) 
-0.084* 
(0.045) 
0.251 
(0.191) 
-0.111*** 
(0.035) 
Insurance GSP 0.003  
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.003  
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
State Income   0.017*   
(0.009) 
0.016  
(0.010) 
0.026 
 (0.030) 
-0.015 
(0.022) 
0.025**  
(0.011) 
Insurance Employment    0.004*  
(0.002) 
  0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.003  
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Insolvent Insurers -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001  
(0.001) 
Firm-Line-Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.414 0.416 0.403 0.446 0.417 
Observations 229,410 204,124 25,286 36,750 192,660 
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Table 11 
Impact of Guaranty funds on Market Discipline at Firm-Line-State-Year Level, Line of Business variation 
 
The dependent variable is ΔLog Premiumt. The sample is at firm-line-state-year level and the period is 1990-2011. 
Regressions include only downgraded firms. Uncover equals 1 if the premiums in a state are uncovered by guaranty 
funds, 0 otherwise.  Nontraditional lines include ocean marine, fidelity, surety, credit, title, financial guaranty, health 
and accident, mortgage guaranty and warranty. The set of control variables include logarithm of lagged premium, a 
firm-state-year fixed effect and an insurance line of business fixed effect. Aggregate line of business time-variant 
variables are included in all regressions, which are loss ratio and loss volatility. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm-state-year level and are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Variables            All  lines Nontraditional Lines Commercial Lines 
Log Premium t-1      -0.059*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.037*** 
(0.004) 
-0.070*** 
(0.001) 
Uncover × High -0.058*** 
(0.011) 
-0.028 
(0.026) 
          -0.064*** 
          (0.011) 
Uncover × A-           -0.053** 
           (0.021) 
-0.264* 
(0.133) 
-0.044** 
(0.022) 
Uncover × Low            -0.055* 
            (0.032) 
-0.174 
(0.155) 
-0.059* 
(0.032) 
Loss Ratio            -0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.336**  
(0.140) 
0.002  
(0.011) 
Loss Volatility 0.007 
(0.008) 
0.196**  
(0.091) 
-0.003  
(0.008) 
Firm-State-Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Line Fixed Effect YES YES YES 
R2 0.427 0.726 0.447 
Observations 229,410 25,286 192,660 
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Table 12 
Impact of Guaranty funds on Market Discipline at Firm-Line-State-Year Level, Time Variation 
 
The dependent variable is ΔLog Premiumt. The sample is at firm-line-state-year level and the period is 1990-2011. 
Regressions include only downgraded firms. Uncover equals 1 if the premiums in a state are uncovered by guaranty 
funds, 0 otherwise. The set of control variables include logarithm of lagged premium, a firm-line-state fixed effect 
and a year fixed effect. State time-variant variables are included in all regressions, which are insurance employment, 
insurance gross state product (GSP), state income, and the number of insolvent insurers. All state variables are 
scaled by state annual population. Aggregate line of business time-variant variables are included in all regressions, 
which are loss ratio and loss volatility. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm-state-
year level and are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables All 
 Lines 
Personal  
Lines 
Commercial 
Lines 
Log Premium t-1    -0.159*** -0.129*** -0.163*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Uncover × High -0.084* 0.038 -0.088* 
 (0.050) (0.044) (0.051) 
Uncover × A- -0.301*** 0.047 -0.302*** 
 (0.058) (0.238) (0.060) 
Uncover × Low -0.462*** 0.080 -0.462*** 
 (0.070) (0.550) (0.072) 
Insurance GSP -0.015 0.008 -0.018 
 (0.012) (0.020) (0.014) 
State Income   0.020 0.080 0.009 
 (0.031) (0.067) (0.035) 
Insurance Employment     0.011*** -0.017 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) 
Insolvent Insurers 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Loss Ratio 0.027 0.180 0.029 
 (0.028) (0.224) (0.029) 
Loss Volatility 0.003 -0.091 -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.152) (0.019) 
Firm-Line-State Fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES 
R2 0.261 0.321 0.250 
Observations 229,410 36,750 192,660 
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Table 13  
Univariate Tests of Loss Ratio by Guaranty Fund Covered Status by Lines 
 
The table shows results of univariate tests for loss ratio across guaranty funds covered status from 1990 to 2011 by lines, in which loss ratio is calculated 
at the line by year level. Special liability includes ocean marine, aircraft, and boiler and machinery; special property includes fire, allied lines, inland 
marine, earthquake and burglary and theft; other includes credit, accident and health. The covered business is defined as premiums covered by guaranty 
funds and uncovered business is defined as premiums uncovered by guaranty funds at firm-line-state-years. Loss ratio is defined as directed loss incurred 
divided by directed premium earned, where direct loss incurred and direct premium earned are aggregated at the line by year level. Significance of tests 
of differences in means are based on a two-tailed t-test.   
 
 
 
Lines of Business Covered Business (1) Uncovered Business (2) Difference (1)-(2)  Variance of Loss Ratio 
Homeowners / Farmowners     0.690 0.572 0.118 0.031 
Auto Liability        0.676 0.633 0.043 0.012 
Workers compensation    0.695 1.127 -0..432* 0.020 
Commercial Multiple Peril 0.591 0.568 0.023 0.022 
Medical Malpractice 0.627 0.602 -0.025 0.040 
Special Liability 0.595 0.632 -0.037 0.031 
Other Liability 0.651 0.615 0.036 0.022 
Special Property 0.634 0.618 0.016 0.051 
Auto Physical Damage 0.604 0.571 0.033 0.010 
Fidelity/Surety 0.396 0.333 0.062 0.032 
Other Lines 0.678 0.724 -0.046 0.011 
Product Liability 0.904 0.573    0.331*** 0.073 
Fin. /Mortg.  Guaranty 0.599 0.737 -0.137 0.176 
Warranty 0.617 0.747    -0.130** 0.027 
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Table 14   
Insurers’ Risk Management Behavior 
 
The dependent variable is ΔLog Premiumt. The sample period is 1991-2011. Risky business is defined as the 
first seven insurance lines with high variances of loss ratio based on Table 13. Regressions include only business 
covered by guaranty funds. In Panel A, the sample is at firm-year level. The sample consists of 33,111 firm-
years. Firm controls are included in the regression, which are Size, Leverage, Reinsurance, Group, Mutual, 
Geoherf, Busherf, Directw, Anticipation and the interaction of Prop Risk with a linear year trend (variables are 
defined in Table 3). Prop Risk is defined as the proportion of direct premiums written in risky business to total 
premiums written in a firm. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm level and are 
reported below the coefficients in parentheses. In Panel B, the sample is at firm-line-state-year level. 
Regressions include only firms with a ratings downgrade. Risk equals 1 if the premiums are in a line which is 
risky business, 0 otherwise. The set of control variables include logarithm of lagged premium, firm-year, state 
and insurance line of business fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at 
firm-year level and are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * 
are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Variables Firm-Year   
Level 
Log premium t-1 -0.113*** 
 (0.005) 
Prop. Risk   -0.065* 
 (0.034) 
Uppost 0.009 
 (0.010) 
Upcurrent 0.002 
 (0.011) 
Uppre -0.017 
 (0.011) 
Downpost -0.051*** 
 (0.013) 
Downcurrent -0.075*** 
 (0.013) 
Downpre -0.004 
 (0.012) 
Prop Risk × Uppost -0.005 
 (0.021) 
Prop  Risk × Upcurrent -0.014 
 (0.023) 
Prop  Risk × Uppre -0.018 
 (0.024) 
Prop  Risk × Downpost -0.000 
 (0.026) 
Prop  Risk × Downcurrent 0.040 
 (0.026) 
Prop  Risk × Downpre 0.001 
 (0.025) 
Firm, Year Fixed Effect YES 
R2 0.250 
Observations 33,111 
Panel B: Variables Firm-Year-Line-State 
Level 
Log Premium t-1           -0.054*** 
     (0.002) 
Risky business × High    -0.055 
 (0.057) 
Risky business  × A- -0.035 
 (0.061) 
Risky business  × Low 0.018 
 (0.060) 
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES 
Line Fixed Effect YES 
State Fixed Effect YES 
R2 0.427 
Observations 198,468 
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Table 15  
Prices, Market Discipline and Guaranty Funds at Firm-Line-Year Level 
 
The dependent variables are ΔLog Pricet. The sample includes 120,533 observations with positive calculated 
insurance price as in Cummins and Danzon (1997) during 1991-2011. Firm Controls include Size, Leverage, 
Reinsurance, Group, Mutual, Geoherf, Busherf, and Direct writer. Guaranty fund controls include Reg%, Max%, 
Prov% and the interaction of Prop with a linear year trend. Firm-line fixed effects and year fixed effects are 
included in all fixed effects regressions. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm-line 
level and are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Variables OLS (1) F.E. (2)   OLS (3) F.E. (4)  
Log price t-1 -0.278*** -0.463*** -0.279*** -0.465*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Prop. of Uncovered Premiumt-1 — — 0.032*** 0.042 
   (0.007) (0.031) 
Uppost 0.009* 0.015*** 0.011** 0.019*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Upcurrent   0.014*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Uppre -0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Downpost -0.006 -0.009* 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Downcurrent  -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Downpre  -0.057*** -0.044*** -0.057*** -0.044*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Prop t-1 × Uppost — — -0.019 -0.033 
   (0.020) (0.021) 
Prop t-1 × Upcurrent — — -0.006 -0.012 
   (0.019) (0.020) 
Prop t-1 × Uppre — — -0.004 -0.005 
   (0.020) (0.022) 
Prop t-1 × Downpost — — -0.073*** -0.078*** 
   (0.022) (0.024) 
Prop t-1 × Downcurrent — — 0.013 0.007 
   (0.021) (0.022) 
Prop t-1 × Downpre — — -0.002 0.000 
   (0.020) (0.022) 
Anticipation —    -0.633*** — -0.600*** 
  (0.241)  (0.241) 
Constant 0.006***  -0.045   0.002 0.069 
 (0.002) (0.098) (0.002) (0.103) 
Firm-Line & Year  Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
Firm Controls NO YES NO YES 
Guaranty fund Controls NO NO NO YES 
R2 0.185 0.362 0.186 0.362 
Observations 120,533 120,533 120,533 120,533 
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Table 16 
Prices and Market Discipline at Firm-Line-Year Level based on Pre-change Rating Categories 
 
The dependent variables are ΔLog Pricet for the first two regressions. The sample includes 120,533 observations 
with positive calculated insurance price as in Cummins and Danzon (1997) during 1991-2011 for the first three 
regressions. Firm controls include Size, Leverage, Reinsurance, Group, Mutual, Geoherf, Busherf, Direct writer, 
anticipation and pre-change rating categories. Firm-line fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all fixed 
effects regressions. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm-line level and are 
reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables                                               OLS (1)                      F.E. (2)                            
Log price t-1 -0.279*** -0.465*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
High × Downpost 0.003 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
High × Downcurrent -0.013** -0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
High ×Downpre -0.055*** -0.048*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
A-× Downpost 0.000 -0.007 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
A- × Down current -0.090*** -0.078*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
A- × Downpre -0.081*** -0.067*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Low × Downpost -0.014 -0.017 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Low × Downcurrent -0.045*** -0.043*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) 
Low × Downpre -0.039*** -0.027** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
High × Uppost 0.015* 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
High × Upcurrent -0.013 -0.014 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
High × Uppre -0.023*** -0.013 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
A- × Uppost 0.014 0.023** 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
A- × Upcurrent 0.021**   0.034*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
A- × Uppre -0.019* -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
Low × Uppost 0.002 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Low × Upcurrent 0.045*** 0.045*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
Low × Uppre 0.045*** 0.042*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Fixed Effects & Firm Controls                 NO YES 
R2 0.187 0.362 
Observations 120,533 120,533 
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Table 17 
Prices, Market Discipline and Guaranty Funds at Firm-Line-Year Level based on Pre-change Rating 
Categories 
 
The dependent variable is ΔLog Pricet for the first three regressions. The sample period is 1991-2011. The sample 
consists of 120,533 observations with positive calculated insurance price. Fixed effects and Controls include firm-
line fixed effects, year fixed effects, Size, Group, Mutual, Geoherf, Busherf, Direct writer, Anticipation, Reg%, 
Max%, and Prov% and the interaction of Prop with a linear year trend. All regressions include upgrades, 
downgrades, pre-change rating categories, the interactions of rating change and pre-rating categories, and the 
interaction of Prop with pre-change rating categories. The third regression column shows the results of Two-Stage 
Least Square estimates of ΔLog Pricet. The proportion of uncovered premiums is instrumented by its value lagged of 
three years, Size, Geoherf, Busherf, Mutual and Group in the first stage of the 2SLS regression. The sample for the 
2SLS regression includes 118,539 since the data of 1991 is deleted. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm-line level and are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables OLS (1) F.E. (2)  2SLS (3) 
Prop t-1 × High × Downpost -0.074*** -0.071*** -0.072*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) 
Prop t-1 × High × Downcurrent 0.013 0.019 0.018 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) 
Prop t-1 × High ×Downpre -0.013 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) 
Prop t-1 × A-× Downpost -0.037 -0.042 -0.047 
 (0.066) (0.071) (0.072) 
Prop t-1 ×A- × Downcurrent -0.065 -0.101* -0.113* 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.059) 
Prop t-1 ×A- × Downpre -0.021 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.054) (0.057) (0.058) 
Prop t-1 × Low × Downpost -0.146* -0.178 -0.179 
 (0.080) (0.109) (0.111) 
Prop t-1 × Low × Downcurrent 0.067 0.031 0.090 
 (0.077) (0.088) (0.089) 
Prop t-1 × Low × Downpre 0.107* 0.024 0.001 
 (0.065) (0.078) (0.077) 
Prop t-1 × High × Uppost -0.063** -0.071** -0.083** 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.035) 
Prop t-1 × High × Upcurrent 0.055* 0.030 0.042 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) 
Prop t-1 × High × Uppre 0.028 0.012 0.018 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.035) 
Prop t-1 × A- × Uppost -0.052 -0.034 -0.036 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) 
Prop t-1 × A- × Upcurrent -0.112*** -0.061 -0.063 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.041) 
Prop t-1 × A- × Uppre -0.014 0.034 0.028 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.041) 
Prop t-1 × Low × Uppost 0.044 0.007 0.016 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.036) 
Prop t-1 × Low × Upcurrent 0.052 0.053 0.038 
 (0.038) (0.046) (0.049) 
Prop t-1 × Low × Uppre 0.000 -0.025 -0.056 
 (0.040) (0.046) (0.048) 
Fixed effects and Controls NO YES YES 
R2 0.187 0.363 0.360 
Observations 120,533 120,533 118,539 
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Table 18 
Market Discipline and Guaranty Funds at Firm-Line-Year Level after Controlling for Price 
 
The dependent variables are ΔLog Premium t for the regressions. The 2SLS regression uses predicted price growth, 
which is instrumented by lagged log price, rating vectors and firm and guaranty funds controls in the first stage. The 
sample period is 1991-2011. The sample consists of 120,533 observations with positive calculated insurance price. 
All regressions include upgrades, downgrades, pre-change rating categories, firm controls, and firm-line and year 
fixed effects. The second model also include Prop, guaranty fund controls, the interactions of rating change and pre-
rating categories, the interaction of Prop with pre-change rating categories, and the interaction of Prop with a linear 
year trend. Firm controls include Size, Group, Mutual, Geoherf, Busherf, Direct writer, Anticipation, Reg%; and 
guaranty funds controls include Max%, and Prov%. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered 
at firm-line level and are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables 2SLS (1)  Variables 2SLS (2) 
Predicted ΔLog Price t -0.043***  Predicted ΔLog Price t -0.071*** 
 (0.002)   (0.004) 
High × Downpost -0.018***  Prop t-1 × High × Downpost 0.010 
 (0.005)   (0.016) 
High × Downcurrent -0.030***  Prop t-1 × High × Downcurrent -0.001 
 (0.005)   (0.015) 
High ×Downpre -0.002  Prop t-1× High ×Downpre 0.018 
 (0.005)   (0.015) 
A-× Downpost -0.057***  Prop t-1 × A-× Downpost -0.054 
 (0.010)   (0.042) 
A- × Down current -0.120***  Prop t-1×A- × Downcurrent -0.178*** 
 (0.009)   (0.035) 
A- × Downpre 0.003  Prop t-1 ×A- × Downpre -0.002 
 (0.009)   (0.035) 
Low × Downpost -0.075***  Prop t-1 × Low × Downpost -0.025 
 (0.010)   (0.054) 
Low × Downcurrent -0.081***  Prop t-1 × Low × Downcurrent -0.181*** 
 (0.009)   (0.047) 
Low × Downpre 0.009  Prop t-1 × Low × Downpre -0.052 
 (0.009)   (0.045) 
High × Uppost -0.022***  Prop t-1 × High × Uppost -0.004 
 (0.007)   (0.020) 
High × Upcurrent -0.020***  Prop t-1 × High × Upcurrent 0.026 
 0.007   (0.020) 
High × Uppre -0.027***  Prop t-1 × High × Uppre -0.016 
 (0.007   (0.021) 
A- × Uppost -0.007  Prop t-1 × A- × Uppost 0.060*** 
 (0.007)   (0.022) 
A- × Upcurrent -0.012  Prop t-1 × A- × Upcurrent -0.022 
 (0.007)   (0.023) 
A- × Uppre -0.009  Prop t-1 × A- × Uppre -0.012 
 (0.007)   (0.024) 
Low × Uppost 0.030***  Prop t-1 × Low × Uppost -0.024 
 (0.006)   (0.022) 
Low × Upcurrent 0.039***  Prop t-1 × Low × Upcurrent 0.026 
 (0.006)   (0.027) 
Low × Uppre 0.009  Prop t-1 × Low × Uppre -0.036 
  (0.007)   (0.029) 
R2 0.126  R2 0.124 
Observations 120,533  Observations 120,533 
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Appendix A: Definitions of Independent Variables  
A. Firm and guaranty funds controls 
Various features of state guaranty funds might affect market discipline and our model 
attempts to control for these effects. Guaranty funds have a maximum claim payment, which 
may dampen the cost of undercutting market discipline. If there is a significant proportion of 
private loss in excess of the caps in the case of an insurer’s insolvency, policyholders might have 
additional incentive to monitor insurers. We construct a continuous variable Max% to represent 
the percentage of the insurer’s direct premium written in a state with maximum claim paid of 
guaranty fund exceeding $300,000.25 Another feature of state guaranty funds is net worth 
provisions. Given these provisions, wealthier policyholders have a greater incentive to monitor 
their insurers. We apply a continuous variable Prov% to represent the percentage of the insurer’s 
direct premium written in states with state guaranty funds that have the net worth provision 
above $25,000,000.26 More stringent rate regulation may dampen the impact of market discipline 
on prices, if the regulated rate is not a function of insurer risk. To account for rate regulation, we 
use Reg% (Grace and Leverty, 2010): it represents the percentage of the insurer’s direct premium 
written in states with strict rate regulation laws (with prior approval or state made rate 
regulation) for regulated lines such as medical malpractice, auto insurance, homeowner 
insurance and workers compensation at the firm-line-year level.27 
We also use a number of firm level control covariates that have been shown in previous 
research to affect the change of insurance premiums and prices. Although regulations forbid 
insurers to advertise guaranty funds in selling insurance policies, insurance agents and brokers 
are aware of guaranty funds and of insurer financial strength ratings. Accordingly, we control for 
insurer distribution channel by using Directw, which is an indicator variable that equals one if an 
insurer is a direct writer and zero otherwise. To account for firm business diversification we use 
product line Herfindahl index (Busherf) and geographic Herfindahl index (Geoherf), which are 
calculated by the sum of the squares of the percentages of direct premium written across all lines 
of business (all states for geographic Herfindahl index) for the insurer. Other firm characteristic 
                                                 
25 Workers compensation is treated as other lines covered by guaranty funds, although most states have infinite 
coverage for it. The reason is in many cases workers compensations are sold in insurance packages with other 
insurance contracts. Our results are very similar if we exclude workers compensation from our sample. 
 
26  
27  
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control variables are Size, the natural logarithm of total assets; Leverage, the ratio of total 
liability to total asset; Reinsurance, the ratio of premiums ceded to total premiums written; 
Mutual, a dummy variable set equal to one if the insurer is a mutual organization; and Group, an 
indicator if the firm belongs to some affiliated group. 
B. Default-value-to-liability ratio   
It is possible that insurers and markets anticipate the rating changes of some firms and 
thus react less to the rating changes. To control for this possibility, we use a continuous measure 
of insurer risk. Specifically, we calculate an insurer’s default-value-to-liability ratio (Risk) 
(Myers and Read, 2001):  
                  }{)1(}{),(   zNszNsfd       (A1)  
where  is the cumulative probability function for the standard normal variable,  is the 
surplus to liability ratio, 
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 , and  is the volatility of the asset to liability 
ratio. The overall firm’s volatility of the asset to liability ratio is calculated as 
2 2 2  V L VL      , where  is the volatility of insurer’s assets,    is the volatility of 
insurer’s liabilities, and   is the covariance of the natural logarithms of liabilities and assets. 
The respective volatilities are calculated by the following functions: 
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where  is the proportion of asset from asset type  to total asset, is the proportion of liabilities 
from line  to the loss liability,  is the correlation coefficient of the logarithms of asset 
classes and  with  number of asset classes28,  is the correlation coefficient of the 
logarithms of liability line and  with  number of lines of insurance business29, and  is the 
                                                 
28 Assets are divided into six classes: stocks, bonds, real estate, mortgages, cash and other invested, and other assets. 
29 Lines of insurance business are divided into 12 classes based on Schedule P. 
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correlation coefficient of the logarithms of liability line and asset . The volatilities and 
correlation matrix of insurers’ assets are calculated using industry wide quarterly time series of 
return for each asset30 and liability class31.  
C. Loss ratio and loss volatility and state variables 
 We have three variables as state time-variant controls in equation (3). First, we use 
employment in the insurance sector (Insurance Employment) divided by total state population as 
a proxy for the power of the insurance labor. Second, we use insurance gross state product per 
capita (Insurance GSP) as a proxy for the magnitude of economic size of insurance sector in a 
state. Income per capita (state income) is used to proxy the relative household wealth for each 
state each year. All above state variables are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Last, the number of insolvent insurers (insolvent insurers) in a state by year is used to proxy for 
policyholder knowledge about insurer insolvency. The variable is calculated as the count of the 
number of insurers that went insolvent in a year that are domiciled in a state. The list of insolvent 
firms is collected from the NAIC’s Global Receivership Information Database (GRID). We 
classify an insurer as insolvent if it is subject to proceedings for conservation of assets, 
rehabilitation, receivership, or liquidation in each year.  
 In equation (4), loss ratio is calculated as aggregated direct loss incurred divided by 
directed premium earned, for each line and each year. Loss volatility is calculated as the cross-
sectional standard deviation of losses incurred for each line and each year. Loss volatility is 
scaled by the cross-sectional standard deviation of premiums earned for each line and each year
                                                 
30 The quarterly estimates of the asset returns on the first five categories are obtained from the standard rate of return 
series: the total return on the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index for the stock returns, Moody’s corporate bond total 
return for the bond, the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts total return for the real estate, the 
Merrill Lynch mortgage backed securities total return for the mortgages, and 30 day US Treasury bill rate for the 
cash/other invested assets. The non-invested assets are calculated by the natural logarithm of the gross quarterly 
percentage change in the total value of asset of the insurance industry net of the value of the first five asset 
categories. 
31 The quarterly liability return series are defined as the natural logarithm of the present value of incurred losses 
divided by the earned premium for each quarter. 
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Appendix B: Insurance Price Calculation 
To disentangle quantity and price changes, we calculate insurance price growth 
( ). Since explicit contract prices are not available (i.e., we do not have information on 
prices at the contract level), we follow the literature and use an implicit measure of price (e.g. 
Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Cummins et al., 2005).  We measure price at the firm-line-year 
level. Specifically, Price for firm , line , in year , is defined as follows: 
 
jtijtijt
ijtijtijt
PVFLAENLI
EXPDIVNPW



)(
Priceijt      (B1) 
Where NPW is net premiums written, DIV is dividends to policyholders, EXP is underwriting 
expenses, NLI is net losses incurred, LAE is loss adjustment expenses incurred, and PVF is the 
present value factor for line , in year . Since premiums reflect the discounting of loss in a 
competitive market, losses incurred and loss adjustment expenses are discounted using a present 
value factor that accounts for differences in the payout pattern across insurance lines (e.g. long-
tail lines vs. short tail lines).  To calculate present value factors (PVF) we use information about 
how losses developed in the past to estimate how losses develop in the future. Specifically, we 
estimate payout proportions for each insurance line by applying the Taylor separation method 
(Taylor, 2002) to loss reserve data from the Schedule P of the regulatory annual statements.32 We 
discount these estimated future payments using US Treasury yields obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis. The estimation of payout tail proportions is akin to the method 
prescribed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for computing loss present values for tax 
purposes (Cummins 1990).                                                                      
                                                 
32 Schedule P of the NAIC regulatory annual statement aggregates each insurer’s lines of business into 12 
categories: homeowner/farmers, auto liability, commercial multiple peril, workers’ compensation, medical 
malpractice, special liability (ocean marine, aircraft and boiler & machinery), other liability, special property (fire, 
allied lines, inland marine, earthquake, burglary and theft), auto physical damages, fidelity/surety, other, and 
warranty. 
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Appendix C. Extra Tables and Figures 
Figure C.1 :  Premium Growth for Insurer Upgrades at Firm-Line-Years, 1991–2011 
The figure plots event time premium growth coefficients from estimation of equation (5) on the 1991–2011 panel. 
Panel A is premium growth for all insurer upgrades, panel B is for A- and lower rated insurer upgrades and Panel C 
is for higher rated insurer upgrades. The end points on the graph are binned so that −7 (+7) is a bin for years −7 to 
−20 (+20 to +7). The vertical axis measures ΔLog Premium. The coefficient for the last second year before a 
downgrade is normalized to zero. The bars show the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered by firm-
line level.   
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Table C.1 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression for Premium Growth and Price Growth 
 
The dependent variables are ΔLog Premiumt and ΔLog Pricet for the SUR regression. The sample includes 120,533 
observations with positive calculated insurance price as in Cummins and Danzon (1997) during 1991-2011. Firm 
controls, line fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in the regressions.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm-line level and are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
                                                             F.E.  (1)                      F.E. (2)                          Equality of  
                                                   (ΔLog Premiumt)            (ΔLog Pricet)                   Coefficients 
High × Downpost -0.038*** 0.000     26.96***    
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.000) 
High × Downcurrent -0.041*** -0.017*** 10.93***                
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) 
High ×Downpre -0.007 -0.051*** 33.25***    
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.000) 
A-× Downpost -0.087*** 0.005 31.54***    
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.000) 
A- × Downcurrent -0.137*** -0.088*** 10.05***    
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.001) 
A- × Downpre -0.005 -0.081*** 26.05***    
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.000) 
Low × Downpost -0.095*** -0.016 23.56***    
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.000) 
Low × Downcurrent -0.090*** -0.042*** 10.00***    
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.002) 
Low × Downpre 0.030*** -0.031*** 16.33***    
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.000) 
High × Uppost -0.008 0.020** 6.80 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
High × Upcurrent 0.004 -0.005 0.81 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.369) 
High × Uppre -0.006 -0.005 0.00 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.998) 
A- × Uppost -0.009 0.017* 4.85 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.028) 
A- × Upcurrent -0.004 0.030*** 8.04 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) 
A- × Uppre -0.008 -0.008 0.00 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.964) 
Low × Uppost    0.035*** 0.004  11.31*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) 
Low × Upcurrent    0.053*** 0.050*** 0.13 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.719) 
Low × Uppre   0.022*** 0.049*** 6.65*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Fixed Effects & Firm Controls YES YES — 
Observations 120,533 120,533 — 
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Table C.2  
Univariate Tests of Loss Ratio by Guaranty Fund Covered Status for Insurers with Covered Business and Uncovered Business, by Lines 
 
The table shows results of univariate tests for loss ratio across guaranty funds covered status for insurers with both covered business and uncovered business from 
1990 to 2011 by lines, in which loss ratio is calculated at the line by year level. Special liability includes ocean marine, aircraft, and boiler and machinery; special 
property includes fire, allied lines, inland marine, earthquake and burglary and theft; other includes credit, accident and health. The covered business is defined 
as premiums covered by guaranty funds and uncovered business is defined as premiums uncovered by guaranty funds at firm-line-state-years. Loss ratio is defined as 
directed loss incurred divided by directed premium earned, where direct loss incurred and direct premium earned are aggregated at the line by year level. The 
premium earned is scaled by 100,000,000. Significance of tests of differences in means and variance are based on a two-tailed t-test.   
 
Lines of Business  
Covered Business (1) Uncovered Business (2)  Difference of Loss Ratio  
 Loss Ratio 
Mean 
Loss Ratio 
Variance 
Premium 
Earned 
 Loss Ratio 
Mean 
Loss Ratio 
Variance 
Premium 
Earned 
Diff. of 
Mean 
Equality of 
Variances 
Homeowners / Farmowners     0.708 0.076 0.359 0.601 0.412 0.443 0.106   3.43** 
Auto Liability        0.631 0.022 4.337 0.774 0.031 1.381 -0.025 1.95 
Workers compensation    2.243 1.054 0.676 1.921 0.800 0.102 0.677 2.31 
Commercial Multiple Peril 0.565 0.067 2.399 0.578 0.064 2.675 0.005 1.13 
Medical Malpractice 0.699 0.046 3.315 0.819 0.695 1.894 -0.013 1.04 
Special Liability 0.600 0.045 17.327 0.632 0.026 14.837 -0.032   2.92** 
Other Liability 0.567 0.039 6.969 0.555 0.035 2.024 0.011 1.24 
Special Property 0.506 0.044 3.056 0.602 0.062 5.278 -0.096 2.03 
Auto Physical Damage 0.503 0.018 1.919 0.578 0.022 0.631 -0.076** 1.41 
Fidelity/Surety 0.394 0.039 9.702 0.332 0.032 32.450 0.062 1.43 
Other 0.663 0.011 6.552 0.666 0.013 47.067 -0.003 1.42 
Product Liability 0.726 0.221 0.311 0.571 0.056 2.234 0.155    14.93*** 
Fin. /Mortg.  Guaranty 0.654 0.189 2.512 0.685 0.153 44.22 -0.031 1.46 
Warranty 0.582 0.014 9.332 0.626 0.011 9.421 -0.044 1.63 
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Table C.3 
Impact of Guaranty funds on Market Discipline through Price (Direct Premium Written) at 
Firm-Line-State-Year Level 
 
The dependent variable is ΔLog Pricet. Price is calculated by direct premium written and direct loss 
incurred. The sample is at firm-line-state-year level and the period is 1990-2011. Regressions include only 
downgraded firms. Uncover equals 1 if the premiums in a state are uncovered by guaranty funds, 0 
otherwise. Traditional lines exclude ocean marine, fidelity, surety, credit, title, financial guaranty, health 
and accident, mortgage guaranty and warranty. The control variables include the logarithm of lagged price, 
a firm-line-year fixed effect and a state fixed effect. State time-variant variables are included in all 
regressions, which are insurance employment, insurance gross state product (GSP) and income. All state 
variables are scaled by state annual population. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered at firm-line-year level and are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked 
with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables All 
 Lines 
Traditional 
Lines 
Nontraditional 
Lines 
Personal  
Lines 
Commercial 
Lines 
Log Price t-1    -0.378*** 
(0.003) 
-0.380*** 
(0.003) 
-0.343*** 
(0.010) 
  -0.398*** 
(0.008) 
-0.376*** 
(0.003) 
Uncover × High -0.045 
(0.055) 
0.125 
(0.035) 
-0.172** 
(0.074) 
-0.338 
(0.282) 
       -0.041 
(0.055) 
Uncover × A- -0.069 
(0.086) 
-0.055 
(0.107) 
0.009 
(0.157) 
-0.156 
(0.296) 
-0.065 
(0.089) 
Uncover × Low -0.203** 
(0.098) 
-0.137 
(0.104) 
-0.299 
(0278) 
  -0.361*** 
(0.025) 
-0.199** 
(0.100) 
Insurance GSP 0.002  
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.023 
(0.024) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
State Income   0.007   
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
-0.063 
 (0.055) 
0.007 
(0.028) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
Insurance Employment    0.011***  
(0.003) 
  0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003  
(0.014) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Firm-Line-Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.292 0.292 0.328 0.275 0.299 
Observations 145,788 138.653 7,135 27,609 118,179 
